

HEMISPHERES

The Tufts University
Journal of International Affairs

Vol. 22, 1999

SPECIAL FEATURE

The Nuclear Age and the Changing
Face of Global Conflict

Interview with Noam Chomsky

Photographic Exploration

Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Fallout

Iraq and the UN: The Showdown

ESSAYS

Ethnic Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy: The American Jewish
Community and the \$10 Billion Loan Guarantee
by Scott Roehm

Who Loves the Euro?

by Tara Guberski



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Established in 1976, *Hemispheres* is the Tufts University Journal of International Affairs. The journal addresses a variety of social, economic, political and legal issues, both contemporary and historical, within the framework of international relations. The articles contained herein reflect diverse views of undergraduates at Tufts as well as other universities. While the Editorial Board is solely responsible for the selection of articles appearing in *Hemispheres*, the Board does not accept responsibility for any opinions or biases contained within. Submissions should be addressed to: Editorial Board, *Hemispheres*, Box 633 Mayer Campus Center, Tufts University, Medford, MA 02155. Submissions are due February 15, 2000 (hard copy and IBM formatted disk please).



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Editor's Note

Traditionally, the *Hemispheres* Editors' Note has been the work of two individuals. However, this year a set of unusual circumstances dictated the presence of a sole editor and a much-compromised staff. Thus, rather than discuss strictly world affairs issues in the Editor's Note, I thought it would be pertinent to discuss the process involved in assembling *Hemispheres*.

Above all, *Hemispheres* is an experiment in human cooperation and interaction. What I as an editor and we as a staff have learned has more to do with human nature and sacrifice than with our individual specialties within International Relations. As a staff, we faced many obstacles, either those placed there by circumstance or those placed there by other individuals. Fortunately, we were also assisted by many friends who were with us throughout production. People like John Jenke and Omar Rocca of the International Relations department contributed invaluable advice and material assistance to *Hemispheres*, and were solid pillars of support to which we could always turn. The Offices of the Vice President, the History Department, and the Tufts Council on International Affairs all contributed financial assistance to the publishing process without which *Hemispheres* could not have been produced on time. I would like to thank the TCU senate, for their encouragement, support, and in some cases, a BMW. I would also like to thank Mr. Reynaldo Reyes of the UN Photo Library, Mr. Ewen Buchanan of UNSCOM, and Mr. George Capaccio for their help in compiling the photo presentation. Finally, I would like to thank Linda for her continual support and patience and *Hemispheres* Treasurer Stacia Neeley for her help when others did not have the time.

This year's *Hemispheres* is undoubtedly one of the most ambitious. Reflecting the rapid pace of international events and issues, *Hemispheres* attempts to capture the broad range of issues that typify International Relations today. Scott Roehm's article on ethnic influence in US foreign policy formulation explores the question of whether or not US foreign policy should be a reflection of the people's will or that of one ethnic lobby. A candid interview with Professor Noam Chomsky analyzes US involvement in the international arena in an economically globalized world. Finally, among the host of fine articles contained within *Hemispheres*, a Photographic Exploration features the past and present of International conflict in the contexts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the United Nations and Iraq. I hope that you find the articles contained within *Hemispheres* to be reflective of the care and effort the staff has placed in selecting them.

Abdallah W. Simaika
Editor-in-Chief

Trade Reform and the Food Crisis in Sub-Saharan Africa

Liz Carlson

African countries rank among the lowest in the world on the United Nations Development Program's Human Development Index. Of the 43 countries ranked "lowest human in development," all but 11 are African. The lowest 20 countries, with the exception of Haiti, are all African. According to the UNDP, Sierra Leone is the least developed country in the world.¹ In order to raise its ranking, this country would have to raise its per capita GDP, improve access to education and increase life expectancy.

The chances of these changes happening in Sierra Leone or almost anywhere in Sub-Saharan Africa are slim. African per capita GDP is falling; between 1980 and 1992, it fell at a rate of 0.8% per year.² The external debt to GDP ratio is nearly 100 percent (or more) in many countries, with an additional 20% for debt service payments, leaving little money left over for investment, infrastructure, and human services.³

As with anywhere in the developing world, foreign capital flows have decreased, but foreign investment is lowest in Africa. While the region receives the most official development assistance of the developing world, this is also shrinking in magnitude.⁴

Per capita agricultural productivity has also been declining over the last decade. This decline does not represent an actual decrease in output, but rather, an increase in population. Nevertheless, it threatens to erode food security, both by limiting staple crops grown domestically and by reducing incomes needed to import the difference. This shortage has factored into Africa's life expectancy calculations. Between ten and twenty percent of

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African children die before their fifth birthday; 40% from malnutrition and many more from diseases that a well-nourished child could probably have avoided. The World Bank estimates that three children die every minute from hunger-related causes.⁵ An increase in production of goods to be sold in a local market is imperative; imports are often poor substitutes. While imports are often cheaper than domestic staples, they are more expensive per calorie than locally grown grains. Additionally, since much of Africa lacks adequate transportation technology, perishables, like fruits, must be bought from local producers.

In this essay, I will examine the causes of Africa's low food productivity, focusing on the role played by international trade. I argue that the cash crop-based economy encouraged by trade has negatively affected domestic production of food crops. Additionally, I will analyze the effects of the Uruguay Round and the Fair Trade Initiative, two attempts to mitigate the crisis by reforming problematic terms of trade. Both of these solutions have the potential to boost domestic production. Given inappropriate domestic policy however, their benefits may be limited and even have negative consequences.

Constraints on African agriculture

If food availability is to increase, farmers must be willing to grow more crops than what they need for their own subsistence. Mark Chona, a Zairian farmer, explains, "It is a very hard job and you require very strong incentives to get people into farming and ensure they stay there."⁶ Unfortunately, African farmers do not receive many incentives; instead they face a number of constraints. First, they are limited by environmental factors. Fertile soil is created by erosion from mountains, but Sub-Saharan Africa has no major mountain ranges. As a result, soil is easily depleted of nutrients. Also low in clay, the soil cannot effectively retain moisture. Good soil is associated with hilly regions, where erosion is more problematic and irrigation is difficult. More than 90% of the region suffers from moderate to severe soil constraints.⁷

Rainfall patterns in Africa are not conducive to growing crops. Rain does not fall with any kind of consistency. Long droughts are followed by torrential rains, which leach more nutrients from the soil and drown crops. The lengths of these droughts and storms are unpredictable. The dramatic effects can be seen in the drought-caused famines in southern Africa in 1992 and in Ethiopia in 1994.⁸ Africa's declining market share of coffee, tea, and cotton between 1970 and 1984 has also been partially attributed to drought.⁹

Second, agricultural productivity is limited by labor shortages. Flight to

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urban centers has lowered rural populations, as have deaths from armed conflict and the AIDS epidemic. Women, who comprise up to 70 percent of the agricultural force, are overburdened: in addition to farming, they must raise children, maintain the household, prepare meals and scavenge for fuel. The situation becomes worse when able-bodied men leave villages for months at a time to look for work in larger towns.¹⁰

Both these climatic and labor constraints could be mitigated with technology. Unfortunately, Africa faces a third constraint in its lack of access to even simple advances. For example, under the structural adjustment program, African governments were forced to end all price maintenance and subsidies to farmers. Subsequently, farmers are no longer able to afford chemical inputs; in 1989, only 18% of Ghanaian farmers reported using chemical fertilizers and 30% had never used any kind of chemical.¹¹ In Burkina Faso, fertilizer purchases have plateaued since the 1980s.

If farming were to become more profitable, more farmers would be willing and able to add inputs to their fields, invest in technologies or hire more workers. Unfortunately, demand for local goods is low; African peasants simply do not have enough available income to create a market for food goods. This lack of demand is the key to Africa's food crisis; the most important incentive for production—the expectation of profits—is missing.

Trade and domestic productivity

Trade can be seen as one of the driving factors behind Africa's low production. The poor terms of trade between Africa and the North result in low incomes for export producers, which decrease their purchasing power. Unfair practices of developed nations lock Africa into this unprofitable primary production and lower competitiveness of domestic goods. Additionally, Africa's export-oriented economy encourages cash crops, which usurp resources from food production.

Being the producer of primary goods is unprofitable because a primary product gains value with each step from producer to wholesaler to retailer. The more steps, the smaller the portion of the final price that reaches the producer. As Julius Nyerere, former president of Zaire explains, Africa is a "price taker;" either it takes the price offered, or it does not sell its products.¹² For African producers, the UN estimates that number to be about 15% of the retail price. Even this percent does not reflect costs; consumers may end up with as little as 1-2 percent.¹³ Additionally, prices are dropping for many of Africa's most important com-

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modities as supply outstrips demand: incomes from coffee exports are expected to be slightly lower in 2000 than they were in 1988.¹⁴ The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development forecasts that in the cocoa market there will be "increasing over-supply and consequently persistent lower prices."¹⁵ Tea stands out as an exception to the rule, with an expected increase in both price and market share for African teas.¹⁶ However, even the tea market can be flooded when tea is simultaneously harvested during the rainy season in Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda.¹⁷ Obviously, price fluctuations affect producers most; middlemen can buffer their losses by passing on the cuts to the producer, but producers can only harm their own productivity by cutting back on inputs. Because the production of cash crops accounts for 75% of the labor force, these low and unstable prices can lessen the purchasing power of a large segment of the population and significantly decrease aggregate demand.

One of the key ways in which producers could increase and stabilize the prices they receive for their goods would be to process them. Prices gain value as they become more processed. For example, cocoa producers could get more profit from selling cocoa butter or chocolate than they do from selling plain beans. Unfortunately, African countries are restricted from processing their goods by a process known as tariff escalation: at each level of production, tariffs in the importing (usually developed) country become higher. A cocoa producer can export cocoa beans duty free to the United States, but cocoa powder, cocoa butter, and chocolate each become more expensive relative to products manufactured domestically in the importing country. It is virtually impossible for primary producers to break into the processed goods market, and they end up producing low-value primary goods. As a result, as long as tariff escalation exists, there is little chance that demand for local goods will increase.

Demand is further lowered by the availability of cheap imports. An export-oriented economy is also an import-oriented economy. The premise being that, rather than being self-sufficient, farmers will gain income from exports and use that income to import what food they need. Africa's food imports are mostly comprised of grains grown in developed countries. These countries can afford to subsidize their goods, artificially lowering prices. These cheap imports flood African markets reducing the competitiveness of domestic goods. Demand, prices, and thus farmer's willingness to produce these goods have also declined.

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Cash crops like cocoa, coffee and tea are the main exports of many African nations. Encouraged by trade, they can end up usurping resources that could be going towards domestic production. The numbers suggest that, as a whole, farmers have not switched from domestic to cash crops. Only 10% of agriculture is devoted to cash cropping, and most farmers who grow cash crops also grow their own subsistence foodstuffs. However, cash crops consistently take the best land, while food crops take what is left. In Kenya, cash crops are grown not only on the best land, but also on almost the only arable land.¹⁸ Whereas traditional crops are rotated to preserve soil fertility and moisture, cash crops are grown as monocultures and further deplete the soil. The land on which cash crops have been grown becomes unsuitable for both cash and food crops. In addition to environmental resources, cash crops take economic resources as well. What meager government funding goes to research and training in agriculture goes almost entirely to developing cash crops.

Trade Solutions

The Uruguay Round and the Fair Trade Initiative attempt to rectify the problems caused by unfair terms of trade. The Round's solution is found in an international agreement to liberalize trade through the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers, such as subsidies. The Fair Trade Initiative approaches the issue through business. Retailers who wish to be part of the Initiative agree to directly pay producers higher, more stable prices than they would receive on the world market. Both of these solutions have the potential to increase food security.

The Uruguay Round

The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade began in Uruguay in 1986. The Final Act of 1994 established the World Trade Organization and ensured a close working relationship between the WTO, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.¹⁹ The Act reached agreements regarding many sectors of trade, including textiles and services, but most notably, it was the first agreement to focus on trade liberalization in the agricultural sector. The agricultural agreement had three goals: abolition of subsidies which artificially depress prices, reduction of duties which make exporting costly, and reduction of tariff barriers which make imports less competitive. By making the trade regime more reflective of natural comparative advantage, these changes were intended to allow Third World products to be more competitive in

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developed countries as well in their own markets.

Increased demand and prices for exports have benefited producers in almost all of the developing world. In Africa, however, it is generally agreed that the Uruguay Round has led to losses. Many of the "gains" of the Uruguay Round actually have little effect on Africa and can even harm producers. The region is already party to several international and bilateral preferential trade agreements that have lowered—if not eliminated—tariffs on primary goods. Therefore, the Uruguay Round does not help Africa, but rather allows other nations to catch up to the region's preferential status (a process known as preference erosion). In Ghana and Cote d'Ivoire, prices for key agricultural exports have actually dropped as a direct result of the Round. The world price of cocoa is estimated to fall 0.7 percent, coffee is to drop 1.5 percent and fruit 1.4 percent.²⁰ Tariff escalation for cocoa has actually increased due to the Round, making it harder for African nations to gain increased income from processing this key crop.²¹ The consequence that is most relevant to the region, as a whole, is the lowering of subsidies in developed countries, which will raise the prices of Africa's imports (mostly grains from the North). The increase in import prices is expected to be US \$19.9 billion.

Estimates of the effects of the Uruguay Round on Africa's economy vary. Though some project an increase of up to 1% due to larger export markets, most analysts predict a loss of up to half a percent of the region's combined GDP. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations projects an increase in import prices of \$6.5 billion, with 17% of this increase due to the Uruguay Round. (The rest would be caused by an increase in the amount of food imported to support the rapidly growing population.) In this scenario, the trade deficit is expected to rise to \$12 billion.²² Other estimates, however, predict an overall loss as high as \$8.2 billion.²³

These policies are clearly causing immediate losses and doing little to encourage exports. However, as Pierre-Victor Mpoyo writes, "In the long term, import substitution is better than export promotion." By increasing import prices, the Uruguay Round will do exactly what it set out to do, making domestic goods more competitive relative to imported goods. Cheap imports lower the demand for domestic goods; expensive imports will do the opposite. It is important to note that although an overall loss is predicted, Africa is expected to gain \$16.6 billion from the reduction

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of trade barriers on its exported products. If this increase could be channeled towards domestic, instead of foreign goods, demand would skyrocket. In this way, the Uruguay Round can encourage an increase in domestic production.

Fair Trade Initiative

The Fair Trade Initiative also has the potential to increase local productivity by increasing demand, stabilizing prices and encouraging investment in human capital. Most importantly, it can do this without causing some of the losses associated with Uruguay Round. Instead of encouraging production by making imports unaffordable, the Fair Trade Initiative increases demand by increasing resources.

The Fair Trade Initiative began in the 1960s under the title Alternative Trade. The most well known of the early trade organizations is Oxfam International, which traded mostly locally made handicrafts. The first organization formed specifically to handle the trade of agricultural products was the Max Havelaar Foundation. More have followed suit, including such megacorporations as the Body Shop and Safeway Stores. Products that are registered with the organizations receive a "Fair Trade Mark," signifying that the producers who sold the product received a fair price for their product. The extra cost is passed on to consumers, who are willing to pay the extra price for the benefit it gives to the producer.

Products that are eligible for this type of label are commodities generally produced in the Third World, which do not require excessive processing before they are sold. This includes items such as coffee, tea, honey and bananas, but excludes most minerals and oil. Any retailer wishing to receive a Fair Trade Mark must meet requirements that help mitigate the effects of unfair trade. In order to prevent the concentration of profits in the hands of large multinational corporations, and to reduce price mark-ups, the products must be bought directly from the small farmer organizations or plantations.

In order to mitigate the effects of price fluctuation, Fair Trade organizations establish a minimum price to be paid for products handled under the initiative. To this price a surcharge is added. These surcharges go to the farmer's organization, to be spent in a way that improves the community as a whole. If the creditors so wish, retailers must offer credit up to 60% of the value of the harvest, so that farmers can afford to add inputs to their field before they

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plant. Retailers must also plan to nurture long term trading relations and abide by basic labor and environmental guidelines.

The Fair Trade Initiative has the potential to increase domestic productivity in a number of ways. The first is by simply increasing income at a local level. Cash crop farmers' incomes can be directly increased by the implementation of minimum prices, and the community projects funded by surcharges can also save families money, effectively increasing their disposable income. For example, in Tanzania, the Fair Trade Initiative provided a village with the opportunity to construct its own maize-grinding mill. This project saves farmers the cost of sending the maize elsewhere to be ground, which can be up to 10% of their salary.²⁴

This increase in income, Delgado explains, can "stimulate local employment through net increases in production of farm and non-farm goods and services that could otherwise not be sold." A study by the International Food Policy Research Institute supports this conclusion. The study found that each extra dollar of income to rural households increases expenditure by one to two dollars. Most of this money is spent on local products, which account for three-fourths of local employment and the majority of local income.²⁵ Hence, the extra income provided to the small subset of the community could increase incomes and the standard of living for a much larger group of people, who will also spend their surplus on local goods. Since Africans in any income bracket spend approximately 68% of their income on food, demand for food will presumably increase. As demand for, and subsequently, the price of domestic food products increases, it may also spur an increase in agricultural output.

A second way that the Fair Trade Initiative can increase production is by mitigating the worst effects of price fluctuations. Third World producers are especially hard hit by fluctuations, since many of them are dependent on one or two crops, and there are no state safety nets in place as there are in the developed world. While low profits decrease the purchase of chemical inputs (or other inputs like seeds or irrigation), it is uncertainty about the market that causes them not to be used when they are available. Farmers are not sure whether their investments will bring them money. They also do not know if prices will be enough to support their families' food needs for the next year, so they are likely to save any surplus income. According to Eboe Hutchful, "Farmers are extremely sensitive to weather and price fluctuations, and respond to uncertainties by cutting back or delaying application of fertilizers."²⁶ In

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addition, retailers are responsible for providing credit to producers in advance of the harvest, for the express purpose of increasing inputs.

Finally, the Fair Trade Initiative can improve productivity through education. In the least developed countries, average school enrollment stands at 36% (as opposed to 57% in the most developed third).²⁷ In African countries, most students do not complete primary school.²⁸ Much of this low enrollment is due to the prohibitive costs of tuition and school uniforms that are no longer subsidized by the state under structural adjustment policies. Education is consistently a top priority of Fair Trade Initiative farmers, and the "free money" provided by the organization is frequently put towards education. Extra income is put aside for uniforms and supplies, while community funds are often oriented towards paying for tuition, and occasionally even construction of new schools.²⁹ The organizations may also use their own resources to educate the adults in the community.

An increase in the education of people in rural communities can help mitigate the food crisis. The UNDP describes education as one of the "most powerful forces for growth."³⁰ A World Bank study of African farmers shows a rate of return for education of 26%, and found that education can also result in higher output from newly introduced technology.³¹ The Zimbabwean Farmer's Association attributes much of its success in increasing productivity to increasing the education of farmers.³²

The education of women is also particularly important. Since women make up the bulk of the agricultural labor force, their productivity level is key. Education may make women more productive by relieving some of the burdens they bear responsibility for. For example, simply providing women with the ability to make efficient cook-stoves can save hours per day of looking for fuel. Educated women will also have more say in household and community decisions. This increases the chances that the crops grown and the technology used are well suited to their constraints. Additionally, educated women have fewer children and along with increasing productivity, population control is the solution to the per capita food shortage.

Like the Uruguay Round, the Fair Trade Initiative has the potential to increase food production by increasing demand for it. Through education and encouragement of inputs, the Fair Trade Initiative can also enhance the productivity of the farmers themselves. This is markedly different from the incentive system of the Uruguay Round, which focuses not on gains, but on avoid-

ing losses. In an ideal situation, the gains in aggregate income could even buffer the losses of increased import prices caused by the Round.

Domestic Constraints

Both the Uruguay Round and the Fair Trade Initiative have the potential to increase domestic food production in the African region. However, as Peter Harrold writes, "It must be concluded that the most important reaction required... is the pursuit of trade reform at the country level." The effectiveness of these trade-oriented solutions is limited by the domestic policies of African states. Many of these policies decrease the incentives of producing for the domestic market independent of the changes in the international arena.

Amjadi and Yeats argue that in order to mitigate the losses incurred by African countries as a result of the Uruguay Round, they must implement reforms "to ensure that prices paid to domestic producers increase in line with international prices (thus stimulating a local supply response)." This concern arises from the fact that many African governments have historically attempted to control the prices of agricultural goods. In order to ensure that urban populations could afford foodstuffs—and to ensure advantages for large, politically active farms—prices were depressed. In Kenya, in the mid 1980s, three quarters of smallholders were receiving prices for their crops that were below the world price.³³ Regardless of the effects that trade reform might have on increasing demand, farmers who know that prices will not rise with demand will not increase their production.

In countries like Ghana, where price controls have never played a large role, or where structural adjustment has opened up food markets, the biggest problem has been poor infrastructure.³⁴ Bad roads and expensive transport systems make trading across regions difficult and means that much arable land will not get used. Michael Westlake of the FAO writes that money freed up from parastatals should be redirected into "infrastructure provision, especially roads and markets" in addition to "well organized and properly funded market information systems," and "advisory services, in areas such as business management, pest control, and the provision of advice to farmers on input usage."³⁵

In general, there has been too little attention paid to agriculture relative to its importance in the economy to ever accomplish these goals. Most governments spend an average of 10% of their GDP on enhancing agricultural productivity through research, technology or education. As mentioned above,

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almost all of this is invested in cash crops. Understandably, farmers feel shortchanged, and view developments that help cash crops less positively than they do those that benefit cash crops.³⁶ The fact that farmers express feeling constrained by domestic policy suggests that increased demand from trade alone may not be able to increase production. African governments need to alter their policies towards agriculture if trade reforms are to be effective.

In fact, if demand increases while domestic policy constrains supply, the Uruguay Round and the Fair Trade Initiative may have negative results. If domestic production does not increase, people will have no recourse but to purchase goods whose prices have been inflated due to the Uruguay Round. Additionally, as demand increases and is not followed by supply, prices of domestic food will also increase, making it harder for people to afford food of any kind.

Clearly, the benefit that African countries can gain from the Uruguay Round and Fair Trade Initiative is limited by the policies of the countries themselves. The policies that exist in these countries can actually make the food security situation worse by increasing demand without increasing productivity. If they wish to increase food security, African governments must be willing to invest in improving infrastructure and human capital in the agricultural sector.

Conclusion

As per capita agricultural productivity in Africa falls, it becomes clear that the reason behind this decline is a lack of incentives for farmers to produce beyond subsistence levels. Demand for domestic goods is low because people have little money to spend on food, and when they do purchase food, they are drawn to cheaper imports. The Uruguay Round and the Fair Trade Initiative both offer potential solutions to the food crisis by increasing demand for local foodstuffs. The Round's potential to boost income comes from the same policy that is causing Africa's short-term losses: the increase of import prices. As people substitute away from imports, they will begin to purchase domestic foodstuffs.

The Fair Trade Initiative also encourages production by creating more demand. Rather than forcing a switch to avoid higher costs, Fair Trade boosts the available income of African cash crop farmers, simply allowing them to spend more. The Fair Trade Initiative also increases the productivity of the farmers themselves: price stabilization may make farmers more willing to invest in their fields, and education makes new technology more beneficial.

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The potential benefit of these trade policies is limited by the domestic policies of the African nations themselves. Domestic policies have set maximum prices on goods that do not rise with world prices, keeping incentives to farmers low even in the event of increased demand. Also, governments have generally neglected the agricultural sector. Infrastructure is badly needed for the transport of foodstuffs, yet governments are unwilling to devote resources to improving necessary support structures. No matter what the Uruguay Round and the Fair Trade Initiative do to increase demand, until domestic policies are reformed, incentives to farmers will not be great enough to spur an increase in production. Indeed, these trade reforms, when combined with poor domestic policy, may simply make Africa's food crisis more severe.

- 1 UNDP Human Development Index
- 2 Chege. Pg. 309.
- 3 Ibid. Pg. 332.
- 4 Stallings. Pg. 143-49.
- 5 Mikell. Pg. 261
- 6 Obasanjo and d'Orville, Pg. 74.
- 7 Harrison, Pg. 348.
- 8 Chege, Pg. 315.
- 9 Ibid., Pg. 318.
- 10 Based on discussion in Mikell, Pg. 313-315
- 11 Hutchful, Pg. 163.
- 12 McGinnis, Pg. 67.
- 13 Barret Brown and Tiffen, Pg. 97-98.
- 14 Ibid., Pg. 42.
- 15 Madeley, p. 32.
- 16 Barret Brown and Tiffen, p. 58.
- 17 Mason.
- 18 World Facts and Maps 1997, p. 137.
- 19 Graham.
- 20 "Developing Countries and the Uruguay Round", p. 11, 30.
- 21 Harrold.
- 22 "Uruguay Round Analysis."
- 23 Ibid.
- 24 Cowe.
- 25 Delgado, p. 165.

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- 26 Hutchful, p. 167.
- 27 UNDP Human Development Index.
- 28 Appleton and McKinnon, p. 110.
- 29 Cowe.
- 30 Human Development Report 1997. Pg. 8.
- 31 Sub-Saharan Africa, From Crisis to Sustainable Growth. p.77.
- 32 Obasanjo and D'Orville, p. 81.
- 33 Peterson, pg. 69.
- 34 Hutchful, p. 163.
- 35 Westlake, p. 4.
- 36 Ibid, p.2.

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Ethnic Influence in U.S. Foreign Policy: The American Jewish Community and the \$10 Billion Loan Guarantee

by Scott Roehm

With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged from the Cold War as the world's sole military and economic superpower. However, the hegemonic status that the U.S. now enjoys is accompanied by a serious dilemma: how does this nation define a coherent foreign policy based on national interests in the absence of a true enemy? With the dissolution of the U.S.' major antagonist, the influence of domestic interest groups on foreign policy initiatives has increased considerably. Ethnic lobbies have a greater voice in the U.S.' actions vis à vis the international community than they have ever had, and are taking advantage of this opportunity to promote their individual interests. The presence, and arguably prominence, of these ethnic groups in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy has been met with both positive and negative responses.

Professor Tony Smith argues that while ethnic constituencies certainly deserve a voice in the decision making processes of the U.S. government,

American power in world affairs is not to be divided up among ethnic constituencies to be used as they will, without the greater community being consulted, its interests protected, and its representatives determining national policy based on some idea of the common good.¹

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In contrast, Author Yossi Shain argues that "in many ways,...the participation of ethnic diasporas in the shaping of U.S. foreign policy is a truly positive phenomenon."² Before coming to any conclusions concerning the benefits, or lack thereof, of ethnic involvement in United States foreign policy, it is necessary to understand how and why, historically, ethnic groups have succeeded in influencing the U.S.' actions in the international arena.

The U.S. is, and has always been, a nation of immigrants held together by what Samuel Huntington calls the "American creed," a shared belief in "...a set of universal ideas and principles articulated in the founding documents by American leaders: liberty, equality, democracy constitutionalism, liberalism, limited government, private enterprise."³ That the U.S. was founded on such ideals, rather than on a common heritage and culture, created a feeling of exceptionalism among its citizens. Their system was one in which "...no proper identity or interest [existed] other than the multiple interests of all its people."⁴ Although committed to these liberal democratic ideals, citizens of the new nation did not always practice the values of tolerance and respect for others seemingly inherent in its founding principles. The forced enslavement of African Americans is as egregious a violation of the supposed "American creed" as is imaginable. Although few groups in the U.S. have suffered as African Americans have, as immigration to the U.S. increased, new immigrants, seeking their own voice in the government, were also greeted with intolerance.

With the possible exception of the Irish attempting to involve the U.S. in conflicts with Great Britain in the late 19th century, it was not until a huge wave of Europeans immigrated to the U.S. in the early 20th century that "...the ethnic factor [became] a general aspect of the making of American foreign policy."⁵ Much to the dislike of many Americans, the general trend of the most active ethnic groups during the first few decades of the 20th century was to limit American involvement in world affairs. For example, German Americans, with the help of other ethnic groups, particularly the Irish, fought to keep the U.S. in a position of neutrality during the World War I, and forestalled the U.S.' entry into the League of Nations immediately following the war. It was not until post-World War II, and the onset of the Cold War, that the effect of ethnic involvement in foreign policy began to change. The atrocities of Nazism and the imposing threat of international communism created a true na-

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tional interest in the realm of foreign policy to which most ethnic groups subordinated their own agendas (that is those that did not already coincide with existing U.S.' foreign policy goals). Along with developments in the international arena, domestically, the anti-war and Civil Rights movements contributed to the legitimization of ethnic involvement in foreign policy. According to former Tufts student, Will Cruse, these domestic challenges and the new international environment "...forced the United States to fully embrace its liberal democratic creed at home in order to maintain credibility abroad."⁶

Whether or not one sees ethnic group influence in the formulation of U.S. foreign policy as a positive or negative phenomenon, it is a reality which stems from the nature of American democracy and the structure of the American political system. The right of special interest groups to participate in the decision making processes of the U.S. is inherent in the principles upon which this country was founded. Although the term multiculturalism did not appear in political and social jargon until recently, the U.S. has always been, albeit in varying degrees, a multiculturalist society. Soon after the massive wave of immigration in the early 20th century it became clear that the melting pot was not working. Some immigrants faced discrimination in their attempts to assimilate, others struggled to retain aspects of their own culture against proponents of "Americanization." The result was, and still is, a society composed of many different ethnic groups, all of which have the right and responsibility to participate in American government, including the formation of U.S. foreign policy.

Moreover, the system of checks and balances upon which the government of the U.S. is based decentralizes American politics, facilitating ethnic group involvement in political decision making. Primary elections, especially for the House of Representatives, are "...the surest (or easiest) means of access for citizens to the political system."⁷ Because public officials enter government through local elections, it is quite possible that they will be "...as responsive to their constituents as to their party leadership."⁸ That is to say, certain groups in the local electorate, through avenues such as voting solidarity and/or campaign financing, may have greater control over the actions of representatives than is apparent. This leads to increased influence in the political decision making process, including that of foreign policy.

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Those who doubt the ability of ethnic groups to affect the American political process, specifically foreign policy, need only look to the American Jewish community. Although they comprise only a small portion of the U.S. population, this ethnic constituency enjoys a degree of influence in Washington shared by few other special interest groups. The following section explores how the Jewish community takes advantage of American democracy, in both the political and ideological sense, in order to influence American foreign policy.

The American Jewish Lobby

While the structure of the American political system allows special interests groups a voice in the making of U.S. foreign policy, not all groups share the same degree of influence in Washington. In order to have any affect on the political decision making processes, special interest groups must have real, or at least perceived, power in one of three areas: voting, finance (most effectively used in campaign financing), or organization.⁹ Many ethnic groups do have some power in one of these three areas and use it with varying degrees of success to compensate for a lack of power in the others. For example, African Americans are not a particularly wealthy ethnic constituency, but they are united by shared ideals and can therefore make their presence felt through block voting. What makes the Jewish community unique, and incredibly influential, is that it has power in all three of these areas.

Clearly the strength of the Jewish lobby is augmented by the U.S.' historically amicable relationship with Israel. The existence of a stable ideological companion in a region as unstable as the Middle East is of great strategic importance to the U.S. But it is the combination of voting power, financial success, and organizational ability that has resulted in the American Jewish community's disproportionate degree of influence in the American political process. Led by American Israel Political Action Committee, "the most powerful, best-run, and effective foreign policy interest group in Washington,"¹⁰ this ethnic group has enjoyed a voice in the foreign policy making of the U.S. rivaled by no other.

Despite the fact that the American Jewish community does not comprise a large portion of the national population, they have considerable voting power. This is attributable to several key factors. First, American Jewry votes together. As a socially progressive, liberal ethnic group,

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Jews vote overwhelmingly Democratic, and do so on a rather consistent basis. Second, the Jewish community votes disproportionately to its size in important areas. For example, while they constitute only 3% of the national population, in 1992, Jews made up over 9% of the population of New York. This geographic concentration is augmented by the fact that Jews tend to vote more than other groups. To again use New York as an example, Tony Smith argues that “since they are overwhelmingly Democrats, Jewish New Yorkers probably constitute...15% of Democratic voters; and since they tend to vote at twice the levels of the state average, they may perhaps account for 30% of all the votes cast in a Democratic primary in that State.”¹¹ A concentration of Jewish voters in strategically significant states helps to explain the political clout that this ethnic group enjoys in Washington.

Another component of this group’s power lies in the fact that the American Jewish community is wealthy. Not only have many Jewish Americans been extremely successful in the United States, but they also tend to be philanthropic. To be sure, a portion of this money goes to benefit the American Jewish community at large in both social and political ways. Arguably the most important use of these contributions, in terms of Jewish political clout, is campaign financing. J.J. Goldberg argues that, “it is one of the worst kept secrets in American Jewish politics that the campaign contribution is a major key to Jewish power.”¹² Money donated during elections (often to Democrats but at times to Republicans as well) often correlates to pro-Jewish/pro-Israeli support among the recipients. According to a study published in 1990 comparing “senator’s voting records in Israel-related issues with their campaign contributions from Jewish donors...a strong correlation [exists] between donations and voting records.”¹³ What is interesting about these donations, as A. F. K. Organski suggests, is that they are given to those who are already pro-Israel. In other words money is predominantly used to ensure that existing support for Israel and the Jewish community remain intact, rather than to elicit support.

Although the effect of Jewish donations is clearly visible, the Jewish community is reluctant to admit that it uses money to further its causes. While it is arguable that some members vote pro-Israel based on ideology and an historical relationship with Israel, to suggest that campaign financing from individual donors and pro-Israel Political Action Com-

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mittees (PAC's) has a negligible effect on support for Jewish causes is naive.

A final component of Jewish power is that of organization. No other special interest or ethnic group rivals the Jewish community in terms of organizational leadership, structure, and focus. Jewish institution building began in the United States in 1859, "...but the beginning of modern, Jewish organizations is usually thought of as the American Jewish Committee, founded in 1906, soon to be followed by B'nai B'rith in 1913 and the American Jewish Congress in 1917."¹⁴ The creation of Israel, and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations in the United States, caused Jewish influence in American foreign policy to increase dramatically from its pre-World War II levels. But the event that turned AIPAC into the most influential Jewish institution in U.S. foreign policy was the AWACS (Airborne Warning and Command System) controversy, in the early 1980s, that saw the Jewish lobby go head to head with President Reagan over the sale of sophisticated aircraft to Saudi Arabia. Although Reagan technically won this battle, it helped transform AIPAC, with Israeli support, into the powerful institution it is today.

Over time, AIPAC has also developed close relationships with major players in the White House, Congress, and the media, which allows it to affect actual legislation, "...to orchestrate the actions of its supporters and to anticipate the moves of its opponents."¹⁵ The importance of AIPAC vis à vis the solidarity of American Jewry, which is truly the foundation of their power, is undeniable. One of the organization's rather unique talents is to keep disputes within the organization private and to resolve them behind closed doors. According to Tony Smith,

Disputes might be inevitable within American Jewry and between this community and Israel, but they should be handled privately; and in the event of unresolved disagreements, the viewpoint of the Israeli government supersedes all others, for it was democratically constituted and ultimately it was the entity that bore responsibility for the consequences of policy.¹⁶

Based on the apparent unity of the Jewish community preventing internal dissension from being publicized may not seem as difficult in theory as it is in practice. Although many, if not most, Jews, in both the U.S. and Israel, support the Israeli government and its actions, conflicts do arise. The divergence in political ideology between American and

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Israeli Jews all but ensures this (the former being considerably more liberal than the latter). A good example of an issue during which there was a split in opinion between the American and the Israeli Jewish communities is the \$10 billion loan guarantee controversy in 1991.

Although almost all Jews, in both the U.S and Israel, saw the U. S.' guarantees as necessary to help Israel acquire the funds needed to resettle a considerable influx of Soviet Jews arriving in that nation, the real question was whether or not the guarantees should be conditioned upon a freeze in Israeli settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territories. The Bush Administration felt further settlement activity could jeopardize the already tenuous peace process. The President's policy of linkage was vigorously opposed by Yitzhak Shamir's Likud government in Israel, but enjoyed more support among American Jewish rank and file than many would have guessed. Not surprisingly, tying the loan guarantees to a halt in settlement activity was not popular among Israeli Jews, nor was it well received by AIPAC, which supported Shamir's stance on the issue. However, as will become evident after a more in depth study of this issue, while a divergence of opinion between American and Israeli Jews existed in the case of the \$10 billion loan guarantee, the effect on the solidarity and power of the American Jewish lobby was rather negligible. Although President Bush was able to stand his ground against the Shamir *government and the American Jewish lobby, by signing a compromised agreement* with Yitzhak Rabin in 1992, he and the Republican party would incur the wrath of an angry Jewish community in the 1992 elections.

U.S. Aid to Israel and The \$10 Billion Loan Guarantee

Before discussing the \$10 billion loan guarantee, it is helpful to briefly review the history of the U. S.' aid to Israel. Israel has historically been a friend and ally of the U.S. However, the nation has not always received the levels of financial aid, with respect to the time period, that it does today. In 1948, President Truman took an important step in recognizing Israeli independence, but he also included Israel in the arms embargo that he imposed on the Middle East. Under President Eisenhower, Truman's successor, the U.S. sought to befriend certain Arab nations in the Middle East to halt the spread of communism despite Israeli objections. Aid continued to remain relatively low throughout the 1950s. In fact, during this time "...the United States never provided Israel

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with more than \$86.4 million in annual aid, and the bulk of the assistance was in the form of loans under the Food for Peace program."¹⁷

The first major increase in American military aid to Israel immediately followed the onset of the Yom Kippur War in 1973. Egypt and Syria's surprise attack on Israel led President Nixon to order a huge airlift of military equipment to Israel and to request \$2.2 billion in emergency military assistance from Congress. Congress approved the request, launching the U. S.' aid to Israel into billions of dollars for the first time in history. Significant financial assistance continued throughout the 1970s as "Congress began earmarking specific amounts of assistance to Israel."¹⁸

In 1979, under President Carter, aid to Israel was significantly increased for the second time. Following the Camp David Accords, Carter asked for \$4.8 billion in loans and grants to be shared between Israel and Egypt, on top of the \$2 billion and \$1 billion that Israel and Egypt were already receiving. Financial assistance of this volume continued during the 1980's, and terms for assistance to Israel actually improved.

Under the Bush Administration, a rift in the U.S.-Israeli relationship began to develop over the issue of Palestinian rights. Despite repeated efforts by President Bush, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir continued his reluctance to open a dialogue with Palestinian leaders in the hope of commencing peace negotiations. Tensions between Israel and the U.S. subsided, however, as a result of Israel's behavior during the war in the Persian Gulf: "Noted for responding swiftly and massively to any attack, Israel adopted an uncharacteristic posture of restraint at the Bush administration's behest."¹⁹ As a result this of lack of action, Israel was commended through resolutions by both the House and Senate. While applause from the U.S. government was certainly welcomed by Israel, perhaps signaling a rekindling of the relationship the two nations had shared for so long, "...the tangible evidence of Israel's special standing had always come in unmatched levels of U.S. aid, and Israel's expectations were high."²⁰ The first request for aid came in 1990, when the Senate introduced a bill "to deal with the issue of housing guarantees to facilitate the movement as fast as possible of Soviet refugees out of the Soviet Union, and to wherever they want to go, including Israel."²¹ The bill called for \$400 million in loan guarantees, not outright financial aid, to be given to the Israeli government to help resettle what was expected to be a significant wave of Soviet Jewish immigrants fleeing the economically tumultuous former

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Soviet Union. While the U.S. government, including the Bush administration, had long fought for the right of Soviet Jews to emigrate, the bill was greeted cautiously at first by President Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, and with good reason.

The skepticism exhibited by the administration was based on a fear that the loan guarantees would allow Israel to increase settlement construction in the occupied Palestinian territories. This was contrary to long-standing U.S.' foreign policy and potentially detrimental to the Arab-Israeli peace process. "We have said we see fungibility as a problem here that has to be considered and looked at," said Baker in his testimony before the Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the House Appropriation Committee in March, 1990, "if the government of Israel could...provide some assurances that it would not be engaging in new or additional settlement activity...in the territories—it's entirely possible that the administration might then be able to support legislation such as this."²² Angry over a seeming lack of U.S. support for Israel in the wake of the Gulf War, the Shamir government refused to accept such a condition.

Disagreements between the Israeli government and the Bush administration over a linkage between U.S. aid for housing Soviet Jewish immigrants and a freeze in Israeli settlement activity in the occupied Palestinian territories continued until October of 1990, when an apparent agreement was reached. In an announcement on October 2, Secretary of State Baker said that the U.S. would agree to give Israel \$400 million in loan guarantees for housing Soviet Jewish immigrants because the Israeli's had promised to "go beyond the traditional assurances that Israel [had] provided us concerning settlements."²³ To many in the Bush administration, this meant that Shamir had agreed that none of the money would be spent on building settlements in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or Golan Heights. However, this was not the case.

In early September, Israeli Ambassador Zalman Shoval told reporters that while Israel had agreed not to use American funds to promote settlement activity within Israel's pre-June 1967 borders, it would continue to use its own money as it saw fit. In a news conference following his meeting with Baker, Shoval stated that, "the U.S. never asked us, nor could it have asked us not to use our own funds for construction in any place we want to use them."²⁴ In fact, this type of fungibility is exactly what Baker had feared when discussing the Senate bill earlier that year.

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That the money being used for settlement construction was technically not provided by the U.S. was a moot point if U.S. loan guarantees made it possible for Israel to divert other funds toward just that. Indeed, according to a report by the Israeli Housing Ministry, headed by Ariel Sharon, settlement activity was to continue. The report revealed plans, under the name "Project Immigration," for construction of settlements in both the West Bank and Gaza, as well as "areas in Jerusalem outside Israel's internationally recognized pre-1967 border."²⁵

Although Israel's request for \$400 million in loan guarantees was approved and eventually implemented, the debate over linkage between settlement construction and U.S. aid to Israel became even more significant as Israel's demand for wartime compensation increased. On January 22, 1991, Israel's Finance Minister Yitzhak Modai said that he had presented Deputy Secretary of State Larry Eagleburger with a proposal for U.S. aid to Israel. This proposal included \$3 billion to compensate Israel for costs from the Gulf War, and up to \$10 billion in U.S. loan guarantees as "general economic aid tied to the absorption of immigrants from the Soviet Union."²⁶ At the behest of the Bush administration, Israel agreed not to seek congressional approval of the loan guarantees until September, but the issue of linkage remained, and Israel's request was shelved only temporarily.

Despite the difficulties in securing the \$400 million earlier in the year, Sharon continued to expand settlements in occupied territories, angering the U.S. and jeopardizing the Arab - Israeli peace process. In June, at a meeting with the leaders of the Union of Orthodox Jewish Congregations of America, President Bush said that he could not commit himself to endorsing the \$10 billion loan guarantee unless Israel promised not to settle Soviet immigrants in the territories and stopped building new settlements. He then reiterated his position at a news conference on Monday, July 1, stating that the settlements were "counterproductive" to the peace process and that "the best thing for Israel to do [was] to keep its commitment that was given at one point not to go in and build further settlements."²⁷ These statements, although not yet as forceful as they would become, did little to affect change in Israeli confidence or policy.

The Israeli response to continued warnings from the Bush administration was the same; settlement construction would continue. According to Housing Minister Ariel Sharon, "Jewish settlements are not an ob-

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stacle to peace, they are an obstacle to war.”²⁸ Although Sharon was seen by many as a hard-line leader in the Likud Party, leaning further right, perhaps, more than Shamir himself, his actions vis a vis settlement activities in the occupied territories were fully supported by the Israeli government. Occasional disagreements were reported between members of the Knesset and Sharon, but while his actions may have seemed somewhat extreme even to some in his own party, the Shamir government defended these actions when necessary. In doing so, the stage was set for a serious confrontation between the U.S. and Israel, but more specifically, between President Bush and the American Jewish community over the issue of conditionality on the \$10 billion loan guarantee. On Monday, September 9, when President Bush asked Congress to delay Israel’s request for loan guarantees for an additional 120 days, this confrontation began.

After waiting six months to seek Congressional approval for the \$10 billion in loan guarantees, come September, Israel was eager to have the loans approved. However, in a move that stunned both the Israeli government and the American Jewish community, President Bush asked Congress to defer consideration of the loan guarantees for 120 days. His rationale? The fragility of the peace process would not support such a debate at that time. Providing Israel with \$10 billion in loan guarantees to absorb Soviet Jewish immigrants, some of who were going to the West Bank and Gaza, while the Arab nations were angered over Israel’s continued settlement activity in the occupied territories would prove disastrous to the already tenuous peace process. In a news conference at the White House, on September 12, President Bush explained his actions:

A few days ago, I asked Congress to defer consideration for 120 days of Israel’s request for \$10 billion in additional loan guarantees meant to help Israel absorb its many new immigrants. I did so in the interest of peace. I did so because we must avoid a contentious debate that would raise a host of controversial issues, issues so sensitive that a debate now could well destroy our ability to bring one or more of the parties to the peace table.²⁹

But President Bush did not stop at this explanation. He continued with what many people construed as an unprecedented verbal assault on one of the most powerful groups in the U. S., the American Jewish lobby.

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In reference to nearly 1200 Jewish men and women, organized by the conference of the Presidents of Major Jewish Organization, who had come to Capitol Hill that day to lobby congressmen to support the loan guarantees, President Bush said that he was "...one lonely little guy," with only one vote, "up against some powerful political forces."³⁰ He also stated that as the President of the U.S. he was charged with the conduct of American foreign policy, and at such a precarious time in terms of a Middle East Peace, that foreign policy could not simply be the construct of domestic political interests. Needless to say, the Presidents comments stunned American Jewry.

Appearing later that night on *Nightline*, Edward Tivnan, author of "The Lobby," reacted to the Presidents remarks by saying the following: "What George Bush said today was the pro-Israel lobby's worst nightmare come true. An American president stood up before the American people and said that Israel's interests were not only incompatible with American interests, but they were an obstacle to American interests."³¹ Indeed, the American Jewish community was shaken. Shoshana Cardin, Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, which organized and led the march to Capital Hill earlier that day of nearly 1200 pro-Jewish activists, was struck by the President's press conference: "Frankly I was hurt...I am concerned...that the Soviet Jews who are thinking about leaving might now say 'well, if there is no immediate assistance of that nature...perhaps we'll wait', and that's a danger [in such a volatile society]."³² She continued by addressing Bush's comments directed at the Jewish activists; "The [1200] people who were here today do not constitute an Israeli lobby...They are concerned American citizens...not lobbyists, they do not come *en masse* as a lobbying group."³³ While Ms. Cardin and Malcolm Hoeline, Executive Director of the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, were justified in their concern for the fate of Soviet Jewish immigrants in Israel, (now facing a second delay in congressional consideration of the \$10 billion loan guarantees) to argue that the 1200 or so men and women meeting with members of Congress on September 12 did not constitute a lobbying effort was absurd. This mobilization was clearly designed to show President Bush that the American Jewish community, led by major Jewish organizations such as AIPAC, fully supported the Israeli position on loan guarantees and that they had the power to garner congressional support.

Israeli response to the 120 day delay was quick and decisive. They would agree to accept the delay, provided that the Bush administration would promise to provide the full \$10 billion in loan guarantees, without linkage to a freeze in settlement construction, at the end of the four months. According to Defense Minister Moshe Arens, "We won't freeze the settlements at any price, not even at the cost of American loan guarantees."³⁴ Bush and Baker reiterated that they would not grant Israel the loan guarantees without conditionality because they could not jeopardize Arab participation in the peace process. In an effort to reach an agreement, Secretary of State Baker offered a six point compromise proposal to Shamir. According to Baker, the administration would agree to "...work with the supporters of absorption assistance in the Congress in January to find a suitable legislative vehicle," not ask for any further delay, restate the administration's support for aid to help resettle Soviet Jewish immigrants, attempt to minimize the amount of money set aside to protect against Israeli default on the loans, provide compensation for "out of pocket" expenses incurred by Israel as a result of the delay, and encourage U.S. allies to provide similar housing-loan packages to Israel.³⁵ The compromise proposal was rebuffed by the Shamir government, and the controversy continued.

Throughout the year, neither the Bush administration, nor the Shamir government would concede to the others demands, the American Jewish lobby pressed for approval of the guarantees. But the vigor with which this community typically attacks such issues, in staunch support of Israeli policy, was somewhat lacking. In part this may be due to the fact that the Jewish lobby did not want a head on confrontation with President Bush if there was a chance that the Bush administration would prevail. Such a result would be disastrous vis à vis the power and influence that the Jewish lobby could wield in the future. But a second explanation is that the controversy over the \$10 billion loan guarantee caused a typical division in American Jewish support for Israel.

While many major Jewish organizations continued to support the Israeli position, American Jewish support for furthering the peace process between Israel and its Arab neighbors, even if it meant some sort of linkage between U.S. loans and a halt in settlement activity in the occupied territories, began to surface. An article placed in major newspapers by Americans For Peace Now, a liberal Jewish group, expressed this

sentiment. It read "If Israel continues to build and expand settlements in the occupied territories, it will undermine the possibility for a Middle East peace."³⁶ Similarly, front-page reports in the Israeli newspapers, *Maariv* and *Hadashot*, revealed a rift between American and Israeli Jews over how to approach President Bush's policy of conditioning loan guarantees on a settlement freeze. The article in *Hadashot* said that leading U.S. Jews had recently sent a "...very strong message" to the Shamir government about the continuance of settlement construction in the occupied territories, calling the Israeli government's stance "a destructive and unwise policy, and a slap in the face to the Administration, Congress and the American people."³⁷ According to David A. Harris, executive vice president of the American Jewish Committee, in a *New York Times* article on March 3, 1992, "What I am finding as I travel around the country is American Jews who feel caught between a rock and a hard place. People are not fully happy with some of the ways Israel is behaving, but they don't have confidence in the script being written by the Administration either."³⁸

While for most issues, "Support for Israel...is part and parcel of the American Jewish consensus on what it means to be a Jew,"³⁹ the \$10 billion loan guarantee controversy may be an exception. This is not to suggest that Israel was abandoned by American Jewry, or that same community wholeheartedly supported the Bush administration's policy, but with a Likud government in power in Israel, and a very real chance to bring Israel and its Arab neighbors together to negotiate a final peace, members of the American Jewish community began to question their sometimes blind support for Israel. For the first time in a long time, the difference in political ideology between the American Jewish community and Israeli Jews was publicly evident. According to the *Jerusalem Post*, an "...opinion poll among American Jewish leaders indicating that the majority support territorial compromise has evoked an angry response by some Israelis."⁴⁰ Among those angry Israelis was Housing Minister Ariel Sharon, who had called on the U.S. Jewish Diaspora for help in passing the \$10 billion loan guarantee earlier in the year. Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir also commented on the poll on CBS's "Face The Nation", saying "I am sure, 100%, that the rank and file of the Jewish population, the Jewish community in the united States, supports my views, my opinions."⁴¹

While Prime Minister Shamir had overestimated his support, it is true that the effect of the schism between Israeli and American Jews, and

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among the American Jewish community itself, over the \$10 billion loan guarantee controversy was ultimately minimal. Although some American Jews had agreed with Bush's linkage policy, while others continued to support the Shamir government, American Jews went to the polls in 1992 as a unified ethnic constituency, helping to vote President Bush out of office.

When President Bush lashed out at the American Jewish lobby in a White House press conference on September 12, 1991, he did something that "...some Washington sages said no President would ever do — force a showdown with the Israeli lobby just before the start of an election."⁴² The President held his ground during the confrontation over the \$10 billion loan guarantee, refusing to give into the Shamir Government's demands. It was not until Shamir left office in 1992, and Labor leader Yitzhak Rabin became Prime Minister, that an accord was reached. The Rabin government was willing to instate a partial freeze on new Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, a concession that Shamir was unwilling to make.

Whether or not President Bush's ability to block the loan guarantees until Rabin took office is seen as a victory over, or a defeat by, the American Jewish community, the consequences the President faced remain unchanged: the showdown led to a significant loss of electoral support from the American Jewish community in the 1992 election. Speaking about President Bush's rejection of what was to be the final congressional compromise on Israel's request for \$10 billion in loan guarantees, offered by Senator Leahy, Jess Hordes, Washington Director of the Anti-Defamation League, said that "There is anger and dismay in Jewish communities over Bush Administration policy that is increasingly seen as one-sided and unfair against Israel. I imagine it will be translated into an unwillingness to vote for this administration or contribute funds."⁴³

Similarly, former executive director of AIPAC, Morrie Amitay, in reference to President Bush and his policies, said that "The only real option" is to elect a Democratic president. A Republican Jewish activist involved in the Bush campaign also conceded that the confrontation would hurt the President in the 1992 election, especially in states such as California, Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Illinois, and indeed it did.

In the 1988 election, President Bush not only received close to 35% of the Jewish vote, but a significant portion of his campaign contributions

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(up to a quarter) were provided by Jewish donors.⁴⁴ In the 1992 election, however, that support shifted to Bill Clinton. Even though Jews tend to vote Democratic, that Clinton got 78% of the Jewish vote in the 1992 election, and that, in his primary race, "perhaps 60% of his financing was Jewish,"⁴⁵ is attributable to more than his Democratic identification. The American Jewish community was angry with President Bush for his treatment of Israel, despite how some might have felt towards his linkage policy, and they voted accordingly. Democratic political consultant Mark Seigal was wrong in suggesting that Bush "...ran almost no direct political risk"⁴⁶ in confronting American Jewry over the \$10 billion loan guarantee. In fact, he did need Jewish support to win reelection in 1992, support that he did not receive.

Conclusions

Although President Bush was able to hold off on providing the \$10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel until Yitzhak Rabin took office, in the end the Israel received what it, and the American Jewish community, wanted. Rabin did agree to halt some settlement activities in the occupied territories, but not all. Nevertheless, President Bush signed the compromised agreement in part to repair a rift that had grown between himself and American Jewry. Thankfully, the loan guarantees did not destroy the peace process in the Middle East, which continues today, but they were a dangerous risk. Would President Bush have been so eager to reach an agreement quickly with Rabin had the American Jewish community not been pressuring him? Probably not. Was President Bush's concern about the power of the Jewish lobby justified? Absolutely. The President may have been able to stand up to the American Jewish community for some time, but in the end Israel received the \$10 billion loan guarantee and Bush lost much needed Jewish support in the 1992 election.

The controversy over the \$10 billion loan guarantee provides a good example of the power that the American Jewish community wields in the making of U.S. foreign policy. While it is undeniable that the Jewish community, as well as other ethnic groups, should have a voice in the foreign policy making of the U.S., that is not to suggest that our foreign policy should simply be the sum total of ethnic group interests. Are there instances in which ethnic groups have involved the U.S. in foreign policy

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initiatives, that it otherwise would not have undertaken to as great an extent, that benefited both the U.S. and the global community? Certainly. One example is the U.S.' involvement in bringing down apartheid in South Africa, prompted by considerable domestic pressure on the U.S. government by African Americans. But suppose that Bush had conceded to the American Jewish community's immense pressure in 1991, a very real possibility, and provided Israel with the \$10 billion loan guarantee with which that nation could have drastically increased settlement activity in the occupied territories. This could have been disastrous in terms of peace in the Middle East. Ethnic interests can not become the sole determinant of the U.S.' foreign policy, or this country will find itself involved in foreign policy initiatives that do not serve the national interest.

This is particularly dangerous today for several reasons. First, the dissolution of the Soviet Union has removed the overriding threat upon which U.S. foreign policy was based for over forty years. Second, the nature of the state/society relationship in the U.S. in the post Cold War era allows for "...a very low threshold of entry indeed into policy-making."⁴⁷ In the absence of a true enemy, the role of the state vis a vis society has declined, further facilitating ethnic involvement in government. Is this necessarily a negative phenomenon? No. But it does increase the difficulty of formulating a coherent foreign policy based on some form of a common good. The elusiveness of the term common good, or national interest, in the post Cold War era presents another problem. According to Samuel Huntington, "The Cold War fostered a common identity between American people and government. Its end is likely to weaken or at least alter that identity."⁴⁸ Although the Cold War provided the U.S. with an over-arching, easily definable national interest, the fall of the Soviet Union does not mean the complete disappearance of national identity for the American people. The U.S. was founded upon a set of liberal democratic ideals shared by its citizens. It is these principles, along with basic security and economic concerns, that should now define the U.S.' national interest, and govern the formation of U.S. foreign policy.

Ethnic group involvement in U.S. foreign policy decisions in the post Cold War era, as in the past, is a reality. Both the U. S.' political system and democratic philosophies promote such involvement. In many ways, the influence that these groups enjoy is a positive reflection of the principles and ideals inherent in American society. But these groups

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must act responsibly with their influence, as should the politicians promoting it. When the aspirations of ethnic groups coincide with greater U.S. foreign policy goals it serves to further promote the national interest. However, when these goals differ, as they often do, in order to preserve coherence in foreign policy, ethnic group's individual goals can not supercede the national interest. For "...the overall requirements of the U.S. - strategic, economic, political and moral constitute a whole larger than the sum of its parts. Ethnic preferences figure in that whole but cannot be permitted to preempt it."⁴⁹

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Who Loves the Euro?

by Tara Guberski

INTRODUCTION

As of January 1, 1999 there has been a single currency, the Euro, in the eleven member states that make up the European Monetary Union. This is a monumental step in the history of the European integration movement. Although many past EU programs have involved member states giving up a small part of their sovereignty, the EMU is a giant leap towards integration. Departing from a national currency means relinquishing a part of national identity and the power to control the economy through monetary policy. If sovereignty means anything, it is the power to formulate policies that affect citizens' economic welfare, and this is precisely the power that the member states have lost in the transition to the EMU.

Although many scholars have debated the economic merits of the EMU, few have studied the underlying domestic coalitions that influence support levels for the EMU. Moreover, those who have devoted their research to public opinion issues within the EU have focused their studies on the factors that explain support for the integration process in general, factors that may or may not explain why people are specifically for or against the EMU.

Due to this lack of research on public opinion and the EMU, it is the purpose of this paper to empirically examine which groups approve and disapprove of the EMU and why they hold these opinions. In a subsequent section, I examine existing theories of EU and EMU support and conclude that while previous research explains the factors affecting approval ratings for integration, it does not adequately illustrate the relationship between public opinion and monetary union. Consequently, I intend to test previous models

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of support, using an updated data set, to determine if they specifically explain approval for the EMU.

THE CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING EMU

Since 1969 the EU has had a system of exchange rate stability among most of its member countries. However, in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the EU committed itself to full monetary union and laid down convergence criteria that nations would have to achieve in order to be eligible for entry into the system. By 1995, EU leaders had unequivocally confirmed that the monetary union would commence with a single currency on January 1, 1999. However, due to the convergence criteria and the uncertain economic merits of the program, the adoption of the single currency has been surrounded by political controversy. At this point in time, it is not certain if the EMU will help or hurt Europe economically, nor is it certain who the winners and losers will be. The economic criteria that a country must meet to be eligible for the EMU are very strict and have caused problems for large and small countries alike. The convergence criteria are as follows: a nation must have a low rate of inflation which is not more than 1.5 percentage points higher than the three best performing states; interest rates must be within two percentage points of the three best performing states; a nation must adhere to the Exchange Rate Mechanism without a devaluation for at least two years; and lastly, a state cannot have an excessive deficit, as determined by the Council of Ministers (Cameron 1997, 1-2).


Although eleven member states of the EMU have met these conditions, it has been a difficult process. Italy had to make severe cuts to its budget in order to reign in its historically high inflation rates and public debt. Even more stable economies such as Germany and France were outside the deficit criteria as late as 1996, which caused them to cut their budgets significantly. Reaching the convergence criteria has put a strain on the fiscal policy of almost every member state and forced cuts in government spending. These cuts, especially to social programs, led to a public backlash against the single currency as people began to question the future benefits of the EMU and focused on the current decrease in social spending (Cameron 1997, 3-4; Frieden 1998).

There is also debate concerning whether or not the EMU will help Europe's historical problems of low growth and high unemployment. Im-

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proving these difficulties are the stated goals of the European Union, but achieving them is difficult. It is likely that the European Central Bank will pursue a tight monetary policy in order to keep the economy stable. However, such a policy may hurt the competitiveness of European goods as it strengthens the Euro's exchange rate and thereby heightens the existing problems of low growth and unemployment. It is also possible that due to pressures from the public, the ECB will be forced to pursue a looser monetary policy in order to encourage growth. Even with this policy, however, it is unclear if unemployment would decrease significantly because of low labor mobility in Europe. Moreover, there would be losers from a loose monetary policy, namely investors and those on a fixed income (Frieden 1998).

Public support for the EMU has gone up and down amidst the controversy caused by these issues. Figure 1 shows average public support for the EMU since 1989 across all member states.¹ As one can see, it has stayed primarily within the 50 percent range for the past ten years. Although a slight majority approves of the EMU, there is a substantial minority that opposes the initiative, indicating that the issue is extremely controversial.



It is important to note that approval went down significantly after the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992. Although a slim majority of people apparently liked the theory of monetary union, they were not so enamored by its reality, due to the costs of the convergence criteria and the cuts to social welfare programs. By 1995 support rose to pre-Maastricht levels,

due in part to an increase in people's perceived economic status as the European recession was alleviated. However, support took another downturn after the Madrid conference confirmed Europe's path to monetary union, showing once again that not as many people liked the reality of the EMU. Since 1997, support has improved dramatically and now is well above pre-Maastricht levels. This increase in approval is most likely attributed to the healthy European economy and public acceptance of the Euro.

Despite our understanding of the history of the EMU support, the question still remains as to who approves of the EMU. From the above discussion we can see that the Euro is a source of controversy; nonetheless, no previous scholars have adequately researched public opinion and its relation to the EMU. The ramifications of the answer to this question are substantial, as they will enable the European Union to take action in order to reach those who are not in favor of the Euro.

EXISTING RESEARCH

The research of Gabel, Dalton and Eichenberg, Frieden, and Anderson has been at the forefront of the scholarship that evaluates the factors that influence public support for the European Union generally and the European Monetary Union specifically. Since this paper builds directly on the theories and research of previous scholars, it is necessary to review their work in some detail.

Trade Liberalization and Support for European Integration

The work of Matthew Gabel (1998) focuses on the EU as a whole and conceptualizes citizen approval in terms of affective and utilitarian support. Affective support is defined as approval for an organization that remains consistent despite the specific practices or policies that the organization implements upon the people. In contrast, utilitarian support is support based on the policies of the authoritative establishment and varies with perceived benefits. If the benefits decline, support does as well. Gabel states that those who have an affective allegiance to the European Union are more likely to approve of specific EU policy measures, even if those policy measures harm them personally (Gabel 1998, 16-17). The bulk of his research is focused on utilitarian support, based on an individual's cost/benefit analysis: those who will benefit from integration in general have higher approval ratings than those who will lose from it.

Gabel's model of winners and losers from EU integration is primarily based on the distributional impact of the European Union's market liberalization; therefore, it is very pertinent to research on the EMU since monetary union is the last step towards complete market integration in Europe. Gabel believes that the gains from trade liberalization are based on what might be called "personal comparative advantage." Those with higher levels of education, training, and income are more likely to benefit from EU market liberalization because they will be competitive in the face of new labor mobility. Gabel also refines his criteria to capture the winners and losers *within* the high and low-income groups based on the Heckscher-Olin model of losers and winners from free trade. Succinctly stated, high-wage skilled workers and low-wage unskilled workers are likely to benefit more than their counterparts due to the fact that companies can move production to places where cheaper labor and/or more highly trained workers reside. Lastly, Gabel looks at the effects of utilitarian gain based on trade levels and Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) subsidies. Countries with higher levels of intra-EU trade stand to gain more from liberalized EU trade than do those who trade primarily outside the bloc. Likewise, farmers stand to benefit from CAP subsidies and therefore are more approving of EU than other groups (Gabel 1998, 42-49, 57-63).

Gabel effectively proves the robustness of his affective and utilitarian support theories even in the face of controls for other factors such as partisan orientations, value orientations, political awareness, and objective economic factors. However, his data only extends to 1992. This is a serious problem for studying the EMU since the Maastricht Treaty was not ratified until 1994. Nonetheless, his explanations provide an excellent grounding for the study of utilitarian considerations about the EMU, for they definitively show which groups of people are for and against integration as a whole. Because Gabel bases his study on market liberalization, one of the first steps of the EMU, his findings may also determine who specifically supports the implementation of the Euro.

The Impact of Trade and the Macro-Economy

Dalton and Eichenberg (1998, 1997) build on Gabel's theory to evaluate the factors responsible for public approval of the EU in the post-Maastricht era. They find, as they have in earlier studies, that objective economic factors, especially inflation, have an influence on approval ratings. Most importantly, they find that personal perceived economic status is the main component of

approval. They reason that, with the advent of budgetary cuts in social spending due to the convergence criteria for the EMU, many people fear that weakened social programs will worsen their economic situation and therefore are less approving of the EU. Dalton and Eichenberg also show that the Maastricht Treaty gave the EU power over issues involving standards of living and national culture (such as the single currency) which negatively impacted approval ratings.

Dalton and Eichenberg's research provides substantial evidence that perceived economic conditions and the advent of the EMU have had a direct impact on public support for the European Union. In addition, the expansion of their data set gives us a clearer picture of how approval has changed in the post-Maastricht period. However, like Gabel, they deal with general EU support rather than the EMU approval specifically, and so their work is not directly transferable to this paper.

Monetary Policy and Approval for EMU

Frieden (1998) has provided a well reasoned, but not empirically tested, essay on who will win and lose from the EMU. He bases his argument on whether the European Central Bank (ECB) will have a tight or loose monetary policy. If the ECB follows a tight monetary policy to establish the strength of the Euro, the primary winners will be European financial institutions and savers, due to the subsequent rise in interest rates and the potential role of the Euro as an international reserve currency. The losers will be exporters and import-competing industries. A strong currency would make imports into Europe cheaper while also making exports more expensive and thereby less competitive on the world market.

If economically depressed countries succeed in forcing the ECB to follow expansionary or loose money policy, the winners and losers would be reversed. Debtors, exporters, and import-competing industries would win due to the lowered value of debt and increased competitiveness of European goods. Investors, savers, and those on fixed incomes would lose because of the lowered interest rates and presumed higher inflation rates.

Frieden provides a useful model of winners and losers dealing specifically with the EMU, but he does not use empirical data to evaluate his points. Therefore, his analysis needs to be further tested.

Empirical Examinations of EMU Support

Anderson (1998) has done work that is closest to the focus of this paper. He has empirically examined the factors that influence approval ratings of

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the EMU specifically. Anderson bases his research on theories of occupational differences, economic perceptions, value change, and what he calls "proxy theories".

In an extension of Gabel's work, Anderson tests the theory of utilitarian support. Anderson argues that managers and farmers should approve of the EMU more than shop owners and senior citizens. The former group will benefit from liberalized trade and the CAP, while the latter group will lose, having accepted a currency that might be worth less than their national one. Like Eichenberg, he also examines the impact of perceived economic conditions. Those who think the economy is better than before will approve of EMU more than those who think it is worse. He also tests Inglehart's idea that post-materialists (those concerned more with issues of "quality of life") have higher approval ratings of the EMU than materialists (those concerned with economic and physical security). Lastly, he investigates the relationship between satisfaction with domestic politics and EMU approval ratings.

Unfortunately, Anderson did not reach very conclusive or robust results. He found that occupational differences, economic perceptions, and value change were *not* significantly related to approval for the EMU, which is in conflict with Gabel's and Dalton and Eichenberg's theories of EU approval ratings. In addition, he used only one set of data, namely *Eurobarometer* 42 for 1994, to test his hypothesis. This narrow data base is worrisome and leads me to conclude that Anderson's paper needs to be refined in order to ascertain if his conclusions hold across a larger set of data and to also make sure that his findings truly clash with what others have already determined about EU support.

In summary, previous scholars have come up with very useful ideas and theories about which factors influence approval ratings of the EU and the EMU, but there is no research that definitively proves which factors most influence approval for the EMU specifically. Gabel gives us excellent grounding in theories but his data do not go beyond 1992. Dalton and Eichenberg test data until 1996 and have come up with insightful theories about support in the post-Maastricht era. However, their work focuses on the EU as a whole and not just the EMU. Frieden does not provide empirical data to explore his claims, while Anderson results are inconclusive. Clearly, there is a need for a detailed empirical analysis of the factors that lead to approval of the EMU, which is focused on testing the theories above.

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As one can see from the graph and regression line, the data is strongly correlated with an r of .918 indicating that the questions measure support identically.² Therefore, it is safe to use both questions in my analysis.

Intra-EU Exports

Intra-EU exports are defined as the percentage of a nation's total annual exports, which are imported by other EU countries.

Perceived Economic Conditions

This variable is based on a survey question administered as part of the EU's monthly consumer confidence survey. Dalton and Eichenberg use this variable in their research and my data is taken directly from their paper.

The question asks: "What is the financial situation of your household now compared to twelve months ago?" To compute national, aggregate averages for this question, the individual responses are weighted from most favorable (+1), next favorable (+.5), neutral (0), a little unfavorable (-.5) and most unfavorable (-1), and averaged over all respondents (Dalton and Eichenberg 1997, 39)

Welfare State

The size of the social welfare state will be defined as percentage of GDP spent on all social programs within a nation (OECD 1995).

Nationalism

This variable is based on a question from *Eurobarometer* 45. The following statement was read to citizens, "Do you believe that the European currency will or will not imply that (OUR COUNTRY) will lose too much of its identity?". Those who answer "will imply" are considered more nationalistic, while those who answer "will not" are considered to be more cosmopolitan.

Education

Education levels will be measured using *Eurobarometer* demographic groups of terminal education age (the time when a respondent finished formal education). The groups are as follows: under 15, 16-19, 20 years or older, and still studying.

Occupational Levels


Using *Eurobarometer* demographic groups, people will be divided into the following occupational levels; self-employed, managers, other white collars, manual workers, house persons, and unemployed.

INTRA-EU EXPORTS

The European Union has mainly been an economic project since its inception. Liberalized free trade within the EU is one of the main goals of the Commission. Moreover, monetary union is the last step in creating a complete free trade zone between the eleven member states of the EMU. Although economists disagree on many issues, they do agree that free trade improves the welfare of society as a whole. Therefore, from an economic standpoint, those countries that trade primarily in the EU will gain more from the EMU than those who trade primarily outside the area. Based on Gabel's theory of utilitarian support, we would thus expect to find that countries that have higher percentages of intra-EU trade also have higher levels of EMU support.

In order to analyze this hypothesis I constructed the following graph. Using *Eurobarometer* surveys from 1989-1996, I computed the national averages with the question of "EU/National decision taking". The percent that responded "EU decision taking" to the issue of currency is charted on the Y axis. Using Dalton and Eichenberg's data for Intra-EU trade, I computed the average percentage of EU-exports by country from 1989-1996 and plotted this data against EMU approval. I also ran a regression analysis to determine the slope of the regression line and to measure r (a measure of goodness of fit).³

Figure 3
Intra-EU Exports and EMU Support



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Due to the positive slope of the graph, one can tell that there is a positive correlation between the data. The r is quite low at .238, which indicates that while intra-EU exports do influence support levels, there are other factors that also determine approval. This is not problematic though, because I intend to show that five other factors are related to support levels. In addition, working with only eleven data points lowers the r if two or more data points are considerably removed from the regression line.


Looking closely at the graph, it is apparent that Italy and the United Kingdom deviate furthest from the line, Italy well above and the U.K. well below. Although Italy has low intra-EU exports, it has high approval ratings, which can be attributed to its historical benefits from EU membership. The U.K. has a similar amount of exports but falls considerably below expected support levels. This is due to the UK's past independence from the EU. Taking Italy and the U.K. out of the regression analysis causes r to rise to .318, a substantial increase in correlation, indicating that for most countries, intra-EU trade has a significant positive effect on approval of the EMU.

SOCIAL SPENDING AND THE EMU

Compared to the United States, the size of the welfare state (amount spent on social programs) in Europe is quite large as a percentage of GDP. However, the convergence criteria for the EMU has forced many countries to cut their budgets, and thereby their social programs, in order to decrease their deficit. If the European Central Bank is successful in forcing the Euro states to follow conservative budget deficit requirements, these cuts will not be temporary, but will rather be the new reality for the Euro11. The effects of these cuts are different for all the member states. Although all European countries spend more on social programs than the United States does, the size of the welfare state varies considerably within Europe. It is probable that those who have smaller welfare states are less concerned with budgetary cuts than those who have historically high social spending. In large welfare countries, people are much more dependent on the state for benefits and their livelihood. Therefore, we would expect those who live in large welfare states to be more opposed to the EMU than people, who live smaller welfare states.

To test this hypothesis, namely that there is an inverse relationship between the size of the welfare state and support for the EMU, I used data

from *Eurobarometers* 43-44 (1995). I averaged the response to the "EU-decision taking" question for the two surveys to determine each country's 1995 EMU approval. I then plotted the data against 1995 total social spending as a percentage of GDP and calculated the regression line.⁴



As one can see from the graph and the slope of the line there is a negative relation between social welfare spending and support for the EMU. The correlation for this data is given by the r of .357, which is mid-to-lower range, but still tells us that the data is correlated. As seen above, this lower range r tells us that there are other factors that influence support for the EMU. However, social spending is more related to support than intra-EU trade or perceived economic conditions (as seen below). Given the negative slope and the r , we can still be certain that social spending has a negative impact on support for the EMU.

PERCEIVED ECONOMIC CONDITIONS

Dalton and Eichenberg proved in their research that perceived economic conditions, how a person feels about his or her financial status, was an important factor influencing approval for the EU as a whole. Although objective measures of the economy such as inflation and unemployment also play a role in approval, perceptions are far more important. That is, if the economy is doing well but a person thinks it is doing poorly, he or she will be less approving of the EU.


Because the EMU relates directly to economic conditions, it is prob-

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able that perceived economic conditions influence approval of the EMU. Those who believe the economy is doing well will be in favor of a program that promises to expand free trade and improve the economy even more. Given their positive outlook, they will also be less fearful of budget cuts caused by the EMU. On the other hand, those who feel the economy is doing poorly will fear cuts to social welfare spending since these programs would support them in the case of unemployment. Due to these conditions, we would expect to find that there is a positive correlation between perceived economic conditions and support for the European Union.

To test this theory, I employed data from Dalton and Eichenberg's research, namely the average perceived economic conditions for each country from 1989-96. As stated in the definition section, perceived economic conditions are measured aggregately by household for each country. The more negative the number, the worse people feel about the economy. I also computed the national average for the EMU support from 1989-96 (from the "EU decision taking" question). I then plotted these two variables against one another and calculated the regression line.⁵

Figure 5
Perceived Economic Conditions and EMU Support



As expected, the graph and slope of the line show that there is a positive relationship between perceived economic conditions and approval for the EMU. The correlation of the data is low at .234, but again this only tells us that other factors influence support. Unlike intra-EU trade where it was obvious that one or two variables were diluting the certainty of results, household perceptions appear to be more disparate as a whole because the data set is too small to see a strong correlation between the data, or perceived economic conditions are a less influential factor of support. Unfortunately, with the time available, I was not able to test a larger data set, so we do not know which condition holds true. Clearly, this is an area that needs future study. However, given the slope of the line and the r , we can still say that perceived economic conditions have some positive influence on support, but perceptions may not be as important as intra-EU trade or social spending.

OCCUPATIONAL LEVELS

The EMU is the final step in creating a liberalized free trade zone in Europe. As with the Common Market, factors of production, including labor, will be mobile. With the single currency, labor liberalization stands to increase even more since workers will be paid in the same currency, making it easier for employers and employees to compare opportunities in many nations.

In the face of the liberalized EU labor market, job-skills indicate how well a person can adapt to the new system. Those with more training possess the skills to be able to work in an international environment. In addition, those with more job training are less fearful of unemployment because their specialized training is in demand. On the other hand, those with less training have fewer valuable skills and are more susceptible to unemployment because companies can move production to countries where manual labor is cheaper (Gabel 1998, 43-44).

Given these conditions, it is expected that those with higher job-skills would be more supportive of the EMU than less-skilled workers because they can take advantage of the job opportunities created by the single currency and are less fearful about unemployment caused by lower paid manual workers in less developed countries.

Furthermore, those dependent on social welfare, namely the unemployed

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and house persons, stand to lose from market liberalization and the EMU because of cuts in social spending. Given that the EMU will hurt these groups, one would expect them to be less approving of the single currency than those with more job-skills.

In order to test this hypothesis, namely that there is a positive relationship between job skills and support for the EMU, I constructed the following table. I cross-tabulated support for the EMU with occupational levels using *Eurobarometer 45* (April-May 1996). Note that in this instance support for the EMU is based on the "For/Against EMU" question. In addition, I calculated the net support for the EMU, which is derived by subtracting those against the EMU from those who are for it.

Figure 6 Occupational Levels and Approval of EMU

			Support for EMU			Total
			Favor	Oppose	Net	
Occupational Scale	Self-employed	Count	938	362	576	1500
		Percent	62.5%	24.1%	38.4%	100.0%
	Managers	Count	945	520	425	1622
		Percent	58.3%	32.1%	26.2%	100.0%
	Other white collars	Count	963	523	440	1688
		Percent	57.0%	31.0%	26.0%	100.0%
	Manual workers	Count	1828	1360	468	3725
		Percent	49.1%	36.5%	12.6%	100.0%
	House person	Count	853	549	304	1771
		Percent	48.2%	31.0%	17.2%	100.0%
	Unemployed	Count	592	397	195	1193
		Percent	49.6%	33.3%	16.3%	100.0%
Total		Count	6119	3711	2408	11499
		Percent	53.2%	32.3%	20.9%	100.0%

Looking at those who approve of the EMU, it is clear that the self-employed, managers, and that other white-collar workers are substantially more supportive of the EMU than manual workers, house persons, and the unemployed. In terms of straight support—the percentage that favors the EMU—skilled workers are eight to thirteen points more approving than manual laborers. In terms of net support, they are two times

as likely to have approval for the EMU. As expected, house persons and the unemployed also have low support scores compared to those with higher skills, averaging ten points below white-collar workers. In short, there is a distinct positive relationship between job training and support for the EMU.

EDUCATION

Closely related to occupational levels is educational levels. As one gains more education two things occur. First, a person gains more job-related training, which influences his or her occupation and therefore his or her utilitarian support for the EMU. Second, education provides people with the analytical skills necessary to see many sides of an issue. Instead of focusing merely on the immediate advantages and or disadvantages of the European Monetary Union, those with more education can see the long-term benefits of the union and are more willing to support it. Due to these two factors, we would expect to find that educational levels are positively related to approval of the single currency.

In order to study this theory in further detail, I once again analyzed *Eurobarometer 45*. I cross-tabulated terminal educational levels and support for the EMU (based on the for/against EMU question). I also calculated net support for the EMU for all the educational categories. The results are presented below.

Figure 7 Education and Approval of EMU

		Support for EMU			Total	
		Favor	Oppose	Net		
How old were you when you finished your full time education?	Up to 15 years	Count	2167	1708	459	4851
		Percent	44.7%	35.2%	9.5%	100.0%
	16 - 19 years	Count	3242	2285	957	6364
		Percent	50.9%	35.9%	15.0%	100.0%
	20 + years	Count	2066	812	1254	3241
		Percent	63.7%	25.1%	38.6%	100.0%
	Still studying	Count	891	365	526	1444
		Percent	61.7%	25.3%	36.4%	100.0%
	Total	Count	8366	5170	3196	15900
		Percent	52.6%	32.5%	20.1%	100.0%

Looking at educational levels, one can see that support increases with education. Those with the highest approval ratings, namely those

who have a terminal education age of 20 years or older are twenty points more supportive of the EMU than the less educated. Looking at net support the pattern is the same. Approval levels increase as one moves from 15 to 20+. Those with a college education are four times as likely to think the EMU is good than those who have lesser degrees. It should be noted that there is a slight dip in support with those who are still studying, but that can presumably be explained by the fact that this category is made up of people who are of all ages and possible future terminal education levels.

NATIONALISM

In his book, *Interests and Integration*, Gabel examines the theory of affective support stating that those who have an allegiance to the EU are more approving of the EU, even if specific supranational policies hurt them personally. For this paper, I intend to study Gabel's theory in the negative, namely in terms of nationalism. This method of analysis is more illuminating because while some people may indeed have affective support for the EMU, far more have affective support for their country. That is they support their country's sovereignty even if the EMU may help them personally. Affective support for a country can also be defined as nationalism. Therefore, we would expect to find that those with high levels of nationalistic pride are less supportive of the EMU than those who are more cosmopolitan.

In order to test the hypothesis that there is an inverse relationship between levels of nationalism and support for the EMU, I cross tabulated support for the EMU with those who believe the EMU will or will not cause their country to lose too much of its national identity. Support for the EMU is measured using the "For/Against EMU" question. The national identity question is probably not the best way to ask about nationalism because it does not directly ask how nationalistic a person feels. However it was the only question available and given the robustness of the statistics, it does not significantly throw off the results.

Figure 8 Nationalism and Approval of EMU

			Support for EMU		
			Favor	Oppose	Net
Do you believe that the single currency will or will not imply that (OUR COUNTRY) will lose too much of its identity?	Will	Count	2045	3678	-1633
		Percent	31.4%	56.5%	-25.1%
	Will not	Count	5382	903	4479
		Percent	77.1%	12.9%	64.2%
	Don't Know	Count	932	576	356
		Percent	39.1%	24.2%	14.9%
Total	Count	8359	5157	3202	
	Percent	52.7%	32.5%	20.2%	

The results strongly support the hypothesis. Those who believe the EMU will not hurt a country's national identity are far more in favor of EMU (77.1 compared to 31.4) than those who are nationalistic. Looking at net support the difference is quite striking. Those who feel the EMU threatens their national identity have a net support level of negative 25.1 percent, whereas those who do not see a threat to national identity are 64.2 percent in favor of the EMU. That is a almost a ninety percent difference in net support. Obviously, the data is very robust and shows that nationalism plays a very important role in determining how people feel about the EMU. Furthermore, the strength of the numbers indicates that nationalism is one of the strongest factors influencing support.

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS

Through the course of this paper I have examined support based on two levels of analysis, namely those at the aggregate national level and at the individual level. At the national level, I showed that intra-EU trade, perceived economic situation and social spending influence support for the EMU. At the individual level, I showed that the level of a person's education, job-skills, and nationalism are related to approval for the EMU.

This data is important, because as the Euro continues to be implemented, it informs EU leaders of who exactly supports and who opposes the EMU.

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The bureaucracy can use these statistics to decide how to continue with the EMU once the new currency is in place. Most importantly, the EU could use these statistics to find and compensate the losers from the EMU in order to improve support levels. As I show above, poorly educated manual laborers and nationalistic people are against the EMU. In addition, countries with large social welfare programs, low EU exports and a gloomy economic outlook are less supportive of the EMU, because it will hurt them when the single currency comes into effect. The losers from integration will probably not change their opinion unless the EU compensates them in order to make the EMU personally beneficial. Compensation for low-skilled unemployed workers could be carried out through job training programs. In terms of social welfare programs, the most obvious solution is to harmonize social benefits across member states. This is a huge and controversial undertaking that has been attempted since the early days of the EU without real success. However, there is some evidence for hope. Consider a recent article in the *Financial Times* entitled "Tax Reform Essential to Find True Harmony" which discusses recent ideas for tax harmonization within the EU. The author of the article, Jim Kelly, states:

One suggestion is the establishment of a European Company Statute (ECS), which would allow companies to register within a common legal and tax framework at EU level. This could be used as a basic building block of tax harmonization. It would exist alongside national tax systems and companies would be given a choice between registering according to the ECS or under national rules.

If this EU level tax system did come into effect, it is conceivable that such a system for social benefits would also have to be implemented. Because social programs are based on taxes and closely related labor issues, spillover might occur if an effective supranational tax system was implemented. Therefore, there is hope that in the future the EU could try to compensate the obvious losers from the EMU to not only increase support, but also harmonization across Europe.

Need for Further Research

Although we have identified the demographics which influence support, I have not examined how they work together to control approval. This is most apparent in the individual support models. Gabel tells us that those who

are more educated usually are less nationalistic and have high approval ratings of the EU. Therefore, we would expect to find that these factors are correlated with each other and approval for the EMU. Unfortunately, due to time and data constraints, I was unable to examine the joint variation of these variables.

In addition, a Heckscher-Olin model of support should be empirically tested based on Gabel's theories. My theory of occupational support is valid, but it would be enhanced by being able to examine the differences between high-income and low-income people *within* each group. For example, we would expect high-income manual laborers to be less supportive of the EMU than low-income laborers because those with high wages fear unemployment if companies move to countries with cheaper labor. The Heckscher-Olin model takes a great deal of work to complete and I did not have time to undertake it in this paper. However, if examined correctly, it would provide a very specific model of support that could also be utilized by the EU to identify and compensate losers from the single currency.

Furthermore, in the models of nationalistic support, I consistently found a fairly low r , which shows us that while those factors do influence support there are other indicators, which also cause the EMU support to vary. I would argue that the most important factors have been examined in my paper, but there is a need to find out if any other items exist which cause approval to change. In this way, one can build a more comprehensive model of approval.

Conclusion

The purpose of this paper was to explore approval of the EMU based on the theories of previous scholars who had studied EU support or had not used a large data set. Examining six demographic factors using *Eurobarometer* surveys from 1989-96, I have shown that job-skills and education positively influence support, while nationalism is negatively related to approval of the EMU. In addition, a country's intra-EU trade levels, and aggregate perceived economic conditions positively influence support. Lastly, the size of the social welfare state is inversely related to approval of the EMU. In proving these theories, I have shown that Gabel's and Dalton and Eichenberg's theories of support are also relevant to the EMU approval.

Although there is a need for further research to refine which demographic factors cause a person to be for or against the EMU, this paper is

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useful because it provides six basic factors for support which can be used as a basis for future scholars and EU leaders to identify winners and losers from the EMU. Once the information is complete, it is my hope that the EU acts to compensate the losers of the EMU across Europe.

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APPENDIX A

Data for History of EMU Approval

Table A1. History of EMU Approval Data

YEAR APPROVAL
(EU 12/15)

1989	57
1990	51
1991	59
1991	54
1992	56
1992	54
1993	49
1994	51
1995	58
1996	54
1997	51
1997	54
1998	65

APPROVAL : The percentage of people within the EU member states who answer "decide jointly within the European Union" to the following question for the issue of currency.

Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?

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APPENDIX B

**Regression Analysis and Data for Correlation of EMU Support
Questions**

COUNTRY	BARO #	EU CURRENCY DECISIONS	FOR EMU
BELGIUM	46	62	57
BELGIUM	47	57	58
BELGIUM	48	61	57
BELGIUM	49	73	68
DENMARK	46	35	30
DENMARK	47	41	34
DENMARK	48	37	32
DENMARK	49	45	34
FRANCE	46	64	59
FRANCE	47	60	56
FRANCE	48	64	58
FRANCE	49	75	68
GERMANY	46	50	38
GERMANY	47	45	32
GERMANY	48	50	40
GERMANY	49	64	51
GREECE	46	51	66
GREECE	47	52	65
GREECE	48	51	59
GREECE	49	58	67
IRELAND	46	61	65
IRELAND	47	56	62
IRELAND	48	57	67
IRELAND	49	68	68
ITALY	46	74	75
ITALY	47	76	74

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APPENDIX B (CONT.)

Regression Analysis and Data for Correlation of EMU Support Questions

COUNTRY	BARO #	EU CURRENCY DECISIONS	FOR EMU
ITALY	48	77	78
ITALY	49	85	83
NETH	46	70	66
NETH	47	58	52
NETH	48	64	57
NETH	49	82	73
SPAIN	46	59	63
SPAIN	47	56	58
SPAIN	48	62	61
SPAIN	49	69	72
UK	46	29	29
UK	47	25	26
UK	48	30	29
UK	49	39	34
AUSTRIA	46	45	40
AUSTRIA	47	42	40
AUSTRIA	48	46	44
AUSTRIA	49	61	56
FINLAND	46	26	27
FINLAND	47	27	29
FINLAND	48	27	33
FINLAND	49	50	53
LUX	46	69	65
LUX	47	64	67
LUX	48	61	62

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APPENDIX B (CONT.)

**Regression Analysis and Data for Correlation of EMU Support
Questions Data**

COUNTRY	BARO #	EU CURRENCY DECISIONS	FOREMU
LUX	49	73	79
SWEDEN	46	33	28
SWEDEN	47	34	33
SWEDEN	48	34	34
SWEDEN	49	48	39
PORTUGAL	46	51	60
PORTUGAL	47	41	46
PORTUGAL	48	36	45
PORTUGAL	49	45	52

BARO #: Eurobarometer number. This data utilizes data from Eurobarometer 46-49 (1996-1998).

EU CURRENCY DECISIONS: The percentage of people within a country who answer "decide jointly within the European Union" to the following question for the issue of currency.

Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?

FOR EMU: The percentage of people within a country to answer "for the single currency" to the following question.

What is your opinion of the following statement? Please tell me if you are for it or against it. There has to be one single currency, the Euro, replacing the (NATIONAL CURRENCY) and all other national currencies of the Member States of the European Union.

APPENDIX B (CONT.)

Regression Analysis

Table B2. Correlation of Support Questions Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.918 ^a	.842	.839	6.4005

a. Predictors: (Constant), TAKING

Table B3. Coefficients of Support Questions

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	1.486	3.020		.492	.624
	TAKING	.956	.054	.918	17.580	.000

a. Dependent Variable: FOR

APPENDIX C

Regression Analysis and Data for Intra-EU Trade

Table C1. Intra-EU Trade Data

<u>NATION</u>	<u>AVERAGE 1989-96</u> <u>% EXPORT</u>	<u>APPROVAL</u>
FRANCE	62.45	65.30769
BELGIUM	75.16	63.92308
NETHERLANDS	77.04	60.46154
GERMANY	54.67	49.38462
ITALY	56.72	71.07692
DENMARK	57.96	49.23077
IRELAND	73.07	57.15385
UK	55.44	34.38462
GREECE	60.11	51.23077
SPAIN	65.26	53.53846
PORTUGAL	76.26	45.30769

% EXPORT: The percentage of each countries total exports which are imported by other EU countries. The annual percentage is averaged over the years 1989-96.

APPROVAL: The percentage of people who answer "decide jointly within the European Union" to the following question for the issue of currency. Each country's bi-annual response is averaged over the years 1989-96.

Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?

APPENDIX C (CONT.)
Regression Analysis

Table C2. Intra-EU Trade Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.238 ^a	.056	-.048	10.6296

a. Predictors: (Constant), EXPORTS

Table C3. Intra-EU Trade Coefficients^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	EXPORTS	.278	.379	.238	.734	.482

a. Dependent Variable: APPROVAL

Table C4. Intra-EU Trade Model Summary (minus UK and Italy)

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.318 ^a	.101	-.028	7.1263

a. Predictors: (Constant), EXPORTS

Table C5. Intra-EU Trade Coefficients (minus UK and Italy)^a

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	(Constant)	37.736	19.688		1.917	.097
	EXPORTS	.259	.292	.318	.886	.405

a. Dependent Variable: APPROVAL

APPENDIX D**Regression Analysis and Data for Social Spending**

Table D1. Data for Social Spending

NATION	SOCIAL SPENDING (1995)	APPROVAL (1995)
BELGIUM	26.8	70
DENMARK	31	51
FRANCE	28.8	68
GERMANY	29.8	56
GREECE	16.8	56.5
IRELAND	20.8	65.5
ITALY	25	74.5
NETHERLANDS	30.5	77
PORTUGAL	17.5	52
SPAIN	22.4	61.5
UK	23.7	42.5
AUSTRIA	25.6	45
FINLAND	34	26
SWEEDEN	38.5	33

SOCIAL SPENDING: The percentage of a nation's GDP spent on all social programs during the year of 1995 (OECD 1995).

APPROVAL: The percentage of people who answer "decide jointly within the European Union" to the following question for the issue of currency. Each country's aggregate response to Eurobarometer 43-44 was averaged to determine each country's approval for the year of 1995.

Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?

APPENDIX D (CONT.)
Regression Analysis

Table D2. Social Spending Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.357 ^a	.128	.055	14.8058

a. Predictors: (Constant), SOCIAL

Table D3. Social Spending Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	Social Spending	-.888	.670	-.357	-1.324	.210

a. Dependent Variable: SUPPORT

APPENDIX E

Regression Analysis and Data for Perceived Economic Conditions

Table E1. Perceived Economic Conditions Data

NATION	AVERAGE FSH	1989-96 APPROVAL
FRANCE	-10.88	65.30769
BELGIUM	-6.31	63.92308
NETHER	2.25	60.46154
GERMANY	-9.94	49.38462
ITALY	-12.19	71.07692
DENMARK	3.69	49.23077
IRELAND	-14.94	57.15385
UK	-18.44	34.38462
GREECE	-29.69	51.23077
SPAIN	-12.06	53.53846
PORTUGAL	-10.88	45.30769

FSH: This variable is based on a survey question administered as part of the EU's monthly consumer confidence survey. The question asks: «What is the financial situation of your household now compared to twelve months ago?» To compute national, aggregate averages for this question, the individual responses are weighted from most favorable (+1), next favorable (+.5), neutral (0), a little unfavorable (-.5) and most unfavorable (-1), and averaged over all respondents (Dalton and Eichenberg 1997, 39). Each country's aggregate monthly response is averaged over the years 1989-96.

APPROVAL: The percentage of people who answer "decide jointly within the European Union" to the following question for the issue of currency. Each country's bi-annual response is averaged over the years 1989-96.

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APPENDIX E (CONT.)

Some people believe that certain areas of policy should be decided by the (NATIONAL) government, while other areas of policy should be decided jointly within the European Union. Which of the following areas of policy do you think should be decided by (NATIONAL) government, and which should be decided jointly within the European Union?

Regression Analysis

Table E2. Percieved Economic Conditions Model Summary

Model	R	R Square	Adjusted R Square	Std. Error of the Estimate
1	.234 ^a	.055	-.050	10.6398

a. Predictors: (Constant), FSH

Table E3. Percieved Economic Conditions Coefficients

Model		Unstandardized Coefficients		Standardized Coefficients	t	Sig.
		B	Std. Error	Beta		
1	Perception Model	.265	.368	.234	.721	.489

a. Dependent Variable: APPROVAL

Photographic Exploration

The Nuclear Age and the Changing Face of Global Conflict Part I: Hiroshima and Nagasaki

by Abdallah Simaika

On August 6 1945, at approximately 8:15 am, the Japanese city of Hiroshima lay witness to the most awesome and destructive man-made force the world had ever seen. In its wake, "Little Boy" dramatically shattered not only the Japanese way of life, but also the world's perception of conflict.

Three days after the United States bombed Hiroshima, the world was stunned yet again as the atomic bomb "Fat Man" rocked Nagasaki. Between the two bombs, 214,000 people died and two cities were completely leveled. However, the two U.S. bombs did more to alter global conflict than was immediately visible in 1945. Within 20 years of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings, the United Kingdom, former Soviet Union, France, and China all conducted nuclear weapons tests in an effort to remain up to date in the technology of war.

While countries continued to expand research into nuclear weapons technology, nuclear proliferation accelerated at a rapid rate, eventually spreading to nations outside the exclusive superpower ring of nations. In response to the spread of nuclear weapons technology, the world's two superpowers, the former USSR and the United States, engaged in talks to curb nuclear proliferation. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), soon became a defining characteristic of international conflict and prevention of such conflict.

The legacies and implications of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the focus of Tufts University's Aidekman Arts Gallery exhibition entitled "The Fallout." The exhibition, which ran from October 1998 until January 1999, drew visitors from all ages and backgrounds, from elementary school children to adults old enough to remember the fateful August morning.

More than fifty years after the atomic bomb shocked the world, the legacies of nuclear war continue to astound and humble the human race.

Photographic Exploration



Children pose in front of a bomb identical to the "Fat Man" bomb dropped on Nagasaki. Over 1,000 students visited the "Fallout" exhibit at Tufts University, and saw first hand, pieces such as the 22 kiloton plutonium bomb.

-Photograph courtesy Tufts University Aidekman Gallery




Cold War fears of nuclear annihilation prompted many U.S. families to construct fallout shelters similar to this replica, constructed exclusively for the Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Fallout exhibition at Tufts University's Aidekman Arts Gallery.

-Photograph courtesy Tufts University Aidekman Gallery

Hemispheres, Vol. 22, 1999

Photographic Exploration



A lunch box once belonging to a Japanese junior high school student in Nagasaki. This lunch box belonged to Shigeru Crimen, whose mother found the charred remains of the box alongside her son's body after the August 9, 1945 atomic bomb explosion.

-Photo courtesy Tufts University Aidekman Gallery



Roof tiles found in bomb wreckage. In Hiroshima, 92% of the buildings in the city were destroyed or damaged by the explosion of the bomb over the center of the city. In Nagasaki, where the effects of the bomb were contained by local topography, 36% of the city's structures were damaged or destroyed.

-Photo courtesy Tufts University Aidekman Gallery

Photographic Exploration

The Nuclear Age and the Changing Face of Global Conflict Part II: Iraq and the United Nations

by Abdallah Simaika

Conflict between nations often involves crafty and evasive diplomacy. Few conflicts illustrate this point as vividly as that between Iraq and the United Nations. Shifting back and forth between compliance and non-compliance with UN weapons inspectors, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein played and continues to play a delicate balancing game between adhering to a militarization timetable and obeying the will of the mostly US-dominated international community.

Throughout the struggle between Hussein and UN/US inspectors, the one group who bore the wrath of the international community consistently was the Iraqi people. Amid tight sanctions imposed by the UN under US pressure and harsh oppression domestically under Hussein, the Iraqis continue to suffer the worst of both worlds. While conditions in schools and hospitals worsen, the Iraqis witness tighter sanctions and relentless bombing aimed at stopping Hussein and his chemical weapons fantasies.

Hussein's elusive chemical weapons remain the target of US attack and the source of much international concern. The United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) met with resistance in searching for these weapons throughout 1998, when in March and later in November, Hussein forced the team out of Iraq.

UNSCOM's role in Iraq holds particular significance based on the recent proliferation of chemical and biological weapons in less-developed nations. Cheaper and more readily available, chemical weapons provide an accurate and brutal means of attack as well as repression. Iraqis caught between the UN and Hussein are experiencing a type of conflict that is becoming more and more pertinent in the international community, as the Serbian crisis is most recently illustrating.

Photographic Exploration



A suspected chemical weapons precursor site. This chlorine manufacturing plant, located 85 km northwest of Baghdad, in Fallucia, was a site suspected of manufacturing chlorine for use in chemical weapons such as mustard gas, sarin, and other blister agents.

-Photo courtesy UNSCOM



A UN inspector takes a sample from a suspected chemical weapons plant in Muthannea, North of Baghdad.

-Photo courtesy UNSCOM

Photographic Exploration



UN inspectors supervising the destruction of 122mm artillery rockets. These rockets were armed with sarin gas, to be used in a strike. April 1992, Camusia.

-Photo courtesy UNSCOM

Photographic Exploration



Head of UNSCOM Richard Butler briefs the United Nations General Assembly on the state of Iraqi compliance. As Australia's ambassador to the UN, Butler worked on the committee which introduced the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as well as the indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty--a move that some claim was equivalent to granting states already in possession of nuclear weapons a monopoly on the deadly devices.

Butler's work in Iraq met no less criticism, as he and the UNSCOM team clashed several times with the Iraqi leadership over unrestricted access to suspected Iraqi chemical and biological weapons sites.

-Photo courtesy UN Photo Library



UN weapons inspectors carry equipment to their jeep prior to leaving Baghdad UN headquarters Friday morning March 6, 1998. The men are part of a group of UN weapons inspection teams that will be conducting spot tours of suspected weapons sites that may cover sensitive compounds.

-Photo courtesy of the Associated Press/Peter Dejong

Photographic Exploration



A convoy carrying 86 UNSCOM weapons inspectors leave the Habaniya airbase 65 kilometers, (40 miles) west of Baghdad, Tuesday, November 17, 1998. Faced with the threat of an American attack, Iraq declared Saturday that the UN weapons inspectors could go back to work immediately, a move that could defuse the third crisis in less than a year over arms inspections

-Photo courtesy of the Associated Press/Jockel Finck

Photographic Exploration



Iraqi women sing as they stand under a picture of President Saddam Hussein during a rehearsal for a military show at the Saddam Stadium in Baghdad, Saturday, November 14, 1998. Soldiers and hundreds of Iraqis prepared a show for Baghdad Day, a local holiday, celebrated Sunday, November 15. UN special envoy Prakash Shah announced Saturday afternoon that Iraq will allow UN weapons inspections to resume.

-Photo courtesy of the Associated Press/Jockel Finck

Photographic Exploration



Shells of ambulances parked in front of Saddam medical center in Baghdad. Since the imposition of the sanctions directly after the Gulf War, the entire Iraqi health care system, among other sectors of the country, have been forced to cut down on expenditures--including routine maintenance.

-Photo by George Capaccio



An unidentified Iraqi woman on Thursday, August 6, 1998, cries for her under one-year-old daughter, Sarah Hassan, who suffers from asthma and dehydration as she breathes with the help of an oxygen mask at Baghdad's Saddam's Hospital. Sanctions, imposed eight years ago to punish Iraq for its 1990 invasion of Kuwait, ban the sale of oil, the country's economic mainstay. Iraq maintains that the sanctions affect the availability of medicines and food for its people.

-Photo courtesy of the Associated Press/Jassim Mohammed

Photographic Exploration



Sixty-two cars carrying the coffins of children on the roofs are driven through downtown Baghdad, Iraq, Saturday, Feb. 21, 1998, in a symbolic funeral procession. Iraqi sources claim the children died of food or medicine shortages due to UN sanctions. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan began formal talks with Iraqi leaders Saturday in Baghdad on defusing a crisis over weapons inspection. At the United Nations in New York on Friday, the Security Council voted to allow Baghdad to more than double the amount of oil it can sell under a special UN program to buy food and medicine. The Security Council will not lift the sanction until the arms inspectors certify that Iraq has destroyed all its weapons of mass destruction.

-Photo Courtesy of the Associated Press/Peter Dejong

Photographic Exploration



An Iraqi mother keeps vigil over her two children at Saddam Children's Hospital in Karbala, approximately 40 miles south of Baghdad, Thursday March 5, 1998. Both children were diagnosed as severely malnourished and having a multi-vitamin deficiency, according to hospital sources the result of UN sanctions. A UNICEF report estimates 30 per cent of all Iraqi children under five years suffer from chronic malnourishment.

-Photo courtesy of the Associated Press/Peter Dejong

Noam Chomsky

The Nuclear Age and the Changing Face of Global Conflict Part III: Interview with Noam Chomsky

by Daniel Matro and Abdallah Simaika

Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor in the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is considered one of the founders of modern linguistics and is the prolific author of numerous works in such various areas as philosophy, politics, cognitive science, and psychology. A linguist who revolutionized his field, Chomsky became better known for his political and social activism than for his innovations in linguistics through his strong moral opposition to the Vietnam War. Since the 1960s, he has been a consistent critic of U.S. government policy, both foreign and domestic. He has become one of America's foremost political dissidents. Though a controversial figure in mainstream American academic circles, Chomsky has been called "one of the most important intellectuals alive" by the New York Times, and "the conscience of the American people" by the New Statesman. He has published volumes criticizing government, business, and the media, and analyzing the violence of U.S. foreign intervention in places like Guatemala, El Salvador, and Indochina. He has attempted to document the subservience of the U.S. media and intellectuals to the ideology of a government shaped by corporate interests. Here he shares his views on some emerging problems around the globe.

Daniel Matro is a sophomore at Williams College majoring in Political Science and Mathematics. His interests include political theory and contemporary politics.

Abdallah Simaika is a sophomore at Tufts University majoring in International Relations and Economics. His interests include the economies of OPEC nations and Iranian politics.

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Hemispheres: *Last week, the State Department released a report criticizing certain countries for human rights violations. China and Cuba were both at the top of the list. Yet while we continue to impose sanctions on Cuba, the United States follows a policy of engagement towards China (for example, Madelaine Albright's recent visit to China). Can you comment on what, if anything, is behind these seemingly contradictory policy approaches?*

Chomsky: Well they're not contradictory, they're only contradictory if you think that human rights are an issue in US policy. If you think that, yes, they're contradictory, but the evidence against that is overwhelming. In fact, not only overwhelming, but quite well known to scholarship. So, for example, the best place to test it is actually Latin America, where the US has the most control and the least interference, so if you want to understand US policy, Latin America is the best place to look. Just as if you wanted to understand the Kremlin's policy, you would look at Eastern Europe, not Southern Africa, for obvious reasons. And in Latin America, the matter has in fact been studied.

The leading US. Scholar concerned with human rights in Latin America is Lars Schoultz of the University of N. Carolina. Back in 1980, he published a study in a scholarly journal in which he compared human rights abuses in Latin America and US aid, including military aid, and they were very closely correlated. That is, the worse the human rights abuses, the higher the US aid. This pattern went on right through the Carter administration, nobody even bothered studying the trend since 1980 because its too obvious, I mean, during the Reagan years, the correlation between US aid and human rights violations was through the roof, so it wasn't even worth studying. But up till 1980, it was maybe worth studying. The correlation was significant. That doesn't mean that the US is in favor of torture, it basically means that it does not care.

There's a reason for the correlation, which was studied by an economist, a colleague of mine who I've written with, —Edward Herman of the Wharton school. He studied the relationship between US aid and the climate for investment as determined by profit remittances and other standard measures. And he found that US aid correlates very closely with improvements in investment climates, so improvements in investment climate go up, aid goes up and relations improve. Well, I think that explains

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the story. US policy is concerned with improvements in the climate for investment. Now it happens that improvements in the climate for investment are often correlated with human rights abuses, so a good way to improve the investment climate is to murder union leaders, to assassinate peasants who are trying to organize, and kill priests and so on and so forth. So you get a kind of secondary correlation between US aid and human rights violations, and that is in Latin America, the primary test area. If you test it in other parts of the world, I think that you would get a similar correlation.

Well, come back to China and Cuba. China is a region where US corporations expect to make money. The region has cheap labor, huge markets, and investment opportunities. The southeast region of China, for example, is developing and is by now I suppose mostly foreign owned. Their region was integrated into the foreign industrial systems and is very profitable for them [US investors]. The markets are still a little bit of a dream, but they expect to have them. And you can get cheap labor and so on. So sure, it doesn't matter how many human rights abuses they carry out.

Let's take Cuba. Cuba is a different story, there is some wealth there, and in fact American business would like to end the embargo because they want to make as much money as they can out of it. It has nothing to do with human rights improvement or deterioration.

Cuba plays a special role in US foreign policy. Cuba is, in fact, the oldest issue in US foreign policy. In fact, in the 1820s, Thomas Jefferson and John Quincy Adams were thinking about how to conquer Cuba—it was the next place to expand to. They couldn't do it at that time because there was a deterrent. It wasn't the Russians, it was the British, and the British were just too strong. That's why Cuba has a different color on the map, and in fact why Canada has a different color on the map—the British were just too strong to allow US expansion. The US could expand west where they could just kill Indians, but they couldn't expand to areas where there was a strong international force. And they understood that at the time. In fact, John Quincy Adams pointed out that, "Cuba will fall into our hands like a ripe fruit by the laws of 'political gravitation,'" which is a metaphoric way of saying that when we get stronger than the British, which will happen over time, then the deterrent will be gone and we'll pick up Cuba, which has to be ours.

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And indeed that happened. Just a hundred years ago, in 1898, the Cubans had essentially liberated themselves from Spain. The US moved in and essentially blocked the liberation and took Cuba over as a kind of colony.

In their recent edition of "The Kennedy Tapes," Harvard professors Ernest May and Philip Zelikow open by describing Cuba as a "virtual colony," through the work of Ernest May and Philip Zellerkoff, two Harvard professors, opened by describing Cuba, accurately, as a "virtual colony," of the US up until 1959, which is correct, it was. It was a center of first of all, agro-export, (US-owned), gambling, prostitution. It was just a great place all around till 1959, when, from their point of view, they [the Cubans] consummated the 1898 revolution. You finally had Cuba libéré. The United States wasn't having any of that. Within a few months (by October of 1959) it [the US] decided to overthrow the Cuban government. So it's 7 or 8 months after Castro took over, and planes were flying from Florida and bombing Cuba. The US claimed it couldn't find them [the bombers], that it wasn't happening. Of course they could find them if they wanted too. If planes were flying from Cuba to bomb Miami, you would find them fast enough. But by March 1960, a formal decision was made in secret to overthrow the government of Cuba. It had to be in secret, and it was conditional—it had to be done in such a way that the US hand would not be too visible. And the reason was because they [the Eisenhower administration] knew it would be extremely unpopular in the US and Latin America, and also in Cuba, overwhelmingly unpopular. They knew it would be unpopular because the Eisenhower administration at the time had studies of Cuban opinion, which showed very strong support for Castro, optimism and so on. So they were going to overthrow the Cuban government, but in secret, so that the effect of public knowledge would essentially be negated.

Then when Kennedy came along, it became an absolute obsession. The Kennedy administration went crazy over Cuba. In fact, internal descriptions of cabinet meetings describe a complete frenzy because Cuba was not falling into our hands like a "ripe fruit." And in fact they [the Kennedy administration] brought the world pretty close to nuclear war before they finally backed off a little bit. They started terrorist operations, instituted the embargo, which remains to this day, and which has gotten harsher after the cold war ended. The pretext was the Cold War. But of

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course the pretext had virtually nothing to do with it, and the evidence for that is that after the Cold War ended, the sanctions became harsher, much harsher, (under liberal pressure incidentally). And Clinton, in fact, kind of forced Bush to accept what they called the Cuban Democracy Act, which affectively made restrictions harsher. If you look back to 1959 and 1960, the Cold War was a very marginal issue.

A lot of this material is now declassified, and shows that when Kennedy came in he had a Latin American mission, which looked over all of Latin America—he was going to be very oriented towards Latin America in his policies. Arthur Schlesinger, the historian, headed the Latin American mission. In his report to Kennedy, Schlesinger talks about Cuba. He said, (and the wording is something like this), that “the problem caused by Cuba is the spread of the Castro idea of taking matters into your own hands.” So the concern was that it might spread around Latin America, other people might get the idea of taking matters into their own hands, and that’s no good. And he later explained that it’s particularly dangerous in Latin America because most people live under extreme oppression. In addition to the oppression, the distribution of land and the effect of the *IMF* policies of the time (1950s) was such as to make people ready for a message which says “let’s take things into our own hands and do something about our own fate.” That was the Castro problem. That’s what’s called a virus in international affairs, a virus which might infect others who might also want to take matters into their own hands. And that’s not acceptable. Schlesinger did mention the Russians—it’s not that they weren’t there. He said, in the background, the Soviet Union is offering development aid and a model for development. So that was Russian aggression. The Russian aggression was that they were offering a development model and assistanc, so we can’t have that.

So that was the Cold War element. And then starts the terror of Operation Mongoose, the sanctions, it goes on. The terror is going on up to the present. There were bombings last year in Havana which are tied back to an international terrorist operation, which has been closely connected to the US in the past. Whether or not the operation is still connected to the US, we don’t know, but the bombing was traced back to Luis Posada Carilles, who’s one of the leading international terrorists in the world. He is a product of the CIA Bay of Pigs invasion, and has been involved in other U.S. terrorist operations in South America, including

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San Salvador and Nicaragua. That's right up until the present so Cuba's a special case.

The hysteria over Cuba is sort of out of line with its economic potential and significance and I think it's because it strikes such a deep cord in American foreign policy and in the fantasies of the American leadership. So they [the Cubans] really have to be punished because of all countries, they're the ones who are supposed to be obedient. And they tried to follow their own path and they have to be punished, others have to understand that. And so you now have the interesting, somewhat unusual situation of US government policy running counter to substantial business interest who would like to just drop it all and go in there, make what profit they can, and return Havana to the good old days of the 1950s. And the government is so far blocking it for other kinds of reasons. So Cuba and China are quite different from this point of view.

The whole China story is complicated and goes back again a century. In 1898—it's an important year in US history—the US expanded beyond its borders, or what they called its borders. It [the US] had a national territory that had been conquered in unflattering ways. For example, about a third of Mexico was stolen, not to mention what happened to the indigenous inhabitants. But anyway, the national territory was established and there were three major prizes that were discussed by James Blaine, the US Secretary of State at the time. They were: Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Hawaii. They got them all by 1898—Hawaii was stolen from its own population a couple of years earlier. Puerto Rico and Cuba were taken over in 1898. The Philippines, which were a little bonus—they were not part of the original plan, were acquired when, in 1898, the US moved in to prevent the Filipinos from liberating themselves from Spain, which was essentially what happened. In the process, the US fought a bitter war against the Philippines with huge massacres, hundreds of thousands killed, plenty of war crimes and so on. And the Philippines were turned into a colony. All of this was aimed towards China, including the Caribbean operations. They were thinking about a canal, and then came along Panama (stolen from Colombia). The idea was to have control of the Caribbean, to have coaling stations out in the Philippines, and to have Hawaii as a way station. This was going to be way for the US to break into the fabled China market, which is a big fable for western investors from way back. And China was a major concern at that time. The US wanted to get a piece

of China.

All the European powers and Japan were sort of dividing it up—they wanted a piece. And so things go. The US supported the Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-Shek. It was one of the very few countries that did not recognize the communist Chinese regime when it took over. In fact, well after Europe, for example England, had recognized Communist China, US planes, flown by Kuomintang pilots, were still bombing China from Taiwanese bases. The Korean War was very much China-related. Through the 1950s, there was a debate, which is rather similar to the debate that's now going on about Cuba. There were sectors of American business, strong sectors, that thought it would be a good idea to enter into economic relations with China and gradually draw the Chinese into our sphere even if they called themselves communists. There was another sector that said no, we should follow a harsh line—essentially drive China into the hands of the Russians, which is what was done. There were plenty of tensions between Russia and China that were very visible, and by 1960 they were unmistakable. In fact, a couple of years later, the two were virtually at war with each other. So these two policy lines were in conflict in much the way they are today with Cuba. Segments of business decided that they want to accommodate and incorporate it. Hard-liners wanted to crush it, drive it into the hands of the Russians and make it a cold war issue. *The issue was not settled until Nixon took the soft line. Nixon decided to move towards the doves, to move towards accommodating, to recognizing what was unmistakable—that China and Russia were practically at war. Nixon strove to accommodate China into the US system, and that has been the effort ever since. It hasn't totally succeeded, China is a big country with its own goals and intentions, you can't just push it around. But gradually, China is becoming incorporated into the international system dominated by the major industrial capitalist societies, primarily the United States. This is the background. There are some similarities between China and Cuba; the conflict between government power and a good section of business is a good example. But I mean that human rights are just not an issue.*

Hemispheres: *We would like to move from China to the Asian crisis, to talk about the Asian crises and the US's role in it. Some have questioned the US handling of it and US policies towards Asia in the*

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last couple of years. I was wondering what your thoughts on the subject were.

CHOMSKY: Well, one thing to bear in mind is what every honest economist will tell you, which is that they haven't a clue about what's going on in the international economy. Jeffrey Sachs, for example, writes that the international economy is "dimly understood". The Bank for International Settlements in Basel, which is the most respectable institution that exists, the central bank for central bankers, in their last report, essentially threw up their hands and said we have to look at these matters with "humility", we don't know what's going on. Paul Krugman, another well known economist has an article in *Foreign Affairs* where he says for all we know, we may be heading back into a global depression of the 1930s type without any tools for handling it. And we really don't know. You have to add a fair amount of caution to what anyone tells you on the subject. Nobody really understands it.

Part of the reason why we don't understand it is understood. That is, the reason why it's not understood is understood. And that is that in the early 1970s, the Bretton Woods system was dismantled (a system of post-war international economic order), first by the US and then by other financial powers. And the Bretton Woods system was based on regulation of capital. So currencies were kept within narrow margins, tied to the US dollar, which was in turn tied to gold. And there were countries that were encouraged to regulate capital flow. Well, that broke down in the early 1970s and it led to an astronomical increase in very rapid flows of speculative capital.

There essentially is no theory of financial markets, they're wild. They're governed by panics, manias, crashes, in a phrase. People are trying to guess what somebody else is going to do, trying to decide when to panic, and so forth. If you read what economists are predicting, it's mostly amateur psychology. In effect the markets are extremely volatile and extremely unpredictable and given to sort of herd-like extreme behavior. It's sometimes called irrational, which maybe isn't the best word for it. From the perspective of the investor, it may be quite rational if you see everyone panicking to want to get out first. The point is financial markets are not based on economic fundamentals. They are not based on how strong the economy is. They're based on how much you can make

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tomorrow because of slight differences in currencies between countries.

A reasonable analysis on what happened in Asia, with the qualifications about humility, is that it was a huge market failure. None of the hotshots were predicting it. The IMF and the World Bank's reports at the time that the markets all collapsed were full of praise for the "sound fundamentals, financial stability, great liquidity, etc." of the Asian markets. They quickly withdrew their reports because they came out just when the whole thing was collapsing. It's not because they're stupid, it's because no one knows what's going on.

In the early 1990s, South Korea had a remarkable industrial development from real poverty to major industrial development. They had rather tight regulation on capital controls through the 1980s. In the 1990s, they were forced to liberalize, under tremendous US pressure—they [the US] forced them to overvalue the currency, take in US imports, and to liberalize capital flows so that US financial institutions could get control and so on. And I think, not very surprisingly, the economy collapsed. Because of reasons similar to those in Southeast Asia. There was a huge flow of speculative capital which flowed in and which quickly flowed out again. Even a rich country can't absorb that kind of shock. And these countries went into a free fall. They're sort of leveling off now, and sort of recovering. But the kind of recovery they feel will leave a substantial core of their assets in the hands of western investors, who pick them up on firesale prices. But this looks like an almost classic market failure due to vast speculative flows in and flows out. And even in the west it's called a crisis. It's called a crisis now because it's harming the interests of rich people. When it's only poor people suffering, it's not called a crisis; it's called an economic miracle. But when rich people start to get in trouble, it's called a crisis.

So the period that the rest of the world calls neoliberalism since the 1970s has been quite harmful to the general population of the world. Even in the US, though in such a rich country it isn't obvious, the typical family is working many more weeks per year than they did 20 years ago to keep incomes stagnant or declining, which is unparalleled in modern history. Furthermore, it's the whole international economy that has been harmed. Growth has slowed, productivity has slowed and so on. Social programs have been substantially dismantled. These are the predictable effects of liberalization of financial capital. As a matter of fact, part of

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the reason for regulating them was to maintain stable economies, but also to maintain the welfare state. It was well understood by the designers of the Bretton Woods system that free flow of financial capital is a tremendous weapon against democracy and against the welfare state. If any population tries to do something for itself, what they call governments doing things for the population, then capital flows out of the country to punish it. And that has been a powerful weapon. It was understood to be and that's what we've seen in the last 20 to 25 years. In the case of a vulnerable economy suddenly opened up to financial liberalization such as Thailand or South Korea, it was a disaster. And it became critical enough for the West, for rich sectors of the West that it became what's called a crisis.

In the recent G7 meetings, Germany France, Japan, most of the international economies outside of the US tried to develop a new financial architecture, to introduce some new financial regulation to the international financial economy. When [French President] Jacques Chirac came to the US bringing his message earlier this year, he was talking about a program that they had agreed upon to try to keep the three major currencies (Euro, dollar and yen) within fairly narrow bands by regulation. That was flatly turned down by the US, totally refused, and on interesting grounds. Robert Rubin, the Secretary of the Treasury said that this would be madness. The reason it would be madness (and he explained it correctly) is that the if we agreed to this, then the US would lose control over its financial instruments, over monetary policy. The loss of control over monetary policy would mean that if say, the economy went into recession, we would not be able to lower interests rates to try to stimulate the economy. We would have to keep them high to maintain the currency within the decided range. Rubin said that it's total madness, which is correct, but that's exactly what we impose on the rest of the world—that is the IMF policy exactly. And for East Asia it was a disaster of course, and it was madness. Robert Rubin and Wall Street thought it was great, it's great when *they* suffer, but it's not great when *we* suffer, that's madness. From the perspective of Wall Street, for the US treasury to submit themselves to this policy, it's madness, but for Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea to submit themselves to it, that's "economic rectitude." And if you just ask yourself who's gaining and who's losing, the answers suddenly pop up. In this sense, it's a crisis. It's likely that wealthy people

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might be suffering, so it's a crisis. So there's a great deal of discussion as to how to deal with these out of control financial markets. And probably there's no way of controlling them unless we go back to a Bretton Woods style system. And there have been various proposals around for years as to how to do this, for example the Tobin tax, other controls, which might work, but there hasn't been any willingness to try them out so far because the wealthy are making out like bandits. Just take a look at the distribution of income in the United States and you'll see why there's been no interest in dealing with this. It's been a period of slow growth in the US, including the Clinton recovery, but there has been some growth, and it has been very highly concentrated in the top few percent of the population. Most of the population has either stagnated or declined, so why change things?

Hemispheres: *A recent New York Times article reported on the "brain drain" of technology experts from the former Soviet Republics to neighboring so-called "rogue states." These experts include, for example, chemical weapons specialists who have left Russia due to deteriorating economic conditions. Can you talk a little bit about the reasons for Russia's economic deterioration and also about whether you see any potential danger posed by the export of these scientists to unstable areas?.*

Chomsky: The economic deterioration of Russia was very dramatic, but if you look at the rest the world, Russia was returning to what it had been, a third world country. The term "third world" wasn't used a century ago, but the concept existed.

Eastern and Western Europe have not been alike for five hundred years. At that time they started diverging, the West started developing, and the East became it's third world, it's subordinate area which provided resources, markets, cheap labor and so on. And in fact that continued into the early 20th century. Russia was poorer relative to the West in the earlier 20th century than it had been in the 15th century (relatively). There was development (mostly foreign owned), there was a wealthy educated class, but that's true of any third world country. In fact, it had essentially typical third world characteristics and it was a source of wealth and profit for western investors, not US investors at that time, but more

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British and other western European investors. Well then it went it's own way, like the Castro idea of taking things into your own hands. Well that's not tolerable, countries are not allowed to pull themselves out of the international system dominated by the rich, and that's true if it's Cuba, Grenada, Nicaragua, or a sixth of the world. It would be worse if it was a sixth of the world, so that naturally set off the conflict to try to restore it [Russia] to where it had been, that's called the cold war. It had nothing to do with human rights. Again, Stalin was a total monster, perhaps the worst criminal in history, but that had nothing to do with it. The US supports monsters all the time (Saddam Hussein is a recent example), but this was a monster who was going off on an independent path, and *that's* what's not allowed, so there was a conflict. And there are a lot of other factors. Russia is so huge that the conflict took on a life of its own.

The logic is very much like a north-south conflict, and it ended the way north-south conflicts end—the more powerful force won and then the leadership of the Soviet Union (mostly gangsters) recognized, that from their point of view they would be better off selling the country to the West and enriching themselves. In the process, the leadership of the former Soviet Union became the analogs of third world elites, who are very wealthy but subordinated to the West. So they took on that role and sold out the country, opened it up and turned it into a market economy. And it became like every other third world country, a complete disaster. That's what market economies are like. So yes, it became a market economy, and went into a free fall, a huge demographic disaster. Nobody knows the scale, but by 1993, UNICEF, (which incidentally supported all of this) was estimating about a half a million extra deaths per year. Amidst the economic downfall, a sector of extremely wealthy people emerged. It has very much the structure of a third world country, with the old apparachikes along with criminals and the Mafia running it and enriching themselves.

Boris Yeltsin is a good example. He was a tough Stalinist bureaucrat who became the darling of the West because he was selling the country out to the West and turning it into an open market economy, something that the West would never permit itself to do, but imposes it on the third world—markets are for those guys, not us. So that's what's been happening to Russia. And there has been a brain drain.

The major brain drain by far was to Israel. There has been a huge

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flow of educated Russian emigrants to Israel, I think it's now about a million or so, which has been a big shot in the arm for their economy, they get a lot of trained, educated professionals. Israel is part of the US. You can't call it the 51st state because it gets a lot more from the federal government than any of the US states do. It's an outpost of US power in the Middle East. The immigrants the US is worried about are the ones going to what are called "rogue states." Rogue states are states that don't follow orders. Again, it has nothing to do with human rights or aggression or anything else, it has to do with following orders. So Colombia for example isn't a rogue state even though it has the worst human rights record in the hemisphere because the government more or less follows orders. Indonesia under Suharto was a total monstrosity, it can't even be tolerated, with events such as the killing of half a million people in East Timor, a quarter of the population. This was never a rogue state because it was a paradise for investors, he (Suharto) was opening up the country to robbery by foreign investors, so he was a great guy or "our kind of guy" as the Clinton administration described him. But if a country isn't following orders, it's a rogue state, and you don't want to strengthen them. Incidentally, the US is quite isolated internationally in its characterization of rogue states. Cuba is a clear example. Here the US can't get any votes in the UN on the matter except for Israel, which is automatic. Another one is Iran. Here the US is in conflict with Europe and Japan, as well as most of the Middle East, who want to bring Iran back into the international system. The US so far is refusing, and is in conflict with Europe over this.

As long as the US wants to isolate a country or not support it, there's concern about whatever brain drain there might be from Russia to say Iran, but I think the concept has to be reinterpreted.

Hemispheres: *You've criticized the U.S. for not supporting democratic opposition movements in Iraq as a possible alternative to the use of military force. Recently, the U.S. allocated \$80 million to fund opposition factions in the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. Will the U.S. begin to consider aiding democratic opposition, or will it prefer aiding the military opposition in its efforts against Hussein?*

Chomsky: I believe exactly what they say. What they've been saying

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directly or indirectly through mouthpieces like the Chief Diplomatic Correspondent of the New York Times, (which is a technical term meaning "State Department Spokesman of the New York Times"). Well let me quote Thomas Friedman, Chief Diplomatic Correspondent back in the early 1990s, he said that the best of all possible worlds for the US would be an iron-fisted military junta which would rule Iraq just the way Saddam did. That would be the best of all worlds, if you can't get that, then maybe you can get something else. The US was so strongly opposed to the democratic opposition that the State Department had ordered diplomats not to contact them. According to the Iraqi opposition itself, this began in 1988, right after the gassings of the Kurds. The US was afraid that it might alienate "our friend Saddam" if there were contacts with the democratic opposition. I can't verify that, that's what the opposition claims. After that, it certainly became formal, in fact the formal order to block all contacts was reiterated in March 1991, right at the time of the uprisings—the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings which the US wanted Saddam to crush, and you can see that by the US reaction. Years later Brent Scowcroft, who had been National Security Advisor for Bush, was asked about this and he said that yes, it was the right policy. He said that the policy was to maintain political stability of some military rule.

Last December, Madeline Albright made the statement that "we have come to the realization that the Iraqi people would benefit if they had a government that really represented them." I don't know if the religious conversion took place or not, but the fact that the words were pronounced tells you all you have to know, meaning that up until December 1998, that was not our position, now their claiming that it is their position, I don't see any reason to believe it. It looks like they're [the US] still trying to get a military uprising, and that military uprising, or any kind of coup that takes place, may lead to a regime that's worse than Saddam. That's the opinion of Denis Halliday, who's probably the most knowledgeable Western analyst. He was a UN bureaucrat for 30 years, he was head of the oil for food program, and in that capacity, he was traveling all over Iraq, saw lots of things, made lots of contacts and so on, and is very knowledgeable. I'm sure that he knows way more than US intelligence. He resigned in protest, describing what was happening as genocide. One thing he pointed out is that he believes that the sanctions policy is creating what he calls a post-Versailles atmosphere, something like Germany after

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Versailles, which we're aware of. It's turning the potential leadership of the young professionals into people that are angry desperate, who are becoming to regard Saddam as too moderate. If that's true I don't know, but if it is, a replacement from the inside could be worse.

I don't think the US will care as long as the leadership will be obedient. After all the US had nothing against Saddam. Remember that the claim that we're bombing Saddam Hussein because of his crimes cannot possibly be true. That's about as close to logical impossibility as you can get, for the simple reason that he committed these crimes while we supported him and the support continued without a break. You can't be bombing him because he used weapons of mass destruction against his own population because when he did that, the US continued its support for him. The fact that people can repeat that explanation without so much as batting an eyelash shows something about the servility of the intellectual class.

So that can't be the reason. The other reason offered is that we're trying to degrade his weapons capacity. That can't be the reason either. The main effect of the bombing as the Pentagon predicted, was the elimination of the UN inspections. The inspections are the only thing that was degrading the weapons capacity. So that can't be the reason. So what are the reasons? Whatever the reasons for this policy— and I do not think they are hard to find but it's continuing and again, with the US in considerable international isolation, there's very little support for them, with the exception of Britain.

Hemispheres: You've often commented that the international press is much more independent than the mainstream American press, where the manufacture of consent limits and structures what is presented. Do you see any signs of globalization causing the international press to suffer the same fate you feel the American press did after WWII?

Chomsky: The whole international media system is moving into the hands of a very small number of mega corporations, maybe about a dozen or so mega corporations, which are largely in control of the bulk of international media, not just press, but also television, book publishing, journals, they're trying to get a hold of internet access, but that'll be a little more difficult. It's very concentrated.

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There's more variety when you move out of the northeast corridor than there is in the northeast corridor. If you want a critical analysis of the policies of France, you don't look at the daily French press. That's not to say that the US press is more independent than the French press, but on the policy of France it may well be.

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The Nuclear Age and the Changing Face of Global Conflict Part IV: Interview with Robert Pfaltzgraff

by David Stevens and Henning Fischer

The Cold War international order may have been based upon the possibility of great power conflict, but the bipolar system that resulted was nevertheless characterized by a high degree of stability. The fall of the Soviet Union has ushered in a new era in which the prospect of major war has declined while general instability has increased. The present situation bears little resemblance to the "New World Order" predicted by former President George Bush, and in fact, we may be in the midst of a movement towards an international system ruled by internationally codified procedures administered by international organizations.

The incidence of conflict among and within states has increased since the end of the Cold War, as has the number of actors capable of international violence. This is diametrically opposed to New World Order visions. Rather than supranational convergence, we are witnessing a further dissolution of international units. Regional and inter ethnic conflicts, such as those in the Balkans and the Middle East, threaten to become the norm.

How can order and stability be achieved in this context?

As the co-author of *War in the Information Age (1997)*, *Roles and*

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Missions of Special Operations Forces in the Aftermath of the Cold War (1995) and *Ethnic Conflict and Regional Instability: Implications for US Policy and Army Roles and Mission* (1994), Professor Robert L. Pfaltzgraff of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University has many insights to offer on this subject.

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Recently, he has been quoted in the *Boston Globe* regarding the crisis in Kosovo. Professor Pfaltzgraff sat down with *Hemispheres* staff members to discuss the recent developments in the Balkans and his thoughts on the future of armed conflict.

Hemispheres: *The present international system is characterized by types of conflicts different than those of the Cold War era. It has been argued that we have entered a transitory phase since the collapse of the Cold War bipolar order and that we are moving toward a "New World Order." Do you see such regional conflicts as the ones in Iraq, the Balkans and the Great Lakes region as merely symptoms of the transition towards the New World Order, or do they represent a different and new face of conflict in the 21st century?*

Pfaltzgraff: I would begin by saying that it is not so much a "New World Order" as a "New World Disorder," and that in this New World Disorder, we have a spectrum of conflict. That spectrum extends from the possibility, indeed the reality, as we saw in Operation Desert Storm in 1991, of what we call major theater war, or major regional war, between state actors such as Iraq and its neighbors, and the possibility of regional wars in the future, which could include North Korea. Having said that, most of the armed conflicts that are taking place today are at the lower end of the spectrum, and of course they are the types of internal wars or

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civil wars or ethnic conflicts such as we see in the Balkans in ample measure, but also tribal conflicts as we've seen in Central Africa. These conflicts are symptomatic of the breakdown of the states within which those conflicts take place. We have a large number of such states in various parts of the world that fall into a category called "failed states."

It seems to me that we have to look at the post-Cold War world in this context, while at the same time remembering that these types of conflicts did not begin with the end of the Cold War. We had a great deal of conflict within states in the Cold War period, especially in the Third World. Think, for example, of Vietnam, which was a civil war, or of the civil war that broke out in the Congo in 1960 just after it became independent. There are many other examples that I could give, but it is true that the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union itself has given momentum to new conflicts that in many ways are revivals, I suppose, of old antagonisms, as in the Balkans. Remember, the Balkans have gone through periods historically, such as the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 preceding the outbreak of World War I in 1914, that had some of the same characteristics as what is taking place there today; that is, the expulsion of populations based upon ethnicity.

Hemispheres: *What role, if any, do you see international organizations (such as the United Nations, NATO, the EU, the Organization of African Unity or other, more traditional alliances) playing in these types of conflict? What are the prospects for the New World Order?*

Pfaltzgraff: First of all, the operations that have been undertaken under the auspices of international organizations, and in particular, the experience that we have had in the Balkans in the early 1990's, illustrate both the strengths and the weaknesses of international organizations, including the United Nations, and the NATO alliance, the key actor today. These mechanisms, these international organizations, provide a basis for the organization of collective action on the part of their members. The problem with these organizations is that they cannot do a great deal more than the collectivity of their members wishes them to do. And, for us to impute a certain independence of action on the part of the organization is to exaggerate its contribution to the situation.

I would say that the weakness of the international organizations lies

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to some extent in the fact that the members of those organizations have not been willing to do more than they have actually done. In a sense, what the international organization has done is to codify the level of response that the members are willing to undertake. In the case of the early 1990's, with the United Nations Protection Force, UNPROFOR as it was called, the purpose was to provide a series of peacekeepers within Bosnia and Croatia, but not to achieve a settlement that would allow a curtailment or a reduction in the conflict. After all, the peacekeeping mission that UNPROFOR had was one that took place in the midst of conflict. In fact, you had peacekeepers sometimes standing by, watching populations being slaughtered in military operations and not being able to do anything about that. You had peacekeepers being taken hostage. Only when the United States and other countries took action to go beyond that did we get the Dayton Accord of 1995 and the effort that we now see attempting to create a stabilization of some kind, of some sort, in Bosnia.

What we now see in Kosovo is the level of agreement that the Alliance is capable of reaching about what should be done. That level of agreement extends at this point to air strikes, but not to the establishment of a ground force presence in Kosovo, even though many military analysts would conclude that for NATO to be successful in achieving its objectives in Kosovo-- to prevent the ongoing expulsion of the ethnic Albanian population--(which it has failed to do) it would need to have a ground force presence there to keep Milosevic's paramilitary forces from carrying out their ethnic cleansing and genocide. That is the weakness of the organization. Having said that, NATO, in particular, has provided a basis for contingency planning, for the development of training of forces and security commitments that have been made by the members with regard to defense, but also as regards other issues which fall within the parameters of the North Atlantic Treaty. I'm thinking not only of the Article V collective defense provision of the treaty, but also of what is called the "non-Article V" part of the treaty, which includes NATO participation in peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations that are, of course, very much a part of the post-Cold War situation.

Hemispheres: *Given the failure of New World Order visions and diplomacy in preventing regional armed conflict (i.e. Somalia, Bosnia and the Great Lakes) and the corresponding humanitarian crises, what is the utility of armed intervention versus diplomacy in such situations?*

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Pfaltzgraff: It seems to me that you cannot separate armed intervention and diplomacy. Armed intervention, of course, should always be a last resort in crisis situations. We should seek always to resolve crises without the actual use of military force, but the very presence of military force, and the perceived willingness of states to use military force itself is an aid to diplomacy under many conditions. In other words, diplomacy that is not backed by the willingness to use force to make that diplomacy credible is diplomacy that may be non-productive. Was it Metternich who once said that to have the Viennese Waltz without the music would not be the Viennese Waltz? The waltz and the music would be the analogy to diplomacy and military force, and that was what Metternich was referring to. There is a necessary relationship, it seems to me, between the ability to achieve political objectives through negotiations, and the willingness to do so based upon the perceived threat that military force provides to those who would otherwise not engage in diplomacy. The problem that we have faced in Kosovo is that we did not have a credible military threat behind our diplomacy at Rambouillet, and, as a result, we gave repeated deadlines to Milosevic threatening to use force. Then, when he did not comply with those deadlines, we simply moved back the deadlines and he apparently built up an expectation that we would not use force, and that if we did use force, it would be used ineffectively. And that is really what has happened over the last several days when we have used force. I suppose one could say that what we've done is to bluster and blink. We've blustered that we will use force, and then we've blinked when he has not responded to our threat to do so. That is a very fundamental reason for the failure of our diplomacy. Diplomacy and force must be looked at as closely related instruments to be used in crisis management and in statecraft.

Hemispheres: *Do international organizations and/or states have a responsibility to intervene, and if so, what is the source of authority to intervene?*

Pfaltzgraff: States increasingly have been seen, according to international law and humanitarian laws, to have an obligation to intervene in conditions of extreme internal crisis, such as we see today in Kosovo and as we did before in Bosnia. But the willingness to do so is questionable when it comes to the

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issue of interests at stake. I believe that the issue we have to face is: when does a humanitarian interest become a national interest? Thus far we have not seen the two as necessarily coinciding, and I must admit that it is very difficult for a country, such as the United States, or for other countries as well, to reach the conclusion that a military intervention in what is the internal setting of another country is necessary and appropriate. So, it seems to me, that as you think about intervention and humanitarian intervention as a justification for the use of military force, you must reconcile that with a set of national interests that states have, because, after all, to tie forces down in one humanitarian intervention will mean that they are not available for other situations in which you may have more vital interests at stake that transcend humanitarian interest. It seems to me that this is a complex set of questions that has to be addressed when you think about intervention for humanitarian reasons, or for reasons of national interests. States need to determine when the two coincide and when they don't.

Hemispheres: *As an International Relations scholar, you must have observed the failure of traditional peacekeeping efforts in regional conflicts such as Bosnia. NATO seems well equipped to pursue alternate policies of peacemaking (imposition of peace by military means) or peace building (crisis prevention and management). Should the Alliance devote its resources to the preservation of its military advantage, or should it focus more on crisis prevention and management?*

Pfaltzgraff: NATO is the organization that we have that is most capable of effectively using the military component of crisis management. While NATO should, of course, seek to prevent crises from breaking out, we have other mechanisms that we have been developing in the post-Cold War Euro-Atlantic setting for that same purpose: one being the OSCE, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, another the European Union, the EU, and of course the United Nations itself. I would say that if you think of a division of labor between the pre-crisis, the crisis, and the post-crisis, NATO has the capability to do more of the heavy lifting, so to speak, of military operations. Now, having said that, when you think of the post-Cold War role of NATO, we think of, as you said, peacekeeping operations as well as "peace support operations" or "peace enforcement operations." For NATO to suc-

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ceed, or for any organization to succeed, in peace-keeping operations, the traditional rule of thumb for peacekeeping operations is that the force enters the situation with the consent of both sides, and peacekeeping must be undertaken with the consent of both parties. The historical precedent for this goes back to the United Nations' experience of the 1950's, just after the Suez crisis of 1956, when the United Nations put a force, which was called the United Nations Emergency Force, interposed between Egyptians and the Israelis. The fact that you did not have this in Bosnia in the early 1990's doomed the United Nations Protection Force, as I discussed in an earlier answer to your question, to failure. The basis for the current peace support force, which is what we now have, was the IFOR, the Implementation Force as it was called, that came in after Dayton in 1995 and that was succeeded by the two SFORs (Support Forces), SFOR I and now SFOR II. Those are forces that are there with the consent of the parties, but they are also, in the case of the US, heavily armed forces. It seems to me that peace keeping and peace enforcement operate under special circumstances. In both cases, outside forces can only be introduced with the support of the sides that are being separated and stabilized.

The problem with Kosovo is that we could not reach agreement with Milosevic, having gotten grudging agreement on the part of the Kosovo Liberation Army, to allow a NATO force to come into Kosovo. Milosevic was not prepared to allow that to happen. The original purpose of the NATO air strikes was to make him change his mind, to allow that force to come in. Instead, what he has done is to engage in a very brutal, and it seems quite thorough, ethnic cleansing and genocide of the Albanian Kosovo population, since the NATO operation began. In that sense, and at this point in time, the NATO operation has been a failure. Now, whether it will be ultimately successful remains to be seen in what goes on next in Kosovo. But, as of now, we have roughly 400,000 refugees pouring out of Kosovo, or out of Kosovo already.

Hemispheres: *In Kosovo, diplomatic efforts backed by the threat of force have failed, and the actual use of force has only worsened the situation. On May 25, 1993, former NATO commander General John Galvin testified before House Armed Services Committee on the policy implications of US involvement in Bosnia. He stated "I would say we*

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have to learn a lesson from what we have seen happen... in Bosnia, and that is, first of all, NATO is needed when there is a question of response to crisis in Europe, under the United Nations, of course, because I think you need an international mandate for any kind of entry into some other country." How do you see the situation in Kosovo evolving and what lessons should the international community draw from this crisis? Have we learned anything from our experience in Bosnia? Is the handling of such crises a model for the future of conflict?

Pfaltzgraff: There are some fundamental differences between Bosnia and Kosovo. For Kosovo to have worked, it would have been necessary to have the agreement of both sides and we had that in the case of Dayton. We would have needed first and foremost an agreement between the two sides about the type of presence to be put in. The lesson I would draw, however, is that if NATO, whatever mandate it may or may not have, is to intervene in such a crisis, it must intervene with military power, and if its going to use military power, it must use military power in a way that will decisively enable it to achieve the results that it wants to achieve. That, of course, is not what is happening today.

There is no historical record of air power by itself achieving the objective that we have set for ourselves. Air power must be used in conjunction with ground forces, if we are going to use the military instrument. Air power, in the case of Operation Desert Storm was mounted decisively, it was mounted rapidly, and it was mounted with vast quantities of cruise missiles and other air assets used against Iraq as part of a concerted air/ground campaign. We do not have that in Kosovo; in fact, we have the reverse effect. We have an alliance that has been very slow to choose even the targets to be hit. We have hit the wrong targets for the military objective that we have, and it may well be that air power is not the optimal instrument. You cannot use air power against paramilitary units operating in Kosovo, and that is what Milosevic has been using. The use of air power to achieve this political objective by itself is inappropriate. That is not a lesson we need Kosovo to teach us. We could go back to other examples in history to show that air power used in this way is indecisive. It in fact will harden the will of the adversary and his population, and it will not soften up his military forces sufficiently to allow them to pull back.

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A decisive military action would also mean removing Milosevic from power. It would mean, if you were to operate militarily, sending an armed force down through NATO's newest member Hungary and right into Belgrade. This would not be an impossible military task. I looked up the military budget of Yugoslavia in the International Institute for Strategic Studies' *Military* and compared the capabilities of NATO's forces to those of others. It would surprise you to see that the 1997 defense budget, or the defense expenditures, of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia amounted to 1.5 billion dollars. We have a country with a population of 10,600,000. It has total active duty military forces of 114,200, according to this, 43,000 of which are conscripts.

Domestic and International Constraints on the Brazilian Cattle Industry

by J. Zak Nissenbaum

Introduction

The Amazon rainforest, as well as other tropical forests located in the earth's equatorial region, is of enormous global and regional importance because of the vital natural resources it contains. In terms of products used for human consumption, Amazonia yields vast amounts of fuel, timber, pharmaceuticals, crops, drinking water, hydroelectric power, and many other potential products that have yet to be discovered. In addition, the area has served as a habitat for indigenous cultures for countless generations, not to mention the fact that it holds some of the most breathtaking scenery this planet has to offer.

It is also widely known that the Amazon, due to accelerated development activity within and outside the region, is currently being destroyed at an alarming rate. It has been cautioned that at the present rate of development, countless species of plants and animals will be permanently wiped out of existence. Also, large-scale deforestation endeavors have contributed to deleterious environmental effects that will probably threaten the sustainable use of the land. Regionally, these problems are manifested in droughts, soil erosion, the resultant siltation of lakes and rivers, the deterioration of watersheds and desertification. Globally, deforestation of the Amazon could contribute to climate change, reduction of biodiversity, alteration of hydrological patterns, and other serious dilemmas down the road.

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Hemispheres, Vol. 22, 1999

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The superficial causes of this destruction are quite obvious. For the most part, rapid deforestation can be attributed to colonization by the landless poor, forestry-related industries, exploration for minerals and petroleum, the construction of roads and highways, which allow easier access to wilderness areas, the flooding of large sections of forest for hydroelectric purposes and the clearing of trees for the production of agricultural crops and beef cattle.

Of all the aforementioned development activities, the conversion of Amazon land for agrarian projects, especially cattle ranching, is generally believed to be the most pervasive reason for the destruction of the region's tropical forests. Beef cattle raised in the Amazon customarily require one hectare (2.5 acres) per head, although as soil fertility and the nutritional value of grasses decline, as much as seven hectares may be required (Shane 1985). Raising beef cattle, a process that takes four to six years to reach a suitable slaughtering weight of 400 to 500 kilograms, requires extensive landholdings due to the necessity of moving herds to new and greener pastures. In terms of output value per unit of land, cattle ranching uses far more land than mining, logging or agriculture.

However, for all of the deforestation caused by cattle ranching in the Amazon, remarkably little beef is actually produced. In Brazil, beef grown on former rainforest land is low-grade and the majority of it comes from old cattle and used-up dairy cows. In fact, beef production is one of the least profitable ventures that can be undertaken in such an environment. The Rainforest Action Network (RAN) has calculated that if rainforest land were harvested for such things as medicinal and ornamental plants, nuts and rubber, each acre would generate approximately \$6200 worth of goods per year. Moreover, all of the above products can be removed with minimal damage to the ecosystem. The same acre of land, cleared and used to graze cattle, generates only \$148 annually (Bloyd-Peshkin 1990). Furthermore, the profits engendered from ranching do not last very long: within a span of five to ten years, ranching exhausts the fertility of the land, leaving a barren desert in its wake.

These unfortunate events, long a source of panic for environmental activists and professional ecologists, have been increasingly brought to the attention of concerned, though often naïve, citizens of rich Western industrialized nations. These people typically react to the phenomenon of deforestation in the Amazon with moral exhortation. For instance, they

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might ask, "How could such a terrible thing happen? Don't these people understand the long-term consequences of their actions? Why can't they just be more responsible? What's the point of sacrificing the precious Amazon rainforest to raise a handle of scrawny cattle?"

The purpose of this essay is to examine the economic basis of decisions to engage in the cattle ranching industry and the incentive structure that surrounds it. It will describe both the domestic and international political and economic constraints on this industry and how they make it difficult to ameliorate its harmful effects. By primarily focusing on Brazil (the largest country in Latin America, inside of which most of the Amazon rainforest is contained) and using its political economy as an example for most other Latin American nations, this paper will center around the following issues:

a) The delegative characteristics of the Brazilian government (either democratic or bureaucratic-authoritarian, depending on the year) and its tendencies toward particularistic behavior. Virtually all Brazilian cattle ranchers have close ties to the state apparatus. Therefore, they receive economic favors in the form of tax breaks, subsidies, and property rights in exchange for continuing support of the political elites. A closer look at the workings of this patron-client network will provide the most informative explanation for the vast deforestation that has occurred within the country and most of Latin America. This system has resulted in extremely high short-term gains for ranchers and has led the government to miscalculate the benefits they receive from deforestation. Most important, it has greatly contributed to the propagation of the unsustainable land-use methods involved with cattle-ranching.

b) The encouragement provided by the World Bank and other large international lending agencies in the 1960s and 70s in favor of cattle ranching activities. Hundreds of millions of dollars were lent to Brazil during this time by the World Bank due to the worldwide surge in beef consumption, undeniably helped by the Third World's desire to eat a Western, meat-heavy diet. These loans were to be used to construct the infra-

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structure necessary to facilitate the growth of the promising cattle industry. However, this development plan never delivered the profits it expected. Brazil fell further and further into debt in the early stages of the 1980's, causing the country to concentrate on export-oriented growth instead of importing goods for domestic needs.

A thorough analysis and description of these and other crucial elements will provide a more than adequate indication as to why the unsustainable business of cattle ranching has been able to exist for so many years. In order to realize this object however, a few important facts about the history of cattle ranching in Brazil must be discussed in order to provide the proper context for the reader to better understand why this industry's rise occurred in the first place. Also, it is necessary to delineate key political theories and their applicability to Brazil's style of government to fully comprehend the underlying political economy of cattle ranching in most Latin American countries. It is to these tasks that this essay now turns.

The Rise of Cattle Ranching in the Amazon: A Brief

History

Seventeen of the twenty-one nations comprising Latin America contain areas of tropical forest. For the sake of brevity, the only ones without tropical forests are Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Chile. In all of the other countries, the most productive lands have, for the most part, been historically owned by a small minority of the population and used for the production of cash crops for export. Not only are these commodities subject to severe price fluctuations in the global marketplace, these nations must import many food items at great expense for the domestic consumption of their population because their most fertile soil is being used to grow crops for export. The concentration of vast tracts of arable land in the hands of a few also creates a grave shortage of employment and property-ownership opportunities for the growing populations of each country. Therefore, to make room for these people, governments promote the colonization of tropical forests as new areas for intensive agricultural projects while blatantly ignoring evidence suggesting that these lands are

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largely unproductive (Shane 1985).

This reasoning can certainly be applied to Brazil, whose portion of the Amazon borders seven other countries. Leaving such an enormous amount of land unoccupied (indigenous tribes are not a factor when issues of national security arise) causes the Brazilian military to feel quite nervous. In the 1960s, as the Brazilian population substantially expanded, the government hoped to alleviate pressure from overpopulated regions, especially those in the northeastern part of the country, by encouraging people to colonize and cultivate land in the Amazon rainforest. To entice settlers into leaving their homes (if they even *had* homes), the Brazilian government gave the ranchers and farmers title to the rain forest land they cleared and developed. Furthermore, it provided them with tax breaks, low-interest loans, and subsidies (Bloyd-Peshkin 1990).

These incentives lured numerous peasants to clear a few acres of land for themselves in these remote regions because it was their only protection against the high inflation rates that have characterized the Brazilian economy for the majority of this century. Also, these settlers were instilled with a sense of hope that they might finally realize their lifelong dreams of becoming self-sufficient farmers. As they cleared the land, these peasants forcefully displaced the indigenous people who had been dwelling in the rainforest for thousands of years.

But these small farms were usually short-lived. The thin topsoil of the rainforest was unsuitable for sustaining crops for more than just a couple years (Southgate 1998). When their crops began to fail, the farmers either attempted to sell the land at a low value, or simply abandon it and search for other areas of the forest to clear. Sometimes, they would not even get the opportunity to watch their crops fail: once the land was cleared, the powerful cattle ranchers would overtake the land and throw the peasants off.

Pervasive Particularism in Brazilian Politics

Unfortunately, activities and practices such as these are still relatively common today. Although they may have been initiated under the auspices of an authoritarian government, not much progress has been made on this front since the transition to a democratic government in 1985. The cattle ranchers, who are normally rich investors, create pasturelands for their livestock as large as 25,000 to 50,000 acres (Macmillan and Furley

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1994). But these ranches are also short-lived. Although they are highly profitable in the short run, after approximately five years, they are virtually useless. Due to the fact that the majority of these ranchers support themselves on multiple sources of income, and that they receive tax breaks and government subsidies for their activities, they have the ability to expand their property further into the rainforest or simply use it as collateral to purchase more land (Katzman and Cale 1990). Consequently, what was once a vibrant rainforest is now slowly evolving into a barren desert.

Above all else, the underlying reasons for this phenomenon can be explained by the pervasive particularism that has embodied Brazilian politics since cattle ranching became extremely popular in the early 1960s. According to Guillermo O'Donnell (1994), Brazil's current political apparatus can be classified as a delegative democracy. In other words, formal democratic institutions have yet to be consolidated in the country's political arena, yet there are no signs of regression toward authoritarian rule (nor advancement toward a representative democracy). Despite the vertical accountability that leaders have to their citizens (i.e. votes in the ballot box), the state's other horizontal democratic institutions (i.e. congress, courts, etc.) are virtually powerless. There is no network of relatively autonomous powers that calls into question, and eventually punishes, the improper actions of a state official. O'Donnell goes on to say that with the exceptions of Chile, Uruguay, and Cuba, every Latin American country can now be defined as a delegative democracy.

Naturally, the majority of citizens living in delegative democracies have low levels of confidence in their government's ability to solve the socioeconomic crises that often exist in these countries. Besides their opportunity to vote every four years or so, they have virtually no influence over their government's policy-making in between elections. As a result, it becomes rational for these people to act with extremely short time horizons and for them to assume that everyone else will do the same. Instead of attempting to see past the immediate future, a scramble for narrow, short-term advantages typically ensues.

The main way of gaining and wielding political power in these societies is through the informal institutions of particularistic exchanges. This form of government is characterized by various sorts of nonuniversalistic relationships, ranging from patronage, nepotism, clientelism, and favors to actions that, in a formally institutionalized democracy, such as the United

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States, would be considered corrupt. Instead of earning one's status in life based on merit, talent or ingenuity, particularism allows for advancement by means of foul play. Individuals performing roles in state institutions, even in delegative democracies, are supposed to be guided by universalistic orientations to some version of the public good, and not by particularistic motives.

The lack of horizontal accountability in these countries creates temptations for corruption. In such environments, pervasive particularism often allows authoritarian practices to reappear, although the continuity of democracy remains unthreatened. In countries that transformed to democracy under conditions of sharp inequality and distributional conflict, as was the case with most Latin American countries, the implementation of particularistic policies becomes *further* biased in favor of well-organized and powerful economic interests.

There is a mutually reinforcing fragmentation of society and state, in which particularism interdependently operates with a segmentation of the state apparatus. Agencies have a great deal of independence from the center and pursue their organizational self-interest through links with particular clients (hardly ever the excluded poor), frequently against the wishes of other agencies. Public agencies are entangled with private interests and clientelist politicians keep a grip on the distribution of state benefits, channeling them to their followers and withholding them from others. This split between the aforementioned formal and informal institutions leads to the exclusion of the poor from many spheres of life.

These theories can easily be applied to Brazil¹, as well as the majority of Latin American countries, as a way of explaining the relationship between cattle ranching and vast deforestation. The cattle industry concentrates land ownership in the hands of a few rich individuals, many of who are government or military officials, who enjoy the numerous conveniences of being members of the privileged class. The peasant farmers who initially cleared the land are coercively removed. The indigenous tribes, who have made a living by raising crops in small plots and bartering with one another, are ruthlessly annihilated. A closer look at the domestic and international winners and losers from cattle ranching activities will help make the picture even more clear.

The Winners and Losers

There are large gains from deforestation that go to narrowly circumscribed producer groups in the cattle ranching industry who produce primarily for the market. In the short run, their activities can result in extremely large increases in income. This small group of individuals, who enjoy such intense gains, are able to protect their interests by obtaining concessions and favors from the state, even though their endeavors impose aggregate losses to a diffuse, larger group of people within the state.

An example of this is the granting of tax concessions by the Brazilian government for ranching in the Amazon Basin. Brazil's tax system virtually exempts agricultural undertakings, such as livestock ranching, and turns them into tax shelters. That adds to the demand for land and drives up its price, making it extremely difficult for the poor (who pay no income tax, and therefore receive no tax breaks) to purchase it. Indirectly, this has caused many members of Brazil's landless poor to migrate toward the unsettled regions of the Amazon and clear sections of forest for their personal utility.

In many parts of the country, tax credits for livestock projects have been the single biggest cause of deforestation (*The Economist*: September 2, 1989). Yet, these ventures rarely produce economic gains. Many are designed to strip the land and offset the consequent operating loss against other sources of income. The government keeps losing revenue and the world keeps losing trees. The only reason why such policies thrive is because those who benefit are powerful and have a strong affiliation with the government.

On the other hand, forest inhabitants, who have managed and cared for their land communally for many generations, are powerless and isolated from the modern world. Excluded completely from the particularistic networking of Brazilian politics, they have very little chance of convincing the winners to desist. In all probability, indigenous tribes are the biggest losers in this particularistic system of politics and economics. According to statistics provided by Cultural Survival, as many as eight million Indians lived in the Amazon rainforest around the turn of the sixteenth century. By 1900, there were only one million, and by now it is believed that less than 200,000 are still surviving in their natural habitat (Bloyd-Peshkin 1990).

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In addition to the gains enjoyed by important domestic producers and ranchers, there are also diffuse market-mediated gains from deforestation in *nontropical* nations, whose consumers have the ability to purchase beef at cheaper prices. These gains are considered diffuse because a reduction in the export of these beef products would not have a profoundly negative effect on the current material standard of living of these outside consumers. Imports of meat into advanced industrial countries from Brazil, only a fraction of which comes from the Amazon region, comprise a mere 3 percent of total meat imports into these advanced nations (Katzman and Cale 1990). A decline in meat exports from the tropical areas of Brazil would promote the expansion of cattle ranching into nontropical regions, thus hardly depressing the net world meat supply.

Citizens of advanced industrial nations must be factored into the equation as *losers* as well. Because of tropical deforestation in places like Latin America and Southeast Asia, they lose out on worthwhile scientific, climatological, aesthetic, moral, and economic option values. These losers are especially relevant due to their economic power and ability to change the incentive structure of the actors involved in deforestation and cattle ranching.

The particularism that permeates Brazil's informal political institutions has imposed external diseconomies on the remaining inhabitants of the globe by its encouragement of deforestation. An external diseconomy results when costs that cannot be compensated by the marketplace are borne by those not directly involved in the activity creating the diseconomy. The economic approach to correct these market failures attempts to internalize external diseconomies through compensation, thus creating motivation for alternative behavior. If the polluter always paid, the parties responsible for the rampant deforestation in the Amazon would compensate the rest of the world for the aforementioned option values it has foregone. However, there is currently no supranational government that could possibly enforce such compensation, so the losers in advanced industrial nations have to compensate the winners in Brazil to make them desist.

Any compensation along these lines is subject to several constraints. First, debt-ridden Latin American countries, like Brazil, regard their rainforests as natural resources to be utilized for profit, much like the

United States did with its western territories in the nineteenth century. They contend that this land is worthless to them unless they develop some form of livelihood on it. The Brazilian government has long argued that it is a sovereign state with the right to build its economy by means of exploiting its land, just like the United States had so successfully done. It will not willingly accept intervention into its internal matters. Therefore, any agreement made with Brazil must be voluntary and must also raise the country's welfare level, defined on its own terms.

Second, a delegative democracy, like Brazil, is generally regarded by the international community as unstable. Agreements over compensation made by one regime do not necessarily mean that its successor will comply. Third, an agreement to abstain from practices involving deforestation is a restriction on property rights. In many areas of the Amazon rainforest, these rights are difficult to define and extremely costly to enforce. Overlapping claims made by cattle ranchers to a given piece of land are quite common in the scattered, settled regions of the Amazon.

Refraining from Unsustainable Uses of the Tropical Forests in Brazil: International Constraints

The attitudes for which the West blames the developing countries in Latin America today are those which rolled back the native forests of North America only two centuries ago. Perhaps these critics of the region's irresponsible management of its greatest natural resources ought to bear in mind the fact that the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the United States Agency for International Development all contributed handsome amounts of money to fund the building of roads for the expansion of the cattle industry.

During the 1960s and 70s, when the Brazilian government began to seriously encourage cattle ranching in the Amazon, beef consumption worldwide was significantly increasing. In addition, the rapidly growing fast-food industry in the United States created a huge demand for cheap, low-grade meat. This stimulated demand created a new market for intensely competitive fast-food chains, such as McDonald's and Burger King. These corporations would go just about anywhere to get a nickel off a pound of beef (Bloyd-Peshkin 1990). So the aforementioned lending institutions, dominated by a strong U.S. presence, promoted cattle

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ranching in Latin America as a means to obtain cheaper prices for beef in the Western Hemisphere while fostering economic development domestically. Consequently, between 1960 and 1980, Brazil's Superintendency for Amazonian Development (SUDAM) invested around \$1 billion in almost 350 new cattle ranching endeavors, covering nearly 20 million acres of rain forest ground (Shane 1986).

Douglas Shane, author of *Hoofprints in the Forest* (1986) and former rainforest consultant to the U.S. State Department confirms that the World Bank loaned approximately \$235 million in 1978. He also contends that those loans were actually open lines of credit. The World Bank demanded only that the loans be utilized for agricultural purposes, and it gave the Brazilian government the latitude to determine which projects should be funded. Much of this money was used to develop the country's infrastructure, so that the ranchers could get into the Amazon and clear the land. According to Shane, infrastructure is at the heart of deforestation, implying that the United States directly contributed to the main source of deforestation. Other money lent to the Brazilian government enabled the elite to supply cattle ranchers with generous subsidies and tax breaks, thereby reinforcing the deleterious, particularistic nature of the country's politics.

Nonetheless, the cattle ranching industry never quite rendered the immense profits that international lending agencies expected. Brazil fell into a heavy debt crisis, and in 1982, the SUDAM stopped supplying financial incentives for livestock ranching. Brazil experienced great difficulties in trying to pay back its initial loan to the World Bank. Attempting to service what seemed to be an infinitely increasing debt placed great pressure on Brazil to gear its economy toward export markets, rather than domestic needs, in order to raise its level of cash availability for debt payments. This series of events left many poor people in Brazil worse off than they had initially been (Macmillan and Furley 1994).

The large international creditors, now convinced that cattle ranching in the rainforest is not a worthwhile investment, have desisted from providing loans for any agricultural activities in the Amazon. As of 1985, under extreme amounts of pressure from environmentalists all over the globe, the World Bank started requiring environmental impact statements and cost-benefit analyses before sanctioning any loan. Yet each of the major lending agencies continues to play a role in the destruction of tropical forests by financing and assisting in the construction of new roads and

rural development projects with cattle ranching components, indirectly propagating environmental degradation and unsustainable forestry practices. In the Amazon, the damage has already been inflicted upon the abundance of life that once existed in the rainforest and upon small farmers, the indigenous people, and the Brazilian economy. Who can possibly know the true extent of the loss the world has suffered from the deforestation of Amazon?

Concluding Remarks

It is widely believed that under the proper circumstances, sound practices such as ecotourism, extraction of nontimber products, environmentally friendly timber production, and genetic prospecting could result in habitat conservation and improved standards of living. Much more could probably be accomplished by raising livestock and crop yields in such a manner that agricultural land clearing is no longer needed to satisfy increasing commodity demands. Of probably even greater importance is human capital investment, which would reduce the number of people for whom converting natural ecosystems into marginal, unsustainable farmland is an attractive employment option. Indeed, excessive encroachment on natural ecosystems can be attributed to the more fundamental problem of rural poverty and the lack of institutions that are needed for markets to function healthily.

Critics have charged that international financing and assistance agencies and transnational corporations often operate in contradiction to the interests of less developed, Southern nations by promoting the production of primary commodities for export markets. Although there may be a great deal of truth in that accusation, this essay has shown, through the example of Brazil, that developing countries in Latin America have needed no urging from the outside world to develop their cattle industries. The demand to ease population pressures, enhance national security, and economically develop were all the motives the Brazilians needed to clear rainforest lands and produce beef for the market.

The underlying problems that have plagued Brazil and the Amazon are primarily domestic. Until the formal institutions of representative democracy are consolidated within the country, the political elite will never be fully accountable to its constituents. Until a noticeable decline in corruption and particularistic behavior occurs, Brazil's tropical for-

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ests will be subject to conversion to pasture lands and other unsustainable practices. Until the poor and indigenous people are included in decisions that affect their lives, they will always have the incentive to clear forestland and make a living for themselves.

The international constraints on Brazil cannot be ignored either. The problem now is simply that the overall demand for beef and its products exceeds that which domestic production can supply. As long as people continue to consume the same or increasing amounts of beef, and as long as the United States and other developed countries continue to import beef from tropical regions of Latin America, the threat of deforestation and its harmful environmental effects will endure indefinitely.

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¹ It should be noted here that particularist favors were also highly prevalent in Brazil's authoritarian regimes (1964-1985) before the transition to democracy.

Towards Bondage or Freedom: Women and Family Law in Pakistan and India

by Sehr Amjad

This paper is a comparative analysis of the way in which Islamic law is applied to women in India and Pakistan. The aim will be to contrast the application of this law in Pakistan, an Islamic state where all laws must be in conformity with the Quran and Sunnah, and India, a secular country with a minority Muslim population which has the option to operate under secular law or religious law on personal matters. This will entail examining how India and Pakistan apply Islamic codes in their countries. It will be achieved by examining certain cases relating to Muslim Family Law, and specifically divorce, maintenance and inheritance, as they have been applied to Muslim women in these two countries.

First, I intend to introduce the subject of Muslim Family Law as applied to women in India and Pakistan by placing it in the context of each country's respective constitution. In India, religious freedom, the basic foundation of secularism, is guaranteed by Articles 25 through 28 of the Constitution. The Constitution, by guaranteeing freedom of conscience, ensures that inner aspects of religious belief and external expression are protected. At the same time, Article 44 of the Constitution directs the country to "endeavour to secure for the citizens a uniform civil code throughout the territory of India." This aim poses a considerable challenge and controversy in a country that has many diverse religions and cultures. The question then arises whether a uniform code becomes a tool in the hands of majority politics to suppress the legitimate personal laws of minorities. It is this issue that continues to foster controversy, debate and tension in Indian society.

The Pakistani Constitution recognises Islam as the state religion of

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Pakistan and directs the government to take steps to enable Muslims to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles of Islam. The constitution provides for a Federal Shariah Court to determine whether an existing law is, or is not, in line with the teachings of Islam. Article 227 of the Constitution specifically states that "all existing laws shall be brought into conformity with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sunnah... and no law shall be enacted which is repugnant to such injunctions." At the same time, it must be borne in mind that the Constitution is the supreme law in Pakistan and there is a Shariat Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court to decide appeals against the decision of the Federal Shariat Court.

The main study will be an evaluation of the impact of *state* and *judicial* intervention in the lives of Muslim women in India and Pakistan with regard to Personal Law, specifically the aspects of marriage, divorce, maintenance and inheritance. It will examine the larger effects of case-law: Did the courts' decision leave women with more or less freedom to seek divorce or inherit property? Have the courts taken a liberal and compassionate view of the position of Muslim females in their society? Are they allowing laws to pass which afford protection and welfare to those who need it? The body of the paper will present cases and then discuss the issues which they bring forth. I will also examine the interplay between social and political conditions in these countries, and how they are manifested into laws.

PAKISTAN

When India and Pakistan gained independence in 1947, the inherited legal system in both countries was a conglomeration of customary practices, religious injunctions and statutes of the Imperial Parliament. While changes have been made in Pakistan which have codified and regulated established Muslim jurisprudence and customary practices, this complex legacy continues to have an impact on family legal cases.

Since independence, women in Pakistan have been struggling to ensure their legal rights. In 1947, the first legislature of Pakistan had two women representatives, Begum Jahanara Shah Nawaaz and Begum Shaista Ikramullah. The very first test for these women came when they found their male counterparts, who dominated the legislature, reluctant to approve the 'Islamic Personal Law of Shariah,' which would have recognised a woman's right to inherit property in accordance with Islamic law. The

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law would also guarantee all citizens, including women, equal pay for equal work, equality of status and equality of opportunity. After protests by women both inside and outside the legislature, the bill was approved in 1948 and became effective in 1951.

It was during the regime of President Ayub (1958-1969) that the most progressive piece of legislation ever to be implemented in Pakistan was approved. The main aim of the Muslim Family Law Ordinance (MFLO 1961) was to discourage polygamy and regulate divorce by prescribing the procedures for both. The ordinance forces a man who wants to marry more than one woman to obtain consent from the first wife. It prescribes a minimum age for marriage and takes the right of declaring-by-repudiation divorce away from the husband. It also gives the wife the right to divorce. A very significant clause of the ordinance is the compulsory registration of all marriages and divorces. This makes it possible for the wife to seek court enforcement of her legitimate rights as a married or divorced woman. These rights were previously inaccessible to her, as in many cases husbands would deny that the marriage or divorce had taken place.

It was after the military take-over on 5 July 1977 that concrete steps were initiated for the Islamisation of existing laws. This was first done on 10 February 1979 as the existing Penal Code of Pakistan was amended, and the existing provisions relating to offences of theft, robbery, dacoity abduction, rape, fornication, adultery, etc. were repealed and replaced by *Hudood* and *Tazirat* Laws which laid out punishments as prescribed in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. In addition, Shariat Benches were set up in each High Court and an Appellate Shariat Bench was created in the Supreme Court to hear appeals on these decisions. The Shariat Benches were empowered to strike down existing, as well as future laws if they were repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam, with the exception of the Constitution, **Muslim Personal Law**, or any law relating to banking and the collection of taxes and fees. In March 1982, the Zia regime, in order to accelerate the process of Islamisation, also conferred 'suo moto' jurisdiction to the Federal Shariat Court to examine whether an existing law was repugnant to the Injunctions of Islam. This far reaching change gave extraordinary power to these Courts. They could now strike down any law made by the Legislature and all laws already in place which the courts considered against the Injunctions of Islam.

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The upshot of these developments has been that today the legal system in Pakistan is in a state of flux. While on the one hand the Constitution remains the supreme law, many of its provisions are being challenged in courts of law on the basis of the injunctions of the Quran and Sunnah. An example is the examination by the Federal Shariat Bench of the Supreme Court in March 1999 of the payment of interest ("riba") which is considered un-Islamic by many Muslims. The judgement of the court could have a far reaching impact on the existing banking system. The result is that officials and bodies within the state are increasingly applying their own understanding of what is Islamic, and what is not, to the legal code. The Fifteenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution proposed by the present Sharif government would make the Quran and Sunnah the supreme law of the land. This amendment was passed by the National Assembly in October 1998, but it has not yet been ratified by the Senate. If it is finally passed, it will further aggravate the existing uncertainty regarding interpretations of laws in Pakistan.

These constitutional developments and amendments to the Constitution started by the military dictatorship of Zia-ul-Haq in 1979 have been particularly disturbing for the women in Pakistan because personal laws are largely not codified and their interpretation is dependent upon the judiciary. Indeed, as we shall see, different judgements of the courts have had far reaching impacts upon the lives and rights of women with regard to marriage, divorce, succession and inheritance.

Marriage, Dower and Divorce

It is a well-settled doctrine that marriage among Muslims is not a sacrament, but a civil contract. The contract undoubtedly has moral overtones, but legally, it remains a contract which can be subject to dissolution if so warranted. Both husband and wife are given the right to divorce. While the husband is given the right to divorce at will, the woman is given the right to *khula* (a judicial dissolution of marriage available to women on the condition that she provides compensation to her husband) in cases of extreme incompatibility. The types of compensation vary and are determined by a judicial officer. These can include giving up her right to *mehr* (money to be paid to the wife at the time of or during marriage), returning the dowry given by her husband and in some cases, gifts given to her by the husband and his family. Islam allows maintenance to

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be paid to the wife only during the period of *iddat*, which is about 90 days after divorce proceedings have begun.

The issues relating to marriage, dower and divorce are the most litigated ones in family law, and the bulk of case law is concentrated in these areas.¹ One comes across cases wherein women seek the dissolution of their marriage, custody of minor children and maintenance for them. After looking through the case law in this area, an interesting pattern emerges in situations where women sought assistance from the law. For example, one comes across very few cases where a first wife invoked the MFLO to inhibit her husband from a subsequent marriage and having failed, making it the grounds for divorce from him, exercising the delegated right to divorce on the basis of a stipulation in the marriage contract (known as '*tafweez-talaq*' or the delegated power of divorce). On the other hand, there are divorce cases in which the wife seeks dissolution of the marriage by offering to relinquish dowry through *khula*. This is followed by cases where the husband has allegedly divorced the wife but has failed to give notice of it as required under MFLO and consequently, the existence of the marriage is contended.² Other provisions of law that have been invoked by women (though less often), are cruelty, failure to maintain on the part of the husband³ and exercising the option of puberty.⁴

A study of reported Pakistani case law suggests that the superior courts have upheld the traditional interpretation of the doctrine of *khula*, namely that it is not an absolute right of the wife but a controlled one.⁵ In order to exercise the right of *khula*, a wife has to prove a fixed aversion towards her husband and convince the court that she is incapable of living with him "within the limits prescribed by Allah." In other words, she must prove an irretrievable breakdown of marriage has taken place, at least insofar as the wife is concerned.⁶

In a landmark decision of the Supreme Court in 1967, the *Khursid Bibi* case gave the right of *khula* to a wife on the condition that she could no longer live in a reasonably congenial atmosphere with her husband in the following words, "The Holy Quran declares in Verse 2:228 that women have rights against men similar to those that men have against them. It conferred the right of *khula* on women as against the right of *talaq* in men..."⁷ Another principle that emerged from the decision in the *Khurshid Bibi* case was that the consent of the husband is not a condition required for termination of the marriage contract. This principle has been upheld so far, and the trend seems to be fairly stable.⁸ Thus, *Khurshid Bibi vs.*

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Mohammed Amin clearly established the principle that intense hatred, dislike or aversion on the part of the wife against the husband were valid grounds for terminating the marriage contract through *khula*. It thus overruled earlier decisions, in which the court had held that an appeal for *khula* was to be dismissed because hatred on the part of the wife was not a valid ground for divorce under Muslim law unless the husband agrees to it.⁹ In later cases, judges have exercised their own discretion as to what constituted extreme hatred, dislike, etc. These have included mental torture as grounds for *khula*.¹⁰ In a decision by the Supreme Court in 1984, Justice Nasim Hasan Shah held, "that in the case of dislike by the wife of her husband, Islam concedes the right to a wife, in circumstances of extreme discord and where life becomes a torture for both, on account of fixed aversion on the part of spouses to seek dissolution of marriage on ground of *khula*."¹¹ Similarly in a judgement of the Lahore High Court, acting Chief Justice Javed Iqbal observed that:

The principle of *khula* is based on the fact that if a woman has decided not to live with her husband for any reason and this decision is firm, then the Court, after satisfying its conscience that not to dissolve the marriage would mean forcing the women to a hateful union with the man, . . . it is not necessary on the part of the women to produce evidence of facts and circumstances to show the extent of hatred to satisfy the conscience of the Judge, Family Court or the Appellate Courts.¹²

In a narrower interpretation, it has been held that *khula* is not to be allowed on the mere asking of the wife.¹³ The existence of an irremediable breach between the parties, making it impossible for her to perform her part of the contract within the limits prescribed by God, has to be proved by the wife to the satisfaction of the judicial conscience of the court.¹⁴ However, in an apparent contrast to the stricter enforcements of the condition of irretrievable breakdown discussed above, it has been held that the wife can claim *khula* as a right, the only limitation being when it was sought for immoral purposes.¹⁵

It is disturbing that the bulk of reported case law in the area of family law concerns the dissolution of marriage through *khula*. At times, there appears to be confusion in this area, whether inadvertent or deliberate, about the extent and operation of the doctrine of *khula*. If evidence presented by the wife

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shows that the husband is at fault, then a clear case for a judicial divorce is established under the DMMA and the husband is liable to pay dower and maintenance to the wife during the period of *iddat*. How is dissolution of marriage by *khula* justified by the court in these circumstances? The conclusion is that in divorce cases, the courts tend to take the least controversial route (i.e. let the woman forego her dower to please the husband) and let the woman get her freedom. This also is indicative of the lengthy delay in litigation in Pakistan's courts.

The frequent application of *khula* undermines women's legal rights on a number of counts, and illustrates how women suffer due to competing legal systems existing at the same time. It renders the DMMA ineffective since all the grounds on which a woman can obtain a judicial divorce as well as retain her dower are ignored. A distinction between a judicial divorce, where the wife does not forego her dower and also succeeds in terminating the marriage contract, and an order granting *khula*, where the wife foregoes her dower, must be clearly drawn. It is also tantamount to encouraging men to be casual and callous in their duties to their spouses, as the inference one draws from reported case law is that in the present social set-up, a woman would forego her dower rather than indulge in prolonged litigation.

The major problems that have now arisen with the post-1979 Islamisation process relate to the interaction between the MFLO and Hudood Ordinances of 1979 and some recent judgements by the superior courts which prescribe behaviour between a man and a woman. The latter bears direct reference to the Saima case in which Saima's right to choose her own husband and her battle with her parents over her decision went all the way to the High Courts in Pakistan. The courts ruled in her favor, but by then the whole country was abuzz with debate on whether a 22 year-old girl should be allowed such freedom. The more controversial religious question on the basis of which her parents filed the case was whether a Muslim woman can have a *nikah* without the consent of her *wali* (*guardian*). Even while the judgement was a majority judgement of 2 to 1, in favor of Saima, one majority judge recommended that the executive and the legislature examine the desirability of enacting law to take care of the menace of pre-marital relationships, secret friendships and secret marriages (which are forbidden in Islam), and to make such immoral relationships a penal offence. While the sentiment of the court is

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to afford protection to women from harassment and violence by her family against secret marriages by insisting on marriages being registered, it is also a flagrant violation of one's basic human rights. This again illustrates the growing tensions between conservative judges, who would like to regulate loves of people according to narrow interpretations of Islamic doctrines and the rights of women to live their lives according to their free will in personal matters.

The 1982 case of Safia Bibi is one of the earliest examples of disastrous decisions awarded by the courts based on the Hudood Ordinances. Safia Bibi, a near blind domestic servant, was raped by her landlord, and his son registered a rape case against them after the birth of her illegitimate baby. The Session Judge taking Safia's illegitimate pregnancy as proof of extra-marital sin, awarded her the punishment of 15 lashes, three years imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1000 while finding her rapists not guilty under the Hudood Ordinance. While on appeal Safia was acquitted after protests from women's groups. The worst consequence of the Hudood Laws is to provide a tool for state authorities to harass women and give it an air of legitimacy.

Also with the implementation of the Zina (Enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance of 1979, the 1961 MFLO's insistence that only notified divorces can become effective has now become an instrument to persecute and punish women. There are many cases where vindictive former husbands, who have not sent divorce notices to the local authorities, now allege that their former wife, who after being given a divorce has remarried, was guilty of adultery.

It was only after many legal battles and awards of punishment to women that the courts finally declared that failure to notify did not invalidate the divorce itself. In a landmark judgement in 1988, Justice Nasim Hasan Shah held that:

where a wife bonafide believing that her previous marriage with her former husband stands dissolved on the basis of a *talaqnama* (divorce papers), although the husband has not got it registered with the Union Council (local body), enters into a second marriage, neither this second marriage nor the fact of her living with the second husband will amount to *Zina* (adultery) because of the bonafide belief that her first marriage dissolved.¹⁶

Such judgements have saved women from the disastrous interaction of the MFLO and the Hudood Ordinance, in the process the protection that the MFLO 1961 offered women against arbitrary and unregistered divorce, while at the same time obviating women taking a second husband from criminal proceedings when the first husband had orally divorced her but did not get the said divorce registered.

There have also been some other positive developments. These include trends in which the courts have sought to simplify legal action to benefit women and have avoided multiplicity of proceedings. Frequently the courts have allowed the joining in one suit of reliefs arising from the same cause of action between the same parties. While those who oppose women's freedom to determine their own private lives (including former husbands and parents) have been able to manipulate certain provisions of the law and have been supported in their action by decisions of the courts, there has been a contrasting trend where courts have insisted that women are not chattel and given protection to their legal rights. In one such case, the court rejected an attempt by a man to restrain his former wife from marrying another man.¹⁷

To conclude, a study of reported Pakistani case law on marriage, dower and divorce reveals that more often than not, only those provisions and injunctions of religious or secular laws are used that perpetuate the status quo. Recent developments, especially the Hudood and Zina Ordinances, have made women much more vulnerable to persecution and extreme punishments, despite some progressive judgements. However, efforts to reform family law and change the Hudood and Zina Ordinances through the legislative and judicial process can offer women fragments of hope. The thrust must now be towards protecting laws, such as the MFLO and DMMA, which protect women's rights with emphasis on their implementation, and ultimately move towards more radical reforms designed to remove the glaring loopholes and contradictions in existing laws, which adversely affect women's lives.

Inheritance and Succession

The issue of succession and inheritance is the realm, in which custom has most dominated over Muslim personal law. This has negatively impacts women's rights. The rule of primogeniture persisted until recent times and only gave way for inheritance rights of males. Although established Muslim jurisprudence gives women a share in inheritance, cus-

tomary law, which denies women their share, was the overriding basis for deciding inheritance cases right up until the fourth decade of the 20th century. Despite centuries of Muslim rule in the region, in matters of succession and inheritance local Muslim communities do not adhere to Muslim personal law, which grants women a share in inheritance. They instead followed different local customs, under which women had extremely limited or no inheritance rights. These predominantly agricultural communities did not want women to inherit land for fear that it would be transferred to another family, clan or tribe. Changes were sought by the Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1937.¹⁸ In Pakistan, the West Pakistan Muslim Personal Law (Shariat) Application Act of 1962, unequivocally and legally made Islamic rights of inheritance available and applicable to women for the first time.¹⁹

At first glance, Pakistani case law on inheritance and succession rights of women is very encouraging.²⁰ From 1947 to date, whenever a woman has approached the superior courts for protection of her right to inherit, she was met with a very positive response. Why is it that in comparison to other areas of family law, the number of cases raising issues of inheritance and succession rights for women is extremely low?²¹ Is it because there are very few disputes in this field due to a religious compliance with the law? Or is it that due to the countless obstacles and inhibitions of women that they seldom make it to court? Is it the pressure from both family and society to forego one's inheritance so compelling for women that they are simply unable to raise a voice and are forced to settle out of court? It is probably safe to argue that it is the last of these scenarios. That of course is not to say that women must simply forego their right to approach the courts or use the law for enforcement of their rights. On the contrary, the review of case law reflects the fact that when women have approached the courts they have in many cases been granted legitimate rights, even though many women will not agree with the arguments put forward by the judges emphasising their vulnerability as compared to men. However, the end might justify the means!

A large number of case law in inheritance and succession cases referred to situations where women had executed relinquishment deeds signing away their inheritance to male relatives.²² The courts rejected such deeds on a theoretical basis without sufficiently recognizing or promoting women's rights to inheritance and succession. It is presumed from

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the tone of these judgements that women are not "adults" and incapable of making important decisions and that they will always be deceived and manipulated out of their possessions by scheming men; hence, the constant need for male protection arises. In the present socio-economic set-up there is no doubt that this protection is indeed required and that the sensitivity of the Pakistani courts to the problem is welcome. But this patronising attitude in women's rights may become the norm. Women in Pakistan therefore run the danger of being permanently marginalised in matters of wealth.

As we have analysed, with the era of the so called Islamization has come the assault on progressive laws such as the MFLO. An attempt has been made through the judiciary to hand down judgements favorable to women with respect to inheritance on the basis of "Islamic" justice. This has often led to various interpretations of religious texts that have to date been considered extremely unfavourable to women. Chief Justice Zullah's judgements are noteworthy in this regard and representative of the ongoing conflict. In 1990 for instance, in *Ghulam Ali v. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi (Mst.)* the question was whether adverse entry and non-participation in the profits of the property would not amount to an ouster of co-sharer.²³ The issue had been adequately dealt with in *Mst. Sahib Jan Bibi and others v. Wah Dad and others* and it was decided that female heirs are deemed to be in possession of their share of estate by succession as co-heirs even though their names were not entered in revenue records.²⁴ But the court's judgement consisted of a comparative discussion of various religious systems and the superiority that Islamic law enjoyed over them rather than implicitly stating that Islam recognized women's rights of inheritance. In arriving at his decision, Zullah CJ, speaking for the court made a highly innovative interpretation of verse 4:34 of the Quran to prove that there was no discrimination in Islam.²⁵ This verse has consistently been relied upon in establishing gender hierarchies and male superiority since it clearly implies that men are the providers and maintainers of women. The judgement holds that for this very reason, brothers can never hold their sisters' share in adverse possession against them! This innovative interpretation of verse 4:34 of the Quran may be a sincere attempt by a distinguished judge to promote women's rights, but the fact is that it reinforces the view held by many people that women are in constant need of supervision.

INDIA

Are Muslims in India economically more worse off than the majority Hindu population or other minorities? It is true that the Muslim population is concentrated in geographical areas²⁶ (e.g. Upper Pradesh state) where poverty levels are higher than the national average. There is also evidence that literacy and educational levels amongst Muslims are significantly lower. This may explain to some extent their incomes also being below the average in these areas. What, however, is well established, is that compared to Muslim men the socio-economic and human development indicators of Muslim women are worse off.²⁷

In India the basic debate on the rights of Muslim women has been between those who justify the retention of Muslim personal law on the strength of the Freedom of Religion Article and those who argue that this is subject to other fundamental rights including equality and individuality and therefore the state can legislate on issues of social welfare. The advocates of the latter school use the Fundamental Rights argument to justify the implementation of a uniform civil code as contemplated under Article 44 of the Constitution which would apply to all religious communities. The State, on the other hand, has adopted by and large a policy of "non-interference" in Muslim personal law based on the plea that it cannot impose its wishes on the Muslim community. Where existing legislation or court rulings have infringed on the basic tenets of Muslim personal law, the State has deemed it fit to either amend such laws or pass new legislation to overrule the courts' decisions. This has led to angry outbursts by those who believe that these steps are 'retrogressive' and worsen the rights and conditions of Muslim women in India. Yet there seems to be no easy way out of this impasse.

The central focus of this debate has revolved around issues on divorce and Muslim women's right to maintenance. This is discussed later in this paper. Many believe that there are other areas including those relating to Muslim women's right to divorce through *khula* where common ground between the two opposing schools could be found which would strengthen women's position in obtaining a divorce. However, always portraying any support for Muslim personal law as 'archaic' and 'fundamentalist' and attempts at a uniform civil code as 'progressive' and 'secular' has meant that little progress can be made in this highly

emotive situation.

The reform of Muslim law, as it pertains to women, has been the subject of debate both within and outside the community. This debate has been heightened after independence in 1947 especially after the passage of the Hindu Code Bill in 1956 which gave Hindu women legal parity with Hindu men. Muslim women were now not only members of a minority community but also their legal status became a matter of controversy since they did not possess legal parity with Muslim men. Earlier during the 1930s efforts, had been made through legal enactments within the Islamic framework to improve the status and rights of women.

The Shariat Application Act of 1937 emphasised provisions in the Shariat which were beneficial to women but had been denied under the plea of the prevailing Customary Law. It demanded that the share of the daughter in the father's property be restored. This Act was greatly supported by the Muslim women in India and was vigorously opposed by the orthodox section who had always sworn by the Shariat but were opposed to women exercising their legitimate property rights given by Islamic law.

The Dissolution of the Muslim Marriage Act of 1939 (DMMA) was another important milestone in providing relief to Muslim women. This law entitled Muslim women to obtain a decree for dissolution of marriage. Gaining legal permission from the court is the only way to obtain a divorce for Muslim women in India. The judicial decree of *Faskh* permits a Muslim woman to get a divorce on eight grounds. According to the DMMA, she can sue her husband on the following grounds:

- (a) if whereabouts of husband not known for four years;
- (b) husband had failed to provide maintenance for two years;
- (c) husband had been sentenced to imprisonment for seven years or more;
- (d) husband was impotent at the time of marriage and continued to be so;
- (e) husband was insane for two years or suffering from leprosy or any venereal disease;
- (f) the wife was given in marriage before the age of fifteen and she repudiated the marriage before eighteen years age;
- (g) husband treated her cruelty;
- (h) any other ground under Muslim law.

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In 1973 the legislature amended Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) and provided divorced women with the right to maintenance. Then under pressure from Muslim members of the parliament this amendment was changed to exclude Muslim women if they had already received the customary payments due to them under Muslim personal law. Despite these changes however, divorced and deserted Muslim women continued to demand their right to maintenance through the courts under Section 125 of the CrPC. This demonstrated the courts taking cognizance of their desperate need by adopting a liberal interpretation of the Code in their favor.²⁸

After 1973, in two significant judgements, the Supreme Court pronounced that divorced Muslim women were entitled to maintenance even if they had been paid customary sums due to them under their personal law, provided that this sum was not adequate for their maintenance. In *Bai Tahira vs. Ali Hussain* the court held that the amendment did not negate the social purpose for which the sections on maintenance had been enacted and "ill-used wives and desperate divorcees" could not be driven "to seek sanctuary on the streets." It further held that "the payment of illusory amounts by way of customary or personal law requirement will be considered in the reduction of maintenance rate but cannot annihilate the rate unless it is a reasonable substitute".²⁹

The main reasoning of the court was that since Section 125 was meant to serve a social purpose and benefit destitute women, it had to be interpreted in a way that served this purpose. Referring to Article 15 (3) of the Constitution which permits the enactment of special provisions for women and children, the court also argued that Parliament had enacted Section 125 of the CrPC in keeping with the spirit of this article.

In another judgement in 1980 the Supreme Court restated its earlier reasoning and held that the law must be interpreted to serve the social purpose behind Section 125:

...the payment of an amount, customary or other, contemplated by the measure must insert the intent of preventing destitution and providing a sum which is more or less the present worth of the monthly maintenance allowances the divorcee may need, until death or remarriage overtakes her. The policy of the law abhors neglected wives and destitute divorcees and S. 1277 (3) (b) takes

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care to avoid double payment, one under custom at the time of divorce and another under Section 125.³⁰

In *Fuzlunbi vs. K. Khader Vali* before the Indian Supreme Court in 1980 the respondent-husband resorted to the unilateral technique of *talaq* and tendered a sum of Rs. 500 by way of *mehr* and Rs. 750 towards maintenance for the period of *iddat*, thereby hoping to extricate himself from the obligation to maintain the appellant. The Magistrate vacated the grant of maintenance. This order was unsuccessfully challenged in the Sessions Court. The appellant went to the High Court but the Division Bench also dismissed the petition. In this judgement, the court also made a reference to Muslim personal law and the meaning of the word *mehr* which is supposed to be given to a Muslim wife and is fixed at the time of marriage, it stated that it was "not a sum of money in lieu of maintenance upon divorce." The court also clarified that since *mehr* may be prompt and is payable during marriage it cannot be a "recompense" for divorce, which the bride and bridegroom do not even contemplate at the time of marriage. In his judgement on her appeal to the Supreme Court Justice Iyer observed:

The facts are clear, the *talaq* has snapped the marital tie, the flimsy *mehr* has been tendered together with the three months' *iddat* dues and the divorcee remains neglected. The question is whether Section 127 (3) (b) of the Code has been complied with or the vinculum juris created by the order under Section 125 continues despite the make-believe ritual of minuscule *mehr* which merely stultifies Section 127 (3) (b) CrPC and hardly fulfils it. The matter is no longer *res integra*. No one in his senses can contend that the *mehr* of Rs. 500 will yield income sufficient to maintain a woman even if she were to live on city pavements! What is the intendment of Section 127 (3) (b)? What is the scheme of relief for driftwood and destitute wives and divorcees discarded by heartless husbands? What is the purpose of providing absolution from the obligation to pay continued maintenance by lump sum liquidation? What, in short is the text and texture of the provision, if read in the light of the mischief to be avoided, the justice to be advanced? The conscience of social justice, the cornerstone of our Constitution

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will be violated and the soul of the scheme of Chapter IX of the Code, a secular safeguard of British-Indian vintage against the outrage of jetsam women and flotsam children, will be defiled if judicial interpretation sabotages the true meaning and reduces a benign protection into a damp squib.³¹

After these two judgements came the famous Shah Bano case in which the Supreme Court again held that a divorced Muslim woman is entitled to maintenance. In 1985, the Supreme Court of India passed a judgement in favour of Shahbano in the case of *Mohammed Ahmed Khan, appellant, versus Shahbano and others, respondents*.³² The Supreme Court confirmed the judgement of the High Court awarding Shahbano, a divorced 63 year-old Muslim woman, maintenance of Rs. 179.20 per month from her husband, Mohammed Ahmed Khan, and dismissed the husband's appeal against the award of maintenance under Section 125 of the 1973 CrPC.³³ The bench went on to consider Surahs 241 ad 242, Chapter 11, of the Quran and concluded that this ruling in no way infringed upon religious provisions. In his concluding remarks, Chief Justice Chandrachud referred to Article 44 of the Constitution that called for a common civil code and noted that "...a common civil code will help the cause of national integration by removing disparate loyalties to laws which have conflicting ideologies."³⁴

Shahbano was not the first Muslim woman to apply for (and be granted) maintenance under the 1973 CrPC. The repercussions of the Supreme Court judgement therefore took many, including the government, by surprise. The ruling Congress-I party lost in the by-elections, as the sizeable Muslim vote turned against it, partly for supporting the judgement. When an independent member of Parliament introduced a bill to save Muslim personal law, the ruling party reversed its earlier position and resorted to a whip to ensure the bill's passage.³⁵ The bill was passed in May 1986 and became the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights in Divorce) Act. Under this act, divorced Muslim women would fall outside the preview of section 125 of the CrPC. Shahbano was led to denounce the judgement in asserting her Muslim loyalty, renounce the compensation, and ask for a restitution of the dower under the new act.

Since the promulgation of the Muslim Women's Bill I 1986 the legal definition of Muslim men's responsibilities in marriage has been undergoing considerable change. A survey of subsequent cases undertaken

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shows that halfway through the maintenance suits initiated by women under Section 125 CrPC, all implicated men have resorted to appealing to Section 3 of the Muslim Women's Bill of 1986.

In another important judgement, the Indian Supreme Court in the case of *Ahmedabad Women Action Group (AWAG) versus Union of India* in 1997, on a writ petition seeking declaration that Muslim Personal Law providing for polygamy and unilateral *talaq* by males offended Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution, that Muslim Women Act of 1986 was also violative of the same Articles, and that keeping more than one wife constitutes cruelty under Section 2 (VIII) (f) of Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act of 1939, held that the writ petitions do not deserve disposal on merit as the arguments are required to be dealt with by the legislature.

However, in *Sarla Mugal versus Union of India and other* before the Supreme Court in 1995, Justice Kuldip Singh in his judgement had observed that:

Article 44 is based on the concept that there is no necessary connection between religion and personal law in a civilized society. Article 25 guarantees religious freedom whereas Article 44 seeks to divest religion from social relations and personal law. Marriage, succession and like matters of a secular character cannot be brought within the guarantee enshrined under Articles 25, 26 and 27. The personal law of Hindus, such as relating to marriage, succession and the life have all a sacramental origin, in the same manner as in the case of the Muslims or the Christians. The Hindus along with Sikhs, Buddhists and Jains have forsaken their sentiments in the cause of national unity and integration, some other communities would not, though the Constitution enjoins the establishment of a "common civil code" for the whole of India. Bigamous marriage has been made punishable amongst Christians by Act XV of 1872, Parsis by Act III of 1936 and Hindus, Buddhists, Sikhs and Jains by Act (XXV of 1955).

He went on to state, "Those who preferred to remain in India after the partition, fully knew that the Indian leaders did not believe in two-nation or three-nation theory and that in the Indian Republic there was to be only one

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nation- Indian nation- and no community could claim to remain a separate entity on the basis of religion.” He also firmly added:

The Legislation – not religion- being the authority under which personal law was permitted to operate and is continuing to operate, the same can be superseded/supplemented by introducing a uniform civil code. In this view of the matter no community can oppose the introduction of uniform civil code for all the citizens in the territory of India. The successive Governments till date have been wholly remiss in their duty of implementing the constitutional mandate under Article 44 of the Constitution of India.³⁶

In a detailed study of cases following the five years after the promulgation of the Muslim Women’s Bill 1986, Mukhopadhyay concluded that (i) the High Court has been contradictory in its judgements and (ii) there is a corresponding constriction of Muslim women’s entitlements in marriage.³⁷ She argues that a plausible explanation for this arbitrariness is that, “social relations mediate women’s access to property and maintenance. Thus as a divorced woman who is expected to be dependent on her natal family (or to remarry and be dependent on another man). The maintenance allowance, therefore, is a sort of ‘pin’ money.”³⁸ According to her, Court officials (magistrates and advocates) see problems with the bill not because it does not in any way ensure women’s right to marital property, but because they claim that Muslim marriages are unstable, since polygamy is prevalent and permissible, and divorce, by pronouncing *talaq*, unilaterally weakens a woman’s position. Therefore, what is at fault here are Muslim marriage regulations “sanctioned” by their religion and culture. She concluded that, “the Muslim Women’s Bill constitutes a major attempt at codifying Muslim personal law, setting up boundaries delineating what Muslim women are entitled to in the event of a divorce. In the process, Muslim women’s entitlements have been redefined and men’s responsibilities to their divorced wives ‘fixed’ in a way that disempowers Muslim women.”³⁹

CONCLUSIONS

This review of how the State and the judicial system have impacted women’s lives in Pakistan and India must be placed in perspective. In both

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countries, the lives of the overwhelming majority of the people are guided by traditional customs which vary across regions, communities and sects. In both countries, the majority of the population, one half in Pakistan and two-thirds in India, still live in far flung rural areas. Levels of illiteracy amongst women are the highest in the world, 75 percent in Pakistan and 60 percent in India. Overall, there is considerable skepticism and lack of faith in state institutions, which are viewed as corrupt and exploitative. This holds especially true of the police and increasingly so of the judicial system. These matters are further complicated by the existence of a heterogeneous legal system which combines laws with a completely different normative basis. Many aspects of family law have their base in religion. Alongside are so-called secular provisions of the general law, many of them made by the colonial rulers.

Yet, it is no exaggeration to state that in both Pakistan and India the Muslim woman's question lies at the heart of any meaningful social reform. Such reform is imperative if women are to achieve a measure of equality. In this struggle, legal equality is imperative. Women's lack of rights in law is a critical factor in maintaining their subordination to men and limiting their access to divorce, property and inheritance. It is, however, not only their lack of rights in law but the impediments they face in exercising the rights they have.

In India, Muslim family laws after independence have remained virtually unchanged. Attempts at legislation or by the courts to expand women's rights outside the scope of Muslim family law have been vociferously opposed by representatives of the Muslim community who view it as a threat to their identity and existence. Their fears are not entirely unfounded. The rise of militant Hindu movements, the relentless communal violence especially in the 1990s and the systematic official neglect of Muslim interests by successive governments, have all added to their fears and sense of insecurity. Muslims in India continue to be amongst the poorest, least educated group in the country in addition to being discriminated against in public employment.⁴⁰ This has increasingly prevented them from full and equal economic, social and political participation in society.

This sense of insecurity amongst the Muslims has had an unfavorable impact upon Muslim women's rights in India. The Shahbano case in 1986 described earlier epitomises the difficulties in achieving equality

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and justice for women in India. Muslims interpreted it as an assault on the Shariat. The 'progressives' viewed it as another attempt by 'obscurantist' forces to deny women their rights. The Muslim Women's Act in 1986 was seen as another example of Indian state appeasement, political expedient behavior and a lack of conviction in moving towards a uniform civil code.

In this emotional debate, the role of the superior courts in India is difficult to judge. Could the judiciary have played a more positive role in rendering a more humane and equitable interpretation of the Shariat and through it enhancing rights of Muslim women? Would this have been more acceptable to the Muslim minority? The answer is difficult to provide but observations such as those of Justice Kuldip Singh of the Indian Supreme Court towards a uniform civil code quoted earlier, although music to the ear of so called 'progressive' forces, may indeed in the end do more harm than good by destroying the multiplicity of Indian society, culture and personal law.

In this, the Indian judiciary could well learn from some of their counterparts in Pakistan. Faced with the increasing reality of Islamisation, the superior judiciary has at times taken an enlightened view of Islamic law and afforded protection to rights of women based on the principle that Islam enshrines equal rights for both men and women. Yet, there is increasing evidence that the process of Islamisation started in the late 1970s by the dictator General Zia has restricted the role of the judiciary and the supremacy of fundamental rights as enshrined in the Constitution. The judges, as we have seen, have not been immune to the overall restrictive socio-political climate in which they function. Recent observations by judges of the higher courts and judgements have sent alarm bells ringing on what the future legal and judicial system holds for women's rights in Pakistan.

As I write this paper, the Federal Shariat Bench, headed by its Chief Justice, will start listening on 25 January 1999 a writ petition filed by religious scholars and religious political parties that the Muslim Family Law Ordinance of 1961—the most progressive legislation on protecting women's rights—is against the Quran and the Sunnah and should be repudiated.

Similarly, the 15th Amendment to the Constitution, which will make the Quran and Sunnah the supreme law of the land, has been passed by the National Congress. At present, as the Government does not have enough support to pass it through the Senate to make it into law, there are fears that

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after new elections to the Senate later in 1999, the government may possess the required majority.

What then will be the future role of the legislature and the judiciary in Pakistan? As a learned former Chief Justice of Pakistan Mohammed Yaqub Ali (my grandfather) wrote in an article in 1987 after his retirement:

Courts decide cases in accordance with the provisions of the prevalent laws enacted by the Parliament. If all cases, including suits, trials, applications, writ petitions are decided in accordance with the Shariat then not only the existing laws become redundant, there will be no occasion for the parliament to enact any law in the future. In other words the legislative bodies will become defunct. I with utmost difference beseech... not to impede the sovereignty of the Parliament which is the only link between the people of different regions and not to undermine the supremacy of the Constitution so that the democratic process in the country can flourish which in the altered political conditions of today can alone secure and preserve the integrity of Pakistan.⁴¹

The late Chief Justice Yaqub Ali understood the importance of the Parliament in interpreting religious texts in a manner that is not an impediment to human rights and freedom. Women must have representation in the process of making laws that affect their well being and the existence of a Constitution which is tractable to their evolving status in South Asia is essential to this endeavor. This involves crediting the South Asian polity with the insight to understand laws conducive to the economic and social development of its people. Shrewd games played by politicians and fundamentalists who posture to be the seers of religion shall inevitably be rejected by such a polity if the power remains within its hands through a democratic constitution.

Notes

¹ Much of this and the next section is based on Shaheen Sardar Ali's article "A Critical Review of Family Laws in Pakistan: a Women's Perspective," in Women's Law in Legal Education and Practice in Pakistan North South Cooperation, ed. Rubya Mehdi and Farida Shaheed (Denmark: New Social Science Monograph, 1997).

² Under sec. 7 of the MFLO the purpose of this provision of the law was to regulate the unilateral right of a Muslim husband to divorce his wife without assigning any reason for it. Sec. 7 was supposed to enable the Chairman of the Union Council to initiate conciliatory proceedings aimed at persuading the husband to withdraw his notice of divorce, in actual fact this clause has proved a mere formality. More recently, this provision has been used by former husbands who, after deliberately failing to send in the notice, claim that they are still married and sue the former wife (if she has remarried) of adultery.

³ That women may invoke as a ground for divorce under sec. 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act (DMMA), 1939. For details of ground for divorce under DMMA see p. 14.

⁴ option of puberty or '*khyar-ul-bulugh*' is the right of a person who was contracted in marriage by his/her guardian before she attained majority to seek nullity of the union. The Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939 incorporates in sec.2.

⁵ *Abdul Rahim vs. Shahida Khan* PLD 1984 SC 329.

⁶ *Surah Al-Baqarah* (2): Verse 229 of the Quran from where the concept, origin and legal basis of *khula* is derived.

⁷ PLD 1967 SC 144-145.

⁸ See for instance *Rafiq Hussain Shah vs. Imtiaz Bibi* 1990 CLC 30 and *Shabbir Hussain Shah vs. Razia Begum* PLD 1986 Azad J&K 73.

⁹ *Mst. Sayeeda Khanum vs. Mohammed Sami* PLD 1952 Lah. 113.

¹⁰ *Altafur Rehman vs. Nusrat Rashid* 1985 MLD 225.

¹¹ A Handbook on Family Law in Pakistan 125.

¹² *Ibid* 155.

¹³ *Aali vs. Additional District Judge-I Quetta* 1986 CLC 27.

¹⁴ Similarly, in PLJ 1986 Quetta 159 it was held that principles of Muslim jurisprudence enjoined upon the court the solemn duty to reasonably scrutinise plausibility; if any loose consideration or blanket author-

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ity was allowed to the wife this would frustrate the very purpose and object of regulating rights through the courts of law. See also *Raisa Begum vs. Muhammed Hussain* 1986 MLD 1418.

¹⁵ *Safia Begum vs. Khadim Hussain* 1985 CLC 1869.

¹⁶ *Bashiran vs. Mohammed* PLD 1988 SC 186.

¹⁷ PLD 1982 SC (AJ&K) 33.

¹⁸ Gazette of India, 1936, Part V, p. 154

¹⁹ K.N. Ahmed, "A commentary on the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act," published by Legal Publications, 77 Garden West, Karachi, 1955.

²⁰ This part draws heavily from Ali's article.

²¹ Ali comments that in over 700 cases she found raising guardianship and custody issues in superior courts of Pakistan, she took up for analysis around 265. Similarly, she came across more than a 1000 cases concerning substantive issues of dissolution of marriage, dower, divorce etc... On the other hand, she did not see more than 100 reported cases covering succession and inheritance.

²² See for instance, *Ghulam Ali v. Ghulam Sarwar Naqvi*, PLD 1990 SC 1.

²³ PLD 1990 SC1.

²⁴ PLD 1961 Peshawar 9.

²⁵ This verse runs thus:

"Men are the protectors
And maintainers of women,
Because *Allah* has given
The one more (strength)
Than the other, and because
They support them
From their means. Therefore the righteous women
Are devoutly obedient, and guard
In the husband's absence
What *Allah* have them guard.

²⁶ Lateef, 99.

²⁷ *Ibid*, 159-160.

²⁸ Kirti Singh, "The Constitution and Muslim Personal Law," in Forging Identities Gender, Communities and the State, ed. Zoya Hasan (New Delhi: Kali, 1994), 99.

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²⁹ 1979 (2) Supreme Court Reporter: p. 75.

³⁰ AIR 1980 Supreme Court 1930.

³¹ 1980 4 SCC 128.

³² AIR 1985 202.

³³ Zakia Pathak and Rajeswari Sunder Rajan, "Shahbano," in Feminists Theorise the Political, ed. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (New York: Routledge, 1992), 257.

³⁴ Shahida Lateef, "Defining Women through Legislation," in Forging Identities Gender, Communities and the State, ed. Zoya Hasan (New Delhi: Kali, 1994), 193.

³⁵ Pathak and Rajan 257.

³⁶ 1995 3 SCC 635.

³⁷ Mukhopadhyay 123-126.

³⁸ Ibid 124.

³⁹ Ibid 127.

⁴⁰ Zoya Hasan, "Minority Identity, State Policy and the Political Process," in Forging Identities Gender, Communities and the State, ed. Zoya Hasan (New Delhi: Kali, 1994), 66.

⁴¹ Chief Justice (retd.) Mohd. Yaqub Ali, "Ninth Amendment and the Private Shariat Bill," *Dawn*, December 6, 1987.

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The Master's Program is a small, selective program of graduate study that emphasizes comparative understanding of historical process. It is organized around colloquia in comparative and regional topics, the preparation of specific fields, and individual research in consultation with a faculty member. The program is designed both to prepare students for doctoral programs in history and to enhance the historical knowledge and interpretive skills of professionals working in secondary schools, libraries, foundations, and museums. In recent years, M.A. recipients have moved on to Ph.D. programs at Yale, Princeton, Brandeis, and Boston University

Programs in Museum Studies and History

The Tufts Museum Studies Program provides qualified, post-baccalaureate students with professional training in the administration, preservation, and interpretation skills required for a career in the museum field

For information contact:

Graduate Information, Department of History: Tufts University
Medford, MA 02155. E-Mail: jbrokeo@emerald.tufts.edu

Ph.D. Program

The Ph.D. program in history accepts only well-prepared students who intend to work closely with a particular Tufts faculty member in a limited range of fields. Training for the Doctorate in History is available presently in the following tracks:

Modern Spanish History.

Modern South Asian History.

East Asian History in World Perspective.



Tufts University Program in International Relations

Foreign Policy Analysis

Regional and Comparative Analysis

Global Conflict, Cooperation, and Justice

International Economics and Environment

Nationalism, Culture, and Identity

Tufts Program in International Relations was established in 1977 to prepare undergraduates for the rigors of graduate school in international affairs. It has succeeded well in its original mission and its graduates are accepted into all of the leading graduate schools of international affairs, as well as to top programs in law, political science, business and education.

In addition to traditional careers in foreign service, law, business, and banking, graduates of the Program have combined their interest in international affairs with those in the arts and humanities to pursue careers in film, journalism, performing arts, and cultural analysis. Perhaps the best measure of success has been the positive feedback from alumnae. Graduates report that the Program prepared them well for professional lives in global affairs, whether in the public, private, or non-profit sector.

The Program in International Relations delivers the hallmark of a Tufts education - small class sizes allowing for individual faculty attention to students. Drawing on the strengths of 15 departments and five related programs, the IR Program is fully integrated into the broader university mission of providing a liberal arts education. Nearly 40 percent of Tufts IR majors pursue a double-major with languages and economics the leading affiliated concentrations.

The IR Program strongly encourages its majors to supplement the undergraduate experience by participating in both Tufts and non-Tufts overseas studies programs. Study abroad not only facilitates completion of concentration requirements but also helps equip students with the linguistic, cultural, economic, political, and sociological skills necessary to succeed in today's rapidly changing world.

To find out more about Tufts University's Program in International Relations, please contact us at the address below.

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